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Propositions
1. e interaction between system-level behaviour and actions of individuals is
essential for understanding complex adaptive systems.
(this thesis)
2. Agent-based modelling is a suitable method for representing a real-world
case of sectoral knowledge management.
(this thesis)
3. For middle range agent-based models, plausibility provides adequate valida-
tion.
4. e Higgs particle would never have been discovered without expert valida-
tion.
5. In the current social media era, it is better to change the proverb “a problem
shared is a problem halved” into “a problem shared is a problemmultiplied”.
6. Writing and running both require three crucial qualities: talent, focus, and
endurance.
(adapted from Haruki Murakami)
7. A good mother needs to be big of heart and short of memory.
(Mrs Verwoerd, mother and foster mother of many children)
8. Bad decisions make good stories.
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Abstract
Complex adapative systems are characterized by multiple levels of be-haviour: the behaviour of individual components and the behaviour ofthe entire system. In this thesis we study this relationship by means of
agent-based models. By modelling individuals (agents) and their behaviour
only, and simulating this behaviour over time, we generate emerging patterns:
we did not explicitly put them in. We try to understand these patterns by reas-
oning back to individual level (multi-level analysis).
Our application domain is knowledge management in the pig sector.
Through a series of cases, we study the relationship between farmers’ decision
outcomes and their implications for the sector (bottom-up), and, vice versa,
the relationship between sector-wide interventions and their effect on farmers’
decision outcomes (top-down). Farmers make decisions based on knowledge,
which diffuses through the population. We develop our agent-based models
and the representation of knowledge throughout the thesis. Our final model is
applicable to not only the pig sector, but to any sector with autonomous suppli-
ers who need to make decisions based on criteria to be matched. A secondary
aim of this thesis is methodological: to convey the merits of applying agent-
based modelling to this type of multi-level research problem.
Our cases concern each farmer’s decision of which quality market to sup-
ply his pigs to (agent level). As outcome, we observe the spectrum of emer-
ging quality market shares (sector level). Knowledge is assumed to be a pre-
requisite for market entry, and defined as everything a farmer needs to know
to match the entrance criteria set by a market segment, as perceived by that
farmer. Knowledge management refers to both the individual farmer’s activit-
ies to coordinate a market’s criteria with his own options, and the activities at
sector level to influence all farmers’ decision behaviour.
One case addresses reproducing a well-known sector-level phenomenon
(the pork cycle) by modelling individuals only. Other cases study the effect
on emerging market shares of experimenting with agent-level properties: the
amount of available knowledge and the conditions under which knowledge
can be exchanged, and knowledge quality. The last case investigates the effect
of experimenting with sector-level properties on individual farmer behaviour:
two different policy interventions, and variations in demand. We apply multi-
level analysis to seek explanations for emergent patterns in terms of individual
farmer behaviour. Expert validation is used to evaluate the plausibility ofmodel
outcomes and explanations with respect to the real world.
v
Results show that (1) the presence of sufficient knowledge in the system
is more important than the network structure between knowledge exchanging
agents for emerging qualitymarket shares; (2) efficient knowledgemanagement
increases quality, but there is a limit to that efficiency; and (3) imposing policies
on a sector the hard way is not necessarily more effective than making gradual
changes, while the latter is more friendly for the individuals. Multi-level ana-
lysis proves to give added value to the results: in two cases, an unexpected pat-
tern in model outcomes occurred, for which multi-level analysis could provide
an explanation in model terms. Judged by the experts, the explanation for one
of the patterns was deemed plausible in reality.
In conclusion we can say that both varying individual properties and vary-
ing system-level properties result in responsive behaviour that can be explained
in model terms, and that is to some extent plausible in reality. Knowledge rep-
resentation power appears to differ per model. Dependent on the aim of the
model, representation power can be kept deliberately modest (as in the pork
cycle model), or can be rich (as in the final model, that allows representing dif-
ferent types of knowledge). We believe that the representation power of agent-
based models make them sufficiently suitable to represent a real-world case,
as long as the model has a well-defined purpose. We recommend agent-based
modelling as amethod, withmulti-level analysis providing added value. We be-
lieve that extending this line of research is promising for any discipline where
complex adaptive systems are object of study, of which knowledgemanagement
is an example.
vi
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Op een ochtend liepen de eekhoorn en de mier door het bos.‘Waar gaan we eigenlijk heen?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
‘Naar de verte,’ zei de mier.
‘O,’ zei de eekhoorn.
Het was een mooie dag en ze liepen het bos uit, de verte in.
‘De wereld is zó groot, eekhoorn...’ zei de mier.
‘Ja,’ zei de eekhoorn.
‘En hoe verder je loopt hoe groter hij wordt,’ zei de mier.
De eekhoorn zweeg.
‘Dus eigenlijk,’ ging de mier verder, ‘als je maar altijd doorloopt is
hij oneindig groot.’
De eekhoorn knikte, maar hij wist niet wat oneindig was en hij
geloofde niet dat iemand altijd zou kunnen doorlopen. Hij dacht zo
diep mogelijk na. Als ik ga zitten, dacht hij, zou de wereld dan weer
kleiner worden? En als ik dan altijd blijf zitten?
Hij vond dat een ingewikkelde gedachte en besloot alleen nog
maar om zich heen te kijken.
One morning the squirrel and the ant were walking throughthe forest.
‘By the way, where are we going?’ the squirrel asked.
‘To the distance,’ the ant said.
‘Oh,’ said the squirrel.
It was a beautiful day and they walked out of the forest, into
the distance.
‘It’s a big world, squirrel...’ the ant said.
‘It is,’ said the squirrel.
‘And the further you walk, the bigger it gets,’ the ant said.
The squirrel said nothing.
‘So in fact,’ the ant continued, ‘if you just keep on walking
forever, it is infinitely big.’
The squirrel nodded, but he didn’t know what infinitely was
and he didn’t think that anyone could keep walking forever. He
thought as deeply as he could. What if I sat down, he thought,
would the world become smaller again? And what if I sat down
forever?
He found that a complicated thought and decided he would
just look around from now on.
Preface to Chapter 1
Introduction
Op een ochtend besloot de tor de wereld op te tillen.Dat is weer eens wat anders, dacht hij.
Hij haalde diep adem en tilde de wereld op.
Alle dieren werden door elkaar geschud, alle bomen kraakten
en ruisten, de rivier stroomde leeg en enorme golven sloegen over
het strand.
‘Hola!’ riep iedereen. ‘Wat gebeurt er?’
De tor hoorde het geroep wel, maar hij zweeg. De wereld
optillen en tegelijk praten, dat was te veel voor hem.
Zachtjes schommelde de wereld op zijn zwarte schouders heen
en weer.
De dieren renden en vlogen naar de open plek in het bos en
vroegen elkaar wat er aan de hand was.
Niemand wist het.
One morning the beetle decided to lift the world.That makes for a nice change, he thought.
He took a deep breath and lifted the world.
All the animals were jostled around, all the trees groaned and
rustled, the river emptied out, and enormous waves swept the
beach.
‘Ho!’ everyone yelled. ‘What’s going on?’
Though the beetle heard them yelling, he kept silent. Lifting
the world and talking at the same time was too much for him.
The world rocked gently on his black shoulders.
The animals ran and fluttered towards the clearing in the
woods and asked each other what was going on.
Nobody knew.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis may best be introduced by an analogy. I have been achamber choir singer for most of my life, performing in countless choralconcerts, often in series of more than one performance of the same mu-
sic. Two performances are never the same. One concert, everything is perfect:
choir members, conductor, and the audience are thrilled because something
happened that nobody can really define. Explanations range from ‘all the notes
came out right’, ‘the atmosphere was present’, to ‘we could communicate what it
was all about’. The next concert, even when things did not evidently go wrong,
the evaluation of the concert may be completely different, having to do with
causes like: ‘we had to work too hard this time’, or ‘the music was not flowing’,
to ‘we did not connect with each other’. From these phrases, we can deduce that
it is hard to even define a ‘good performance’. The elements needed to describe
a successful performance are hard to measure and ambiguous: every person
involved would probably evaluate a concert in different terms. Still it is there,
nobody doubts of its existence.
In terms of this thesis, a concert is a complex adaptive system. It is complex
because no-one can predict in advancewhat will happen during a concert given
what we put in. It is adaptive because the participants can respond to what they
observe or to clues they get from others. And it is a system in the sense that it
is ‘the whole thing’, consisting of separate components that are all interacting
or related to at least one other component (Scholten, 2008). The quality of a
concert is an emergent property: it can be aimed for, but it cannot be explicitly
controlled, and it cannot be produced without fail like a standard product in a
factory. Instead, it self-organizes: it develops as it happens.
An interesting property of a complex adaptive system is that it canmanifest
a tipping point: the point atwhich a series of small changes or incidents becomes
significant enough to cause a larger, more important change. A tipping point
is often irreversible; it is very hard or even impossible to return back to the
previous state. In the choir analogy, a tipping point occurs when a piece of
music modulates from one key to another. The audience hears it coming: there
are some harmonic changes, some voices already sing notes that ‘itch’ a little,
and then suddenly it has happened, the entire choir sings in a new key. Once
the modulation is complete, the new key feels like a ‘homecoming’. The old
key is already forgotten, and can only be brought back if the music explicitly
develops back there.
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What interests us is themultiple-level perspective: the relationship between
the emerging total performance and the behaviour of individual components,
in this case the individuals involved. Can we identify regularities in concert
quality, and canwe trace these back towhatwas going onwith certain constitut-
ing components? In the choir analogy, there is usually a conductor who directs
the choir, and usually choir members behave according to what the conductor
indicates. In many complex adaptive systems, there is no such conductor, nor
a master plan or a grand scheme. Many examples of conductor-less emerging
patterns exist in everyday life. No entity hierarchically controls the way ants
wander in a forest, and yet patterns like neat ant rows emerge, not to mention
their intricate housing systemwhich theymeticulously buildwithout a building
contractor. We can observe a V-shape pattern in the sky from a flock of geese
starting tomigrate south in autumn, and by taking a closer look at the relatively
simple behavioural rules the birds adhere to, we can understand why the pat-
tern emerges. In this thesis we do a similar thing: bymodelling individuals and
their behaviour only, we generate patterns that we did not explicitly put in, and
that we try to understand by reasoning back to individual level. We give our
individuals their rules of behaviour, we let the system create conditions within
which they have to operate, they act according to those rules and conditions,
and together they create system-level patterns.
The focus in this thesis is on the role of knowledge as an instrument for
individuals’ decisionmaking. A choir conductor gives plenty of information to
the choir members: rhythm and pace, but also gestures and facial expressions
indicating in what style to sing the next phrase. Although it may seem that
there is little decision freedom in a choir, still there are many occasions where
choir members make decisions. For instance, they decide how loud or how ex-
pressive to sing a phrase, or where exactly to place a consonant. A conductor
can give clues as to the desired dynamics, but cannot control every individual’s
voice. Choir members also take clues from neighbouring singers, for example
on the pitch of the tone. Is it perhaps slightly too high or too low comparedwith
what others do? A good singer listens to his or her neighbours, and singers con-
tinually adjust their sound to each other. Not every singer is equally inclined,
sensitive, or capable to catch and respond to clues from others. The heterogen-
eity of the singers is another element relevant for this thesis: when modelling
individuals is important, then it is also important to have an eye for individual
differences. A choir consisting of identical singers would sound strangely arti-
ficial; it is the diversity that gives a choir its sound and character. For example,
a piece of music sang by an English boy choir sounds very different from the
same music sang by a chamber choir consisting of adults.
Whatmight be helpful to study the relationship between patterns emerging
over time and the behaviour of individuals involved, is to repeat the exercise
over and over again. If we sang the same concert a hundred times, surely we
would gain understanding of what produces a good performance. In reality,
this is an unpractical, costly and tedious thing to do, if it is even an option.
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What we can do instead is simulate the phenomenon in a computer model and
run it as many times as we want, observing and inspecting individual beha-
viour as much as desired. The challenge in this case is to make the simulation
model as rich as is necessary to capture the essential elements of the real world
case, but also to keep it sparse, or we would no longer be able to relate changes
in model inputs to outcomes. This is a secondary aim of this thesis: to pay at-
tention to methodological issues. These include abstraction and selection of
real world phenomena into a model without losing the representation power
needed to draw any conclusions from that model; how to develop and extend
such a model while ensuring that former model results are still comparable
with new ones; how to handle results from multiple runs and the sensitivity of
model parameters to those results; and validity issues, i.e. the question whether
results have any relevance for the real world.
1.1 Complex adaptive systems and agent-based models
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) is considered one of the first scientific
discussions on complex adaptive systems. Smith describes the ‘invisible hand’
in economics: the phenomenon that the freemarket, without regulation, guides
market participants to trade in a mutually beneficial manner, given that every
individual trader interacts with other traders and that they all dowhat is in their
best self-interest. In fact, Smith recognized the emergence of market struc-
tures that no-one explicitly intended. Complex adaptive systems as a research
area started around the 1960s. In the field of theoretical computing, Von Neu-
mann developed ideas leading to cellular automata, a collection of cells on a
grid that could change their state according to strict rules, thus generating pat-
terns (von Neumann, 1966). The concept of cellular automata became wider-
known after it was used in the 1970s in Conway’s game of life, or life, in short
(Gardner, 1970).
Also in the 1970s, social scientists proposed abstract models to study so-
cial science related problems, of whom Schelling was a pioneer. To illustrate
the simple beauty of these models, I will explain in a little more detail his se-
gregation model (Schelling, 1971). In the segregation model, coloured (‘green’
and ‘red’) households are randomly placed on squares of a grid. Households
can observe the colour of their neighbouring households, represented by the
eight cells adjacent to their own. At each point in time, households count their
neighbours of opposite colour. When the number of opposite coloured neigh-
bours exceeds an adjustable threshold (which is amodel parameter), the house-
hold decides to move and relocates to a random empty cell. Schelling’s model
showed how easy it is to generate segregation in an area; in fact that segregation
according to these assumptions always arises - regardless of initial distribution
- when the threshold is 0.3 or higher. Using these models was a novel way of
gaining understanding of processes such as segregation: earlier models of the
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same problemwere based on equations relatingmigration flows and the relative
values of residential properties, involvingmore parameters to estimate and ana-
lyse, whereas Schelling’s model had only one parameter and was ‘growing’ the
process from bottom-up (Gilbert, 2008). Schelling modelled many such basic
social processes, among which - returning to the choir analogy - the standing
ovation problem: to understand how waves of audience standing up seem to
arise spontaneously (Schelling, 1978; Miller and Page, 2004).
These early models from a bottom-up perspective were theoretical exer-
cises, at the most tried on paper (the Von Neumann machine, cellular auto-
mata) or acted out in real life (Axelrod, 1997) let conference participants act
out his model of the prisoner’s dilemma). When computers entered the room
of the common researcher, these models were further developed in the form
of computational simulation models, opening a whole new era of complex ad-
aptive systems research. Early computer scientists include Stephen Wolfram,
who studied cellular automata by means of computer simulations (Wolfram,
1984). In the early 1990s, dedicated computer environments such as Starlogo,
Swarm, Mason, Repast and Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999) facilitated that this type
of modelling as a method came within reach of researchers of a wide range of
disciplines (Bonabeau, 2002).
The term agent-based modelling, as the computer simulations researchers
called it, was by then generally associated with complex adaptive systems re-
search, defined byGilbert as “a computationalmethod that enables a researcher
to create, analyse and experiment withmodels composed of agents that interact
within an environment” (Gilbert, 2008, p. 2). The agent-based modelling com-
munity consists of groups of various flavours. The term multi-agent system is
generally reserved for agent-based models whose goal is primarily to focus on
explaining collective behaviour of relatively simple agents who behave accord-
ing to certain rules, such as the ant and geese flock examples and Schelling’s
model, rather than to focus on the design of the agents themselves (Niazi and
Hussain, 2011). The term intelligent agent is used in areas where the population
aspect is absent, such as the design of one or few agents in technical discip-
lines like robotics, or an autonomous piece of intelligent software (for example
to scour the internet for cheap flight tickets). In ecology and biology the term
individual-based model used to be preferred over agent-based model but the
fact that Grimm and Railsback renamed their standard book individual-based
modeling (Grimm and Railsback, 2005) to agent-based and individual-based
modeling (Railsback and Grimm, 2012) indicates that differences are fading.
Application domains for agent-basedmodels nowadays range from biology
to computer science and from economics to sociology. Notable contributors to
the field - and leading authorities - include Epstein and Axtell (Epstein and
Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 2006) with their emphasis on growing artificial societies,
Miller and Page (2007) from a general computational perspective, Railsback
and Grimm (2012) from an ecological view, and Gilbert (2008) from sociology.
Methodological aspects are also discussed in e.g. (Garcia and Jager) on innova-
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tion diffusion, in (Squazzoni et al., 2013) on heterogeneity and themicro-macro
relationship, in (Troitzsch, 2013a, 2014) on how to handle simulations and ana-
lysis. A generous, high-quality source of and outlet for social science related
applications is the free, online Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simu-
lation (JASSS, 2015). Axelrod and Tesfatsion actively maintain a comprehens-
ive website on agent-based models in social science and economics (Axelrod
and Tesfatsion, 2015). There is a growing number of conferences and seminars
for complex adaptive systems related research, e.g. Artificial Economics (Arti-
ficial Economics, 2015); European Social Simulation Association (ESSA, 2015);
Autonomous Agents & Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS, 2015). There are several
lively internet discussion groups as well where both new and well-known con-
tributors discuss current topics, e.g. the discussion group on computer simu-
lation in the social sciences (SimSoc, 2015). Wageningen University maintains
a complex adaptive systems Facebook group.
1.2 Thesis objective
The objective of this thesis is to study what knowledge management at indi-
vidual level implies for knowledge management at sector level, and vice versa.
More specifically, within the complex adaptive systems domain of knowledge
management, we1 study the relationship between patterns emerging at sector
level and behaviour of individual actors. We explore this relationship bymeans
of a series of agent-based modelling cases of situations where suppliers are
matched with available markets. Another objective is to highlight methodo-
logical aspects of this research approach, and to evaluate how suitable agent-
based modelling as a method is to represent knowledge and multi-level know-
ledge management. This objective is relevant in the sense that including a
multi-level perspective in knowledge management (1) adds insight in the field
of knowledge management, and (2) evaluates agent-based modelling as a can-
didatemethod for the toolbox available to knowledgemanagement researchers.
In this thesis, supplier and market are applied to cases in an SME sector,
specifically the pig sector: we model farmers who select a market segment to
supply their pigs to. Our final model is generic in the sense that it is applicable
to any situation where suppliers with certain characteristics are matched with
customers who set criteria, for example in other supply chain domains or at
the job market. An important assumption is that the suppliers are autonom-
ous in their decision making and not under control of a larger organization as
employees in a firm would be. From section 1.3.2 on, we assume ‘farmer’ for
‘supplier’ and ‘pig quality market segment’ for ‘market’. We define markets as
the set of available market segments, each of which is well-defined in terms of
the products, of the processes and resources used, and of a set of (legal and cer-
1In Chapters 1, 2 and 9 (and in the summary), whenever I say “we”, I also refer to my co-authors
of the other chapters of this thesis.
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tification) requirements and conditions thatmust be satisfied in order to supply
there. The pattern of interest - to which to relate individual behaviour - is in
most of our cases the emerging division of market shares: the proportion of
farmers that selects a particular market segment.
As far as we know, knowledge management has not previously been an ex-
plicit object of study bymeans of agent-basedmodelling. Grundspenkis (2007)
models enterprise and personal knowledge with an intelligent system that ac-
quires, formalizes, represents and stores knowledge as in an artificial brain. The
agents in his multi-agent systems represent parts of this artificial brain. There
are several other studies like Grundspenkis, using software agents to manage
organizational knowledge (Yu and Singh, 2002; Smirnov et al., 2003; Lacher
and Koch, 2000). Chira et al. (2006) model heterogeneous individuals in a dis-
tributed extended enterprise, aiming at optimizing the design, manufacturing
andmarketing of products based on the knowledge of multiple employees. The
agents cooperate to achieve enterprise-level goals; they are no autonomous de-
cision makers who each maintain a business. Wang et al. (2009) come closest
to our research because they also use an agent-based simulation model (not an
intelligent agent model) in which they model both individual behaviour and
organizational interventions. However, employees’ behaviour in this model is
determined by whether they are ‘knowledge contributors’ or not, and it is as-
sumed that employees concentrate on the organization’s interest. We intend to
not explicitly model a shared group-interest, but to let group-outcome emerge
from individual-oriented behaviour.
1.3 Information management versus knowledge
management
Our notion of knowledge management combines elements from the academic
fields of information management and knowledge management. The essence
of agent-based modelling is that only the behaviour of individuals is modelled,
from which generic patterns emerge. This does not naturally agree with how
information management is typically defined, which is from a top-down per-
spective. Information management usually involves information systems, em-
bedded in a managerial context, and is typically aimed at centralized decision
making in larger firms involvingmultiple employees, for example tomakework
flow processesmore uniform or efficient (Laudon and Laudon, 2014). Informa-
tion systems that have a broader than organization’s focus, e.g. thewhole supply
chain, tend to limit themselves to specific applications (Beulens, 2013).
Informationmanagement is usually prescriptive of nature, and assumes that
people always perform activities with the organization’s interest inmind. How-
ever, people are autonomous beings who work from their own local perspect-
ive, doing the things that are central in their own world, which is only partly
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overlapping with the organization’s world. Wilson (1997) defines information
management from a perspective that comes closer to this latter notion:
Information management is the application of management prin-
ciples to the acquisition, organization, control, dissemination and
use of information relevant to the effective operation of organiz-
ations of all kinds. ‘Information’ here refers to all information of
value, whether having their origin inside or outside the organiz-
ation, including data resources, such as production data; records
and files related, for example, to the personnel function; market
research data; and competitive intelligence from a wide range of
sources. Information management deals with the value, quality,
ownership, use and security of information in the context of or-
ganizational performance
In this definition the term ‘information’ primarily refers to data, and in-
formation management is concerned with maintaining and protecting this
data, so the technological focus of information management is highlighted.
Knowledge management, according to Wilson, started out as a new term with
approximately the same meaning as information management, but at least the
term itself acknowledges the fact that people must interpret the information
before they can do anything with it. Wilson therefore argues that knowledge
management consists of (1) information management and (2) management of
work practices. About the latter he assumes that this can only work well in a
situation where “the benefits of information exchange are shared by all”, and
“where individuals are given autonomy in the development of their expertise”,
or in other words when organizations allow for “sharing knowledge and en-
abling people to use their creativity in innovative ways” (Wilson, 2002).
In 2002 Wilson believed that his assumptions for knowledge management
require a utopian situation that we are a long way removed from. However,
nowadays, knowledge management has developed into a mature area of re-
search. Today, knowledge management deals with making knowledge under-
standable and available to all people involved, manageable by computers, and
easy to maintain or improve (Scholten, 2008, p. 44). This is the technical per-
spective of what knowledge management is. The practical challenge is that
people must be able to use it. It implies that building a knowledge base or
ontology is a bottom-up process, emerging within a population of its users,
changing over time and, undoubtedly still utopian, open and transparent to
those involved.
In our research we combine the technological ‘data’-oriented meaning of
information management and the behavioural notion of knowledge manage-
ment as in knowledge sharing and learning. In this thesis, both the terms ‘in-
formation management’ and ‘knowledge management’ refer to this combined
definition. In the sub paragraphs below we zoom in on knowledge, decision
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making behaviour and management to indicate how we apply these concepts
in our research.
1.3.1 Knowledge
In this thesis, knowledge is defined as everything a supplier needs to know to
match the entrance criteria set by a market segment, as perceived by that sup-
plier, and instrumental in his/her2 decision making process. We leave implicit
that this required knowledge is of heterogeneous nature. It represents factual
knowledge, for example regarding requirements with respect to the product it-
self and the manufacturing process of the product. It also represents skills and
know-how that require experience to build up. It represents personal capabil-
ities. It represents constraints to a supplier’s options, for example access to fin-
ancial resources needed to invest. It represents the available ‘action repertoire’
that a supplier has at his disposal, enabled or constrained by factors beyond
our concern. Throughout the thesis, the terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’
are used interchangeably, both referring to the definition given here.
Knowledge is shared between individuals and diffuses over a population.
We stated ‘as perceived by the supplier’, meaning that even when knowledge
seems easy to share, like factual knowledge, still one receiver attaches different
meaning to this piece of knowledge than another (Brown and Duguid, 2002).
This also implies that not all knowledge is equally transferrable to others.
The notion that knowledge is transferrable to others within a population of
individuals belongs to the theory of diffusion of innovations by Rogers (1962,
2003). This theory is often used within the agent-based modelling research
community, and iconic examples are widely available (Wilensky, 1999), as well
as specific applications such as opinion dynamics (Delre et al., 2010; Deffuant
et al., 2002). Dependent on initial conditions like the amount of starting points
(seeds) of the innovation, conditions for adoption and the speed of the decision
process, the model provides insight into the rate at which an innovation (or an
opinion) gets adopted in a population. When the innovation is interpreted as
for example ‘technology’, or ‘managerial hype’, this is also applicable to know-
ledge: it starts somewhere, and at a certain speed and at a certain rate it gets
adopted by the population. Given the initial amount of knowledge, the condi-
tions under which knowledge can be exchanged, and the connections between
individuals, this will emerge to a population where some have this particular
knowledge and others do not.
A complication with respect to knowledge sharing is that knowledge can
refer to so-called ‘tacit knowledge’, or hidden knowledge, hidden even from the
consciousness of the person who owns this knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). Polanyi
summarizes this as: “We know more than we can tell”. In information techno-
2Whenever I refer to a supplier or farmer as ‘he’ in the remainder of this thesis, it could equally
well be ‘she’. Both in China and in the Netherlands, I met many female pig farmers.
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logy, this type of knowledge is recognized as very valuable knowledge (‘expert
knowledge’) that should be made explicit and put to use for the benefit of the
entire organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), even though this is very dif-
ficult (Turban et al., 2007). In our notion of knowledge, ‘skills and know-how’
fit in this category. Knowledge of this type cannot simply be exchanged with
others, but needs time to build up. From our modelling perspective, our defin-
ition of knowledge assumes that knowledge and skills are a joint concept, and
that it also includes knowing how to operationalize this.
1.3.2 Decision making behaviour
The behaviour of the farmer in this context boils down to his decision of what
market to supply to. Wolfert has applied De Leeuw’s framework (de Leeuw,
2000) to the farmer context before (Wolfert, 2002, p. 42). De Leeuw mentions
five conditions for effective management control: a management objective for
the total system, amodel of the production system, information on the environ-
ment and production system, potential control measures, and an information
processing capacity. To be able to decide which market to choose requires that
the farmer has all relevant knowledge at his disposal, and that he has the flex-
ibility and means to actually take that decision. The management objective is
presumed to be to safeguard continuity and to make a profit; the production
system is reduced here to farm characteristics; information on the environ-
ment and production system is interpreted as the collection of knowledge in
the broad sense (described in the previous paragraph), either in possession of
the farmer or reaching him through exchange with other individuals; potential
control measures are the option to choose for another market segment, and the
information processing capacity is the decision mechanism of the farmer.
The decision mechanism of the farmer is not that of the rational man who
consciously considers all alternative options, as homo economicus. Instead,
farmers are social creatures that make their decisions within a context of other
decision-makers. They exhibit bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), meaning
that they take on a satisficing rather than an optimizing approach. Kahneman
adds to this that people act according to their cognitive abilities (Kahneman,
2003). The satisficing approach also implies that not only cognitive abilities, but
time, resources or personal circumstances constrain decision making (Keen
and Scott Morton, 1978). Jager and Janssen (2012) propose Consumat, a set
of four decision strategies based on their consumers studies: repetition (do as
you always do), imitation (do as your close peers do), inquiring (study what all
peers do and do as the majority do), and optimizing (calculate all alternatives
and choose the best). It is plausible to assume that farmers use similar kinds
of heuristics when they make the decision of what market to opt for. There is
ample evidence from sociology that farmers in real life are not all rational, con-
scious, individual decision makers (Commandeur, 2006; van der Ploeg, 2010),
and that their decisions are influenced by interactions with other farmers, farm
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advisors, farm suppliers, veterinaries, and others (Bock and Van Huik, 2007;
Jansen and Vellema, 2011). The extent to which farmers are influenced by oth-
ers differs per individual (McCrae and Costa, 2003). In this thesis, studying
decision making in itself is not an explicit aim.
1.3.3 Management, or influencing decision behaviour
The term knowledge management in a model of behaviour of individuals re-
quires a multi-level explanation. One managerial level is that of the individual
famer. In line with De Leeuw’s management framework, the farmer needs to
manage his knowledge and apply it in order to make a market decision, which
includes a coordination aspect ofmatching the potential market’s requirements
with what the farmer has to offer. In our research context, a farmer’s individual
management comes down to having an adequate representation for his know-
ledge, and a decision mechanism for how to choose a particular market based
on that knowledge.
There is also management at sector level from a policy perspective, for ex-
ample from the government. Even though farmers are autonomous decision
makers, they need to comply with the law. When the law changes, they have
to adapt their behaviour accordingly. A government can exert power by alter-
ing requirements for farmers. A Dutch example is the law on housing of sows,
which was changed because of animal welfare concerns, and became effective
as of January 2013. This law entailed that pregnant sows should no longer be
individually housed and tethered, but should be held in groups with a minimal
spatial requirement and with some additional requirements. The resulting reg-
ulation implied that all farmers needed to invest in their housing system and
change their management practice. In a similar way, farmers can be influenced
by the sector to voluntarily change behaviour, to which they may be more or
less sensitive. An example is that farmers may choose to voluntarily meet ad-
ditional requirements in order to obtain a quality certificate enabling them to
produce for the organic market. A sectoral body can stimulate this by influen-
cing farmers, for example by informing them about certification requirements,
thus increasing their knowledge or improving its quality. As a result, farmers
may successfully undergo required audits and acquire the necessary certificates
to actually change to another market concept.
In summary, knowledge management in this thesis is applied as follows.
Knowledge management at farmer level implies influencing farmers’ personal
knowledge base as a basis for decision making. Knowledge management at
population level implies influencing the way knowledge diffuses through the
farmer population or the quality of that knowledge. From a policy perspect-
ive, knowledge management implies influencing requirements a farmer has to
meet, either to comply with the law or to enter another market. Our research
questions link to these levels of knowledge management.
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An important issue is how to represent knowledge under these assump-
tions, how to design the agent-based models such that they allow multiple-
level inspection, and how to elaborate these managerial issues in our selection
of cases. Both the representation and design issues and the multi-level analysis
issue develop throughout the thesis.
1.4 Research questions
From the research objective the following research questions are derived, each
consisting of two sub-questions:
1. What is the relationship between sector-level knowledgemanagementmeas-
ures (top-down), actions of individuals, and the system behaviour resulting
from these actions (bottom-up) in the context of a sector of autonomous
suppliers, specifically applied to the case of pig farmers?
a) What is the effect of agent-level variations with respect to knowledge
management on total system behaviour?
b) What is the effect of system-level interventions on agent behaviour and
total system behaviour?
2. How suitable is agent-based modelling as a method for representing a real-
world case of sectoral knowledge management?
a) Representation: How well does the design of the agent-based model
permit representing knowledge management and representing the
multiple levels of the real-world case?
b) Validity: Do the evaluated simulation results lead to increased under-
standing of the interdependence of emerging system behaviour and
individual agent behaviour in the real-world case?
1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of three parts. Part I (General introduction) consists of this
introduction (Chapter 1), the methodology of our research (Chapter 2), and a
pilot study (Chapter 3). This pilot study was our first attempt to model decision
behaviour of individual farmers and the emerging pattern of quality markets
they chose. The model was very dense and essentially a ‘black box’: we could
relate observed outcomes to our chosen inputs, but because of the richness of
the model we could not easily explain this relationship. After this exercise, we
decided to make our models as sparse as we could, so that we could learn more
from their behaviour.
Part II (Cases) contains the cases we studied next, using sparsermodels that
were, as a trade-off, also more abstract in representation. Chapter 4 describes
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the first case. Before doing anything more elaborate, we wanted to demon-
strate whether we could regenerate a generally known pattern by modelling
individual behaviour only. We took the classical pork cycle as an example, the
sector-level phenomenon of periodic over- and under-supply due to delay and
non-optimal predictions, and used information in a simple form as ameans for
the farmers to make predictions. Chapter 5 describes the next case, in which
we wanted to make a more elaborate representation of knowledge. We varied
the amount of knowledge going round in the farmer population, and we varied
the network structures between farmers, to see whether the resulting pattern
of quality market choices changed according to what we expected. In Chapter
6 we study the effect of increasing knowledge quality. What if we maintain
only knowledge that is of high value to us? In Chapter 7, we describe the last
case: this time we modelled two policy interventions and compared what the
implications were for individual farmers.
Part III (Synthesis) begins with a synthesis chapter (Chapter 8), in which
cases are revisited andmethodological aspects are highlighted. Model assump-
tions are explicitly grounded in theory, experiments are repeated more thor-
oughly, and additional multi-level analyses provide added insight in the rela-
tionship between sector and individual levels. In this chapter we also perform
expert validation, to find out how plausible our results, patterns and explan-
ations are with respect to the real world. The synthesis part concludes with
Chapter 9, which answers the research questions and provides a general discus-
sion. Answers for research question 1 relate directly to results from the cases.
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 address research question 1a: we observed sector-level
differences after we made agent-level variations. The cases from Chapters 3, 5
and 7 address research question 1b: the effect of sector-level interventions on
behaviour of individuals. Answering research question 2a requires compar-
ing how we represented knowledge throughout our cases, and what we learned
from these successive representations. Research question 2b can be answered
by what we learned from all our cases and synthesis.
Models and summarized results of our work can be found at: harmoni-
qua.wur.nl/OsingaPhDthesis.
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Preface to Chapter 2
Research methodology
T oen de eekhoorn eens sliep in het hoge gras aan de oevervan de vaart, vroeg de goudvis aan de reiger: ‘Wat is er aan
de hand met jou? Je laat me zo rustig zwemmen vandaag.’
‘Ach...’ zei de reiger.
‘Ben je ziek?’ vroeg de goudvis. ‘Dat lijkt me niks voor jou.’
‘Nee,’ zei de reiger. Hij zuchtte en ging verder: ‘Ik heb je wel
honderd keer opgegeten...’
‘Ik denk wel duizend keer,’ zei de goudvis. ‘Maar goed, ga
verder.’
‘Wel duizend keer,’ zei de reiger. ‘En als ik je net op heb ben
ik ook wel heel tevreden. Maar nog geen uur later heb ik al weer
honger en zie ik je hier weer zwemmen. Het lijkt wel of er nooit
een eind aan komt...’
[...]
‘Goed dan,’ zei de goudvis en hij liet zich voor de laatste keer
naar binnen slokken. ‘Als het hierna dan ook echt afgelopen is...’
riep hij nog toen hij door de lange kronkelige hals van de reiger
gleed.
One day when the squirrel was asleep in the high grasson the banks of the canal, the goldfish asked the heron: ‘Is
something wrong? You are letting me swim so peacefully today.’
‘Oh...’ the heron said.
‘Aren’t you feeling well?’ said the goldfish. ‘That doesn’t seem
like you.’
‘No,’ the heron said. He sighed and continued: ‘I’ve eaten you
at least a hundred times...’
‘A thousand times at least,’ the goldfish said. ‘But never mind,
go on.’
‘A thousand times,’ the heron said. ‘And after I’ve eaten you I
feel very satisfied. But less than an hour later I’m already hungry
again, and I see you swimming around back here. There just
seems no end to it...’
[...]
‘All right then,’ the goldfish said, and he let himself be swal-
lowed for the last time. ‘As long as it’s really over after this...’ he
cried, as he slipped down the heron’s long, twisting neck.
Chapter 2
Research methodology
In this thesis we apply the design research approach in an informa-tion systems context as proposed by Hevner (Hevner et al., 2004; Hevner,2007), see Figure 2.1. Hevner defines design research as the “building and
evaluation of artefacts designed to meet the identified business need” (Hevner
et al., 2004, p. 80). This artefact is what he considers the result of design re-
search. As artefact qualify “the constructs, models, and methods applied in the
development and use of information systems”. The artefact “must be described
effectively, enabling its implementation and application in an appropriate do-
main”. The artefacts do not need to be full-grown information systems used in
practice, so long as they provide a proof of feasibility of what can be accom-
plished. By these definitions we assume that our agent-based simulation mod-
els serve as artefacts to address a certain organizational problem or business
need. In our case, this need is to understand the multi-level aspect of know-
ledge management in the context of our domain. A methodological aim is to
evaluate whether agent-basedmodelling is a suitablemethod to fulfil that need.
Hevner proposes three design research cycles that must be present and
clearly identifiable in a design science research project (Figure 2.1). One is
the relevance cycle, bridging the “environment of the research project with the
design science activities”. Another one is the rigour cycle, connecting the design
research activities with the “knowledge base of scientific foundations, exper-
ience, and expertise that informs the research project”. The third one is the
central design cycle, which “iterates between the core activities of building and
evaluating the design artefacts and processes in the research”. They are called
cycles because they can be alternated and iterated.
Figure 2.2 shows how the thesis chapters fit in these three research cycles:
relevance to the left, rigour to the right, and design in the middle. The in-
troduction in Chapter 1 starts off in the relevance cycle by introducing why
our research is relevant at all. It justifies the objective (why our multi-level
approach adds insight to the field of knowledge management and why agent-
based modelling is a suitable candidate method to be added to the knowledge
management researcher’s toolbox) and the research questions themselves that
are derived from this objective. Chapter 1 deals with the rigour cycle as well,
since a connection is made with existing scientific theories and practice. This is
whyChapter 1 also appears on the right hand rigour side. The sameholds for the
present chapter, Chapter 2. It starts out with describing themethodology of the
thesis, which clearly belongs to the rigour cycle. Prior to the cases, a field study
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Figure 2.1: Hevner’s design science research cycles (after Hevner et al., 2004;
Hevner, 2007).
was carried out in China, which is briefly described first. This field study be-
longs to the relevance cycle on the left hand side, because the everyday reality of
Chinese pig farmers that I came to know quite well triggered this very research.
The remainder of this chapter explains how the cases relate to each other, and
why the next case makes sense as a follow-up to the previous one. Chapters 3 to
7 all belong to the design cycle, since they concern either a pilot study or a case,
each leading to an artefact, in our case being an agent-based simulation model.
Throughout the thesis, we use the word ‘case’ for these chapters in the sense of
‘model study’, comparable to howYin uses the word ‘case study’ (Yin, 2009), in-
tended to investigate a real life phenomenon by means of a modelled example.
All chapters describe amodel with its own research questions and experiments.
There is a gradual development in these cases with respect to their topic, but
also with respect to their maturity. The successive models mature from ‘black
box’ model, whose behaviour is difficult to access, to fully transparent model,
the behaviour of which we can vouch for as researchers.
Hevner stresses in his guidelines that evaluating the artefacts is as import-
ant as designing them. In the overview of cases, later in this section, we pay
attention to the evaluation of each case as well.
Chapter 8, the synthesis chapter, is placed at the rigour side. Content-wise,
the chapter cannot be termed another design cycle, because it does not develop
a new model. Instead, it grounds the existing model’s assumptions in theory,
and it makes the results from three previous design cycles more solid by per-
forming additional runs. It also extends them by addingmulti-level analyses as
well as expert validation. All these activities belong to the rigour cycle because
they aremethods derived from andmeant to be used within a research context.
Themajority of Chapter 9 belongs again to the relevance cycle. It refers back
to the research questions from Chapter 1, and answers them in similar terms:
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Figure 2.2: The thesis chapters organized according to relevance, design and
rigour cycle.
now that we have finished all the work, what was the relevance of this research,
and how do we evaluate agent-based modelling as a method? The discussion
also refers back to reality by addressing assumptions and plausibility aspects of
the research.
Middle range model
In every chapter we emphasize that our agent-based models are middle range
models in terms of Gilbert (2008). Gilbert distinguishes three levels of agent-
based models: abstract models to test theories (such as the Schelling examples
from the introduction); one-to-one facsimile models of a specific real life case;
or, in-between, middle range models of model cases that have qualitative re-
semblance with reality but that maintain a level of abstraction facilitating ana-
lysis.
Agent-basedmodellers tend to refer to these ‘qualitative resemblances with
reality’ as stylized facts: broad, but not necessarily universal generalizations of
empirical observations describing essential characteristics of a phenomenon
(Railsback and Grimm, 2012). The term stylized facts is borrowed from eco-
nomics (Kaldor, 1961), where it is used both to motivate the construction of a
model and to validate it. We apply this approach most clearly in our case of the
pork cycle - without mentioning the term stylized fact in that chapter. We take
the classical pork cycle pattern, which is a nice example of a stylized fact, to be
the starting point of our model: can we reproduce this pattern by modelling
individual behaviour only? In our other cases we have emerging patterns that
we try to understand, but these are not so evidently stylized facts. We could
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call them, however, ‘macro-level regularities’, another term Gilbert likes to use
(Gilbert, 2008, p. 33). The extent at which these patterns emerge depends on
the inputs we provide, which is the relationship we seek to explain. This cat-
egory of middle range agent-based models, to which our work belongs, is not
useful to make predictions in specific real-world cases, but is meant to be used
to explore plausible explanations of phenomena.
In the sections below we first elaborate on the research activities that fit in
Hevner’s relevance cycle and that are not mentioned elsewhere in the thesis,
or only briefly: these concern a field study in China and a mini-traineeship in
the Netherlands, both of the pig sector. Next, we explain the coherence of our
cases (Hevner’s design cycle). Most thesis chapters are self-explanatory with
respect to the model and research questions they address, but do not answer
the question: why did we choose the case the way we did? What is specific for
each case, and what was our evaluation of the case that led to the choices made
for the next case?
2.1 Relevance: Field study in China
Prior to our cases we carried out an exploratory field study in China, which we
now classify as belonging to Hevner’s relevance cycle. This field study was es-
sential in the sense that it provided the empirical foundation of our first concep-
tual model: the Chinese pig sector, with a focus on information management,
addressing multiple levels. Throughout the thesis the pig sector has continued
to be ourmodel case, except that in the latter cases it was no longer the Chinese
but the Dutch pig sector. The conceptual model formed the basis for our first
agent-based model, the pilot study in this thesis. Results from the field study
were presented in (Osinga et al., 2010b). The field study took place in 2006. We
interviewed 40 stakeholders throughout the pig sector in China, face to face in-
terviews with help of an interpreter. Half of the interviewees were pig farmers,
the other half were representatives of slaughterhouses, processing companies,
feed sellers, a pig dealer (intermediary between farmer and slaughterhouse),
and a livestock bureau official (LBO). They were mainly from Greater Beijing
and from high pork production provinces Anhui and Sichuan. These inter-
views gave us a qualitative understanding of (variations of) the pork chain, the
issues stakeholders had to deal with, how they managed information, and the
role of the government. Later in 2006, survey data were collected by survey
teams for 223 Chinese pig farmers in provinces Sichuan and Anhui. The survey
concerned farmers’ information management practices, supply chain partner
relationships, peer relationships, access to services, governmental institutions
experiences, farm data and personality-related questions.
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Total Anhui Sichuan
Freq. of LBO visits n % n % n %
Never 81 36 28 31 53 39
1-6 times a year 17 8 9 10 8 6
Once a month 55 25 27 30 28 21
Twice a month 44 20 22 24 22 17
Every week 17 8 4 4 13 10
Every (other) day 9 4 0 0 9 7
Total 223 100 90 100 133 100
Table 2.1: Frequency of visits of Livestock Bureau representatives as reported
by the farmers in provinces Anhui and Sichuan.
2.1.1 Conceptual model
The conceptual model is based on the field study and reflects what we had in
mind when we started our first agent-based model. It takes the perspective of
the pig farmer, and holds the assumption that improving information provision
to individual farmers will increase the sector’s average product quality.
Informing behaviour of the government
The livestock bureau is a governmental institute that implements national
policy at provincial level. It delegates to county bureaus that send out their
officials to villages to address the farmers in their districts and pass relevant
information on to them. They inspect, give instruction, and distribute medi-
cines. There are also veterinary service providers or independent companies
who offer services to farmers. Not all farmers receive information and service
equally frequently. Table 2.1 shows the visit frequencies of the LBO as reported
by the farmers themselves. More than a third of the farmers never see anybody,
about 45% of the farmers receive a visit once or twice a month, and a minor-
ity gets even more frequent visits. There are no significant differences between
response in Anhui and in Sichuan.
The farmers were also asked what services were offered to them by the
LBO, a veterinarian, or a company. Table 2.2 shows the results (jointly for both
provinces). The LBO comes out as most important to the farm for all types
of services. The LBO offers medical services and training, informs about rules
and regulations, and inspects the farm for the majority of the farmers. A large
group of farmers either never receives any services, or prefers to do everything
themselves: in total, they form about one third of all surveyed farmers. Com-
panies are relatively activewhen it comes to offering training services (18% of all
farmers), which is almost as much as the LBO. These companies are often feed
companies, interested in contracting farmers to buy their feed more regularly.
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Training
(pig raising, Inform
Medical quality, about rules, On-farm
services hygiene) regulations inspection
Service by n % n % n % n %
Not offered to me 12 5 46 21 63 28 56 25
Offered, but not 53 24 36 16 40 18 25 11
accepted
LBO 122 55 85 38 111 50 134 60
Veterinarian 30 13 12 5 0 0 1 0
Company 5 2 40 18 8 4 7 3
Other 1 1 5 2 1 0 0 0
Total 223 100 223 100 223 100 223 100
Table 2.2: Answers to the question: “Were the following services offered to you,
and if so: by whom?”
Social network of farmers
We learned from our qualitative interviews that farmers share practices with
each other, especially with family members and neighbours. Also, we noticed
that groups of related farmers may share certain beliefs regarding e.g. hygiene
or feed quality. It seems very plausible to assume that their social network plays
a role with respect to the information they have at their disposal, and when
making decisions.
We asked the farmers what information they exchange with whom, i.e.
what issues they discuss with others. Their responses were aggregated in Table
2.3.
Table 2.3 shows that most issues (pig raising, housing, quality, ideas and
plans) are discussed with family members and friends, i.e. within the social
network. Also, 40% of the farmers in our dataset are member of a farmers’
organization. Farmer organizations form another platform for interaction and
exchanging information.
Discuss / exchange Price & Pig raising Pig Health Ideas &
info with whom? market housing quality safety plans
Family and friends x x x
Pig buyer x
Livestock bureau x x
Table 2.3: Summary of data showing what issues farmers discuss with whom.
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Total Anhui Sichuan
Main pig buyer n % n % n %
Another farmer 4 20 1 1 3 2
Pig dealer 106 48 53 60 53 40
Slaughterhouse < 5 pigs/day 35 16 12 13 23 17
Slaughterhouse 5-100 pigs/day 19 9 10 11 9 7
Slaughterhouse >100 pigs/day 54 24 11 12 43 32
Other (company, school, gov.) 4 2 2 2 2 2
Total 222 100 89 100 133 100
Table 2.4: Overview of farmers’ answers to the question “Who is your main pig
buyer?”
Business network of farmers
China’s pork chain is dominated bymany small-scale pig farmers who sell their
pigs to individual intermediaries (‘pig dealers’). From the qualitative inter-
views, we learned that farmers sometimes have an agreement with a small, local
slaughter who sells the meat himself in the same neighbourhood. Others ar-
range their pigs to be taken to middle-sized slaughterhouses with a capacity of
less than 100 pigs per day, the meat of which goes to the so-called wet markets
(fresh meat markets in market squares). Or they deliver to larger slaughter-
houses that have contacts with restaurants or local supermarkets. Direct con-
tact with a slaughterhouse is worthwhile for a farmer, because it requires no
profit to be earned by an intermediary pig dealer. Not all farmers manage to
have these contacts. Table 2.4 shows the type of pig buyers of our surveyed
farmers.
About half of our farmers indicate that they do business with ‘pig dealers’,
who contact them and come to take their pigs. That is easy for the farmer, but
he runs a risk of losing money because of lack of price transparency. About a
quarter of our farmers’ pigs go directly to a slaughterhouse that processes more
than 100 pigs per day. The other quarter has direct slaughterhouse contact, but
with a smaller slaughterhouse. There are slight differences between Anhui and
Sichuan, but the overall picture is very similar in both provinces.
Motivations, abilities and actions of farmers
For every decision to change something about their business, farmers have an
underlying motivation. Motivations and abilities are difficult to measure dir-
ectly. Actions are quite measurable, both as in farmer behaviour and in result-
ing outcome. The farmers of our dataset were asked whether they made any
recent changes to their pigs’ housing, how much investment those involved,
and whether they were able to get a loan for it. Also we asked them why they
did it. From our 223 farmers, 77 had changed their pigs’ housing during the
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previous five years, and succeeded in raising the money for it. Concerning the
reasons why they changed their pigs’ housing, 55 indicated because of volume
increase, 9 because of quality considerations, and 1 because of obligations from
a company that had offered him a contract. As for the money: farmers were
very reluctant to talk about money at all. Some said they saved it themselves,
others said they borrowed it from family.
2.1.2 Suitability of this case as basis for agent-based model
In 2009, when agent-based modelling entered our research thinking, we con-
cluded that the field study from 2006 and the conceptual model we made were
well-suited as case for our first model. In retrospect, the following characterist-
ics make the case very suitable for an agent-based model with multiple levels:
• Clear top down strategies. China has clear targets in times when economic
growth seems unlimited: both pork volume and quality must increase. To
this end, information (i.e. advice and training) needs to be spread among
the target population. Especially for quality targets, product information
also needs to be managed for tracking and tracing purposes. (Source: the
China daily online newspaper articles, e.g. China Daily, 2007).
• Strategies are implementable in a straightforward way. Unlike Europe,
China’s centralized government has the power to implement measures in a
relatively short time, in a vertical chain through successively lower levels of
government. (Source: apart from what we learned during our field study,
this was also the message of a course I followed, “Superpowers in global en-
vironmental politics: China and the US”, given by our graduate school in
2007).
• Success of strategy depends (also) on person delivering it. Governmental
measures are carried out by provincial livestock bureaus, who delegate to
county bureaus that send out their officials to the villages to address the
farmers in their districts. Therefore, much of the effect of a measure de-
pends on the actions of these officials (LBOs), which may differ from per-
son to person. Our qualitative interviews and survey confirmed that farmers
experience these differences.
• Bottom-up behaviour: population of autonomous individuals. The
Chinese population of pig producers consists of many farmers who, on aver-
age, have relatively small numbers of pigs. But together, they are responsible
for a large share of national production: in 2005 an estimated 80% according
to the literature (Pan and Kinsey, 2002; Fabiosa et al., 2005). This will have
changed by now, but it is most likely still a majority. It would be desirable to
address them all at once, but this is impossible. To visit every single farmer
is not cost-effective, and technological means (like computer systems and
internet) are not yet well developed or available to the average farmer.
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• Population is heterogeneous. Any other strategy than direct visits to reach
the target population implies assumptions about whether the information
will actually reach the farmers andwhether they will adopt the advice. Much
then depends on the social network, the personal situation and idiosyncratic
attributes of the farmers.
• Enforcement is problematic. Processors (like slaughterhouses) are obliged
to check and register whether farmers have followed certain rules. However,
technological support to make these checks is not sufficiently available, also
because the population of farmers is very large. Farmers (or slaughterers)
may know ‘a way around’ and do not suffer too severe consequences for do-
ing so. This means that following the rules depends on other things than
plain enforcement.
• Feedback / feedforward loops, or: consequences of decisions. Behaviour
is not independent: like disease, it can be contagious within a population.
If one farmer gains profit from his decision (in money, or in reputation),
he will do it again, and it is likely that others will follow his example. Such
influences add extra dynamics to a population, and changes in behaviour.
The pork cycle (Harlow, 1960) is an iconic example in this respect.
2.1.3 Concluding remarks on field study China
This field study provided the ingredients for the conceptual model underlying
the cases throughout this thesis. The pilot study implements it most directly, as
can be seen in Chapter 3. The subsequent cases make abstractions, but the es-
sence remains: heterogeneous farmers, who seek to increase their pigs’ quality,
try to find profitable markets to sell them to, base their decisions on informa-
tion brought to them by the LBO, and share this information within their social
network.
2.2 Relevance: mini-field study in The Netherlands
After returning to the Netherlands, I followed a mini-traineeship in 2007 to
get more acquainted with the Dutch pig sector. I spent two days at Nutreco
Swine Research Centre, where innovative concepts are investigated in an ex-
perimental farm setting. I helped taking basic care of the pigs, feeding them
and transporting them internally. Meanwhile I learned a lot from my super-
vising researcher.
I spent another two days with a representative of Hendrix Feed, who made
on-farm visits to Dutch pig farmers. I learned what it means to manage a pig
farm, how farmers handle disease or health problems, with whom they discuss
issues. Apart from fattening farms, I also visited a sow breeding farm.
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Striking differences with China are that Dutch pig farmers get many visits
from feed seller, veterinarian, pig buyer (pig transporter), or deliverer of piglets.
Also: Dutch pig farmers are reluctant to visit or invite other farmers because of
hygiene issues. The farmers I visited indicated that they do not often exchange
information with other farmers. And: regulations in The Netherlands seem to
demotivate the farmers. They complained that the quality control system IKB
is so strict. Already these farmers were thinking of investing in air scrubbers
to reduce emissions, a regulation which was to be effective as of January 2013,
to which they objected unambiguously.
At the sow breeding farm I heard the farmer discuss the group housing
arrangement for sows, I learned that many animal management activities are
automated (feed intake, climate control), that managing a sow breeding farm
means to “observe, observe and observe”, to notice it when something is strange,
and to take timely action if that is the case.
2.3 Design cycle: coherence between cases
This section describes the coherence between my cases. For each case I start
with a summary, specifying why this case was important, what the model’s
representation of knowledge is, which behavioural freedom farmers have, and
what the simulation experiments tested. Then follows amore extensive descrip-
tion of themodel. Finally, the evaluation gives the simulation experiments’ out-
comes, what kind of analysis we applied and what we learned from this mod-
elling exercise.
2.3.1 Pilot study: Chinese quality markets model (Chapter 3)
Summary
The pilot study’s objective is to model a real-world case, namely: how changing
the demand per quality segment (a sector-level property) affects individual be-
haviour of farmers, and vice-versa. Farmers supply to a quality segment based
on their information, which is a one-dimensional proxy for their quality level.
Farmers have several behavioural options. A demand change affects how suc-
cessful they are, which affects their satisfaction level (an individual property),
which motivates them to change quality segment. The simulations test the ef-
fect of changing a system-level property (demand) and an agent-level property
(frequency of information supply) on quality shares. Heterogeneity is another
agent-level property present in the model (reflecting satisfaction) but its effect
was difficult to evaluate due to model denseness.
Description
The conceptual model resulting from the Chinese field study forms the basis
for the pilot study’s agent-based model, in all its richness. The purpose of the
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model was inspired by a news item reporting that the local Chinese govern-
ment in a town in Guangdong had assigned all live pig supply to one partic-
ular wholesaler, which resulted in the closing of 60 pork shops. How would
farmers respond to such a sudden change in demand? The model has farmer
agents, buyer agents and an information provider agent (LBO). Buyer agents
belong to a quality market, and buy pigs from farmers until demand for that
quality is satisfied. Demand is defined at system level. Farmers collect inform-
ation items (discrete, numerable items that add up) which reflect the quality
level of their pigs (and the price they get). Every time step in the simulation,
farmers receive ‘time units’ to spend on actions (they have an action repertoire
of 4 behaviours, each lasting for a various number of time units, of which only
a few can be completed during one simulation’s time step), coordinated by a
messaging system. We equipped the agents with Costa and McCrae’s Big Five
personality attributes, but in the end we decided to use only ‘openness’ (Costa
and McCrae, 1992). Farmers have a ‘target market’ for which they have to col-
lect information items until they qualify. Farmers have an attribute ‘satisfac-
tion’, calculated from how well they sold their pigs in the previous time step.
The decision to change target market is based on their satisfaction: when satis-
faction drops below a threshold, they change their target market, and go there
as soon as they qualify. Satisfaction is updated by a reinforcement mechanism:
increase of satisfaction happens according to a different mechanism than de-
crease. Farmers do not have any money: an implicit price mechanism (based
on given demand) regulates whether they sell their pigs or not. The information
items are one-dimensional (i.e. no distinction between types of information).
Evaluation
This was our first attempt at building an agent-based model (implemented
in Repast Symphony), which was very rich compared to our later models. It
turned out that we could only have a population of 10 farmers in our model, or
it would become too slow. We varied selected parameters systematically (de-
mand, information supply rate), but there were many more parameters that
needed an initial value as well. We could produce output pictures to show the
results from our structured variations, which made sense, but our model was
essentially a ‘black box’ to us. We could not inspect the model data in a reliable
way because there were simply too many parameters and too many mechan-
isms. We decided that our next attempt would be a very simple, sparse model.
2.3.2 Case: Pork cycle model (Chapter 4)
Summary
The objective is to see whether we can recreate a well-known stylized fact - an
emerging pork cycle of periodic over- and under-supply - when wemodel only
local behaviour of individuals. Farmers’ information (a static, personal prop-
erty indicating how informed they are) determines their accuracy to predict
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the next pig price. Their decision is: to restock their stables or to skip. Their
motivation for this decision is their (personal) expected price. The simulation
tests various levels of informedness.
Description
Again inspired by the Chinese case, the idea was: instead of letting the gov-
ernment intervene (as we learned happened in China), we can increase farm-
ers’ knowledge to make better price predictions and avoid the pork cycle. In
this model there are only farmers, no markets, no information provider, and
no information exchange. Farmers sell in batches, to create a time lag. Farm-
ers are stripped from their personality, their satisfaction attribute, and their
time units. Each farmer is assigned a random number of information items,
indicating how informed they are. There is a supply- and demand mechanism
which would produce a stable system if all farmers would use the hypothetical
equilibrium price. Instead, we let all farmers determine an expected price: the
better informed they are, the closer this expected price approximates the equi-
librium price. Based on their expected price, the farmers decide whether they
will restock their stable or not (which seems a realistic choice for Chinese pig
farmers). When expected prices differ too much from the equilibrium price,
this leads to over- or under-supply.
Evaluation
We were surprised to learn that a sparse model like this, implemented in Net-
logo (Wilensky, 1999), could indeed reproduce patterns similar to the pork
cycle. We learned that farmers can behave in a heterogeneous way just by as-
signing them a random attribute (in this case: information items), instead of
giving them explicit personality attributes like in our previous model. The ran-
domness causes variation in the population, which is sufficient for our aim.
With respect to analysis: we applied a Fourier transformation (designed for
wave frequencies) to evaluate whether there was periodicity or not.
2.3.3 Case: Markets model, multi-dimensional information
(Chapter 5)
Summary
This model’s essence lies partly in its enriched knowledge representation: it
differentiates between several types of information and the personal value of
information to its owner. The same representation is used to express a market’s
quality criteria: a farmer qualifies if there is a match. The objective is to model
what effect changing agent-level properties (i.e. information supply frequency
and network structures between farmers, both affecting how much informa-
tion they have) has on system-level outcome: emerging quality market shares.
Farmers’ only decision concerns a boundedly rational evaluation of an alternat-
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ive market, possibly resulting in changing to that market. The simulations test
agent-level properties (as mentioned) and also test the effect of various market
sets (a sector-level property) on emerging quality market shares.
Description
Knowing now what the power of a simple model can be, we decide to make a
remake of the pilot study model, this time in Netlogo. We want to enrich the
representation of information items and include type and value in the inform-
ation items definition. Value is an abstraction of heterogeneity: it expresses
what an item is worth to a farmer, regardless of the reason why (due to person-
ality, experience, timing, relevance, or still other reasons that do not concern
us). Farmers are also heterogeneous with respect to the number of information
items they have. Information items are directly exchangeable between agents,
not through a messaging system. Information items are no longer static but
have a life time and also become obsolete. We re-introduce the information
provider agent, now called ‘institution’. Markets are no agents, but expressed as
a parameter: a list of requirements and price components. Their requirements
are expressed in terms of the same types and values as the information units. A
price mechanism similar to that of the pork cycle model is used by farmers to
decide whether to changemarket or not (instead of the earlier used satisfaction
mechanism). Farmers no longer sell in batches, but all at the same time, because
the pork cycle is no object of research anymore. Farmers have no targetmarket,
but only a current market. Farmers’ decision mechanism (to change market or
not) is restricted by bounded rationality. The model is more generic (no longer
Chinese), and could even be applicable to other supplier-market cases.
Evaluation
We have trust in this model; it is indeed transparent, and we can understand its
behaviour. The model behaves in a plausible way, at least to our own judgment.
We learned that information supply rate is more important than network ty-
pology. We discovered that niche markets are attractive sometimes. Analysis-
wise we took an effort to summarize results (two-step visualizations) and we
did some post-processing.
2.3.4 Case: Increase the quality of information (Chapter 6)
Summary
This case’s aim is to extend the knowledge management paradigm of the previ-
ous case’smodel (Chapter 5) with a new feature: to add amechanism to increase
the quality level of farmers’ personal information. The objective is similar to
that from the previous model, and also farmers’ decision mechanisms do not
change, only the collection of info-units has been filtered: low-quality informa-
tion items are no longer there. The simulations test the effect of changing agent-
level properties (quality of farmers’ information) on emerging quality market
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shares. The focus is also methodological: can we keep the former and the ex-
tended model’s outcomes compatible? We also include a sensitivity analysis.
Description
In the previousmodel, we learned that information supply rate, or: the inform-
ation turnover, is very determining in the model. This triggers our next idea:
since we represented information items as multi-dimensional, would it make
sense if we discriminated between information that is valuable and informa-
tion that is not? We decide to change themechanism by which information be-
comes obsolete. We try two new mechanisms: maintaining information based
on value (which is a personal property that differs per owner of the information
item), or protecting information that is in use (whether the farmer needs this
information item to supply to his currentmarket, also different per owner). For
this lattermechanism, we extend the information representation with an in-use
property.
Evaluation
The changed mechanisms give some surprising results: initially, maintaining
higher quality information (the value-threshold mechanism) leads to reaching
higher markets. But there is an emerging pattern: maintaining too high quality
information leads to a decrease again. (Wename this ‘boomerang’ pattern, after
the shape of the resulting graph). Themechanism to protect in-use information
mainly reinforces the threshold-effect. With respect tomethodology: we added
a verification step to ensure that model outcomes with the mechanism are still
comparable to themodel outcomeswithout themechanism. Analysis-wise: the
sensitivity analysis (one-at-a-time and two together) gave us insight in relative
influence of model parameters.
2.3.5 Case: System-level change: two intervention policies
(Chapter 7)
Summary
The purpose is to model a system-level intervention by comparing two altern-
ative policies. The objective is similar to that from the previous model, and
also farmers’ decision mechanisms did not change. The model is modified by
adding a mechanism to activate a policy (to close a market) at a given time
step - this mechanism can also be switched off. The simulations test the ef-
fect of changing a system-level property (demand) on emerging quality market
shares.
Description
After having done three cases in which we varied properties at individual level,
we wanted to do a case of a variation at system level. Inspired by a Dutch top-
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icality (retailers jointly deciding that all pork meat should be of minimal cer-
tified quality level), we modelled the intervention of closing the lowest qual-
ity market. We implemented two intervention policies: remove the market
either by ‘sudden death’ (close immediately) or by ‘graceful degradation’ (no
market entry for newcomers, but current suppliers may stay until they volun-
tarily leave). With this case we returned to our pilot study, because closing a
market is in fact a demand variation. This time, the demand change is a real
intervention and happens halfway the simulation. We extended our model to
allow for an intervention at a certain time step (‘shock at’).
Evaluation
Our results indicate that ‘policy doesn’t matter’ for end result, but does mat-
ter during transition period. Most interesting is an emerging pattern with the
graceful degradation policy: the ‘Gini-bubble’, indicating a temporary higher
wealth inequality. The current model outputs do not allow us to inspect what
causes this bubble, because we did not record all raw, individual farmer data.
This is a step-up to our synthesis article, in which we want to make sure that
we can do proper multi-level analysis to resolve this issue. Methodologically,
we verified again that themodel with themechanism switched off produces the
same results as themodel before themechanismwas added. We used Troitzsch’
test to assess how many model runs we needed.
2.4 Rigour cycle: synthesis chapter combining last three
cases (Chapter 8)
Summary
The synthesis chapter no longer belongs to the design cycle, but to the rigour
cycle, because it reinforces the last three cases by repeating all experiments.
This chapter essentially focuses on methodology: all cases are redone with
more simulation runs, and all cases are more thoroughly analysed. Specific-
ally, multi-level analysis is applied to explain patterns on system level through
agents’ individual behaviour. Assumptions that were so far implicitly based on
empirical evidence from the field study are now described and grounded in lit-
erature. We use expert validation to evaluate the plausibility ofmodel outcomes
and the explanations we provide from model inspection.
Description
The chapter starts with explicitly stating what our model assumptions actually
are. So far, we only empirically grounded the model through the conceptual
model resulting from the Chinese field study. This time, we also link the as-
sumptions to theories and findings from literature. We redo the three last cases,
applying Troitzsch’ test to all of them to determine the amount of runs we need
to do per experiment. We use the first case (Chapter 5) to inspect inter-run
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variation (we may have done sufficient runs, but how much variation is there
between those runs?) and to see if we can gain additional insight from ‘outlier-
analysis’. In conventional models, outliers are often neglected, but the essence
of agent-based modelling is that ‘the individual matters’. We use the second
case (Chapter 6) to see whether multi-level analysis can explain the boomer-
ang pattern that we detected there. We use the last case (Chapter 7) to inspect
the cause of the Gini-bubble pattern. To be able to do multi-level analysis on
those patterns requires that we re-run themodel with those parameter combin-
ations that produce the pattern, but now saving all individual data, that were
previously not recorded. We can then inspect this data in order to find an ex-
planation for the pattern.
Evaluation
We learned that it pays off to pay attention to keep successive model versions
compatible: we could re-run all previous cases with the latest model version
without obtaining contradicting results. We also learned that it pays off to
automate the simulation experiments set-up and results processing, because
re-running also gave no trouble in this respect. The multi-level analysis was
successful, although tedious because the individual inspectionwas not yet auto-
mated. The expert validation was very valuable. Experts could indeed judge
whether our model results and explanations were plausible, but they could also
give their opinion on our model, its assumptions and mechanisms.
2.5 In conclusion
Hevner’s research framework is helpful in distinguishing between the three dif-
ferent cycles: the relevance cycle, the design cycle, and the rigour cycle. We
have shown where all cycles are present in our research. What Hevner does
not highlight so explicitly is the process of how to alternate between the three
cycles and that the chronological order in doing so is an exercise of incremental
learning. In that sense, our research is a complex adaptive system itself, where
experience and insight gradually emerge.
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Preface to Chapter 3
Pilot study
’s Ochtends als hij wakker werd wist de eekhoorn somsniet goed wat hij denken moest van zichzelf.
Hij rekte zich dan uit en vroeg zich af: zou ik nu besluiteloos
zijn? Dan dacht hij enige tijd na over de besluiteloosheid. Hij
vond het een mooi woord, besluiteloosheid, maar hij kon er nooit
goed achterkomen wat het precies betekende. Vervolgens zei hij
tegen zichzelf: ‘Eekhoorn, doe nu óf gewoon óf ongewoon óf iets
nieuws óf niets óf je kleren aan.’
Meestal deed hij dan het vierde: niets. Maar als hij een
tijdlang niets gedaan had kon hij ontevreden worden over zichzelf
en roepen: ‘Eekhoorn, kies nu of kies niet, één van beide! Desnoods
slaak je een zucht.’
Als hij dan niets koos was hij toch tevreden want dan had hij
de tweede mogelijkheid gekozen.
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Sometimes when he woke up in the morning, the squirrel wasn’tsure what to make of himself.
He would have a good stretch and ask himself: am I indecisive
now? Then he’d think about indecision for a while. He liked the
word, indecision, but he could never really figure out what it meant
exactly. Next, he’d tell himself: ‘Squirrel, just get going or get out or
get adventurous or get stuck or get your clothes on.’
Usually he’d take the fourth option and got stuck. But then,
after being stuck for a while he grew disgruntled with himself and
cried out: ‘Squirrel, either decide or don’t decide, one of the two!
Heave a sigh if you must.’
If he didn’t decide he’d be satisfied after all, because he’d taken
the second option.
Chapter 3
An agent-based information
management model of the
Chinese pig sector
Abstract. This paper investigates the effect of a selected top-down measure
(what-if scenario) on actual agent behaviour and total system behaviour bymeans
of an agent-based simulationmodel, when agents’ behaviour cannot fully beman-
aged because the agents are autonomous. TheChinese pork sector serves as case. A
multi-level perspective is adopted: the top-down information management meas-
ures for improving pork quality, the variation in individual farmer behaviour, and
the interaction structures with supply chain partners, governmental representat-
ives and peer farmers. To improve quality, farmers need information, which they
can obtain from peers, suppliers and government. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with their personal situation initiates change of behaviour. Aspects of personality
and culture affect the agents’ evaluations, decisions and actions. Results indic-
ate that both incentive (demand) and the possibility to move (quality level within
reach) on farmer level are requirements for an increase of total system quality. A
more informative governmental representative enhances this effect.
3.1 Introduction and background literature
Often, there is a discrepancy between the desired effect of a policymeasure and its actual effect, which is a result of failure to accountfor the behaviour of the target population. A recent example from the
Chinese pork sector was reported in the China Daily of January 7, 2010 (China
Daily, 2010). Because of pork quality and safety reasons, government officials
in Gaobu town of Dongguan in Guangdong province contracted the supply of
live pigs to one particular wholesaler, under the impression that this would not
affect the general market order. As a result, over 60 pork shops in the largest
market in town for fresh pork were closed due to the burden of increased costs.
Since pork is a major food in China, especially during the holiday season, this
caused a strong dissatisfaction among the town residents.
The objective of this study is to gain insight in the relationship between sec-
tor level information management strategies and actual behaviour of individu-
als. This insight is obtained by means of agent-based modelling, because this
allows us to perform simulation experiments on the behaviour of individuals
which are impractical or impossible in the real world. The objective can only be
37
met by applying this general problem to a suitable realistic case. In the Chinese
pork sector the government has targets and requirements, but the majority of
producers consists of individual farmers who act on their own authority. A re-
search assumption is that in order to reach the government’s targets or to fulfil
their requirements, farmers need to have certain information. The government
canmake an effort to disseminate this information, but whether the farmers re-
ceive it and act upon it as well, is something beyond control of the government.
Up to now, information management theory has applied a normative ap-
proach: information management models usually depict a priori designed
flows of tasks, procedures and responsibilities. However, little research has
been done to measure the actual effectiveness of applying such models (Hamill
and Gilbert, 2009). Research does indicate that there is a gap between the
high-level models and the actual behaviour of individuals: information in so-
cial and professional networks does not only travel along the lines of formal
models (Brown and Duguid, 2002). This is especially true in rural communit-
ies (Isaac et al., 2007). Information management as a research field is currently
in need ofmodels that integrate actual behaviour with prescriptivemodels (Di-
mitriadis and Koh, 2005). Suchmodels should allow system level interventions
as well as include behaviour of individual actors who are part of the system,
where much also depends on the interaction structure between individual act-
ors. This boils down to a multi-level system view.
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is becoming popular in the social sciences
and also in information management because it allows representing individual
behaviour as a conjunction of reasoning (decision making), personality and
values (Gilbert, 2008). Focussing on model purpose, Gilbert divides multi-
agent models into facsimile models, abstract models and middle range mod-
els (Gilbert, 2008, p.40 et seq.). Middle-rangemodels aim to “describe the char-
acteristics of a particular social phenomenon, but in a sufficiently general way
that their conclusions can be applied widely”. Gilbert introduces the aspect of
qualitative resemblance. Moss (2002) specifies this as: “The dynamics of the
model should be similar to the observed dynamics, and the results of the sim-
ulation should reveal the same or similar ‘statistical signatures’ as observed in
the real world; that is, the distributions of outcomes should be similar in shape”.
Our conclusion is that the strong points of ABMmatch the requirements of our
study, and that a middle-range model fits best to integrate a multi-level view in
an information management domain.
As a case study, we model Chinese pig farmers who run a family business
and earn a living out of pig farming. The majority of Chinese pig production,
which adds up to 50% of all pork in the world, comes from small-scale farms
with up to a few hundred animals (Fabiosa et al., 2005). The case is significant
because it helps to gain insight into opportunities for this sector to enhance
product quality by means of improved information management strategies.
Furthermore, the choice for this case study wasmade because it has charac-
teristics that are very attractive for a multi-level agent-based simulationmodel.
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Most prominent is the fact thatmultiple levels are a characteristic ofChinese so-
ciety: unlike the Netherlands, China’s centralized government has the power to
implement measures in a relatively short time, in a vertical chain through suc-
cessively lower levels of government. Responsibilities are person-based rather
than rule-basedwithin amulti-layered hierarchical structure (Jahiel, 1998). The
government has clear targets in these times of economic growth: both pork
volume and quality must increase (China Daily, 2007). It would be desirable
for the government to be able to address all farmers at once, but this is im-
possible. To visit every single farmer is not cost-effective, and technological
means (like computers and internet) are insufficiently available for any chance
of success. The population of farmers is heterogeneous: any strategy implies
assumptions about whether the information will actually reach a particular
farmer and whether he will adopt the advice (Narrod et al., 2006). Much
depends on farmers’ social network (Lu, 2007), personal situation, personal-
ity (Costa and McCrae, 1992) and values (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).
Finally, behaviour is not independent: like fashion, it can spread within a
population. If one farmer gains profit from his decision (in money, or in repu-
tation), he will do it again, and it is likely that others will follow his example.
Such influences add extra dynamics to a population, and even cause sweeping
changes in behaviour. The hog cycle (Harlow, 1960) is an iconic example in this
respect. The aspect of feedback/feedforward loops and the emerging behaviour
make the case very interesting for the ABM research community.
3.2 Problem definition
The specific focus of this paper will be on the representation power of agent-
based modelling when applied to the Chinese pig farmer case, and to simulate
the effect of a selected top down policy measure (what-if scenario) on actual
agent behaviour and total system behaviour. The research questions are: Can
we adequately represent the real-world case, and: can we implement the selec-
ted scenario and how plausible are the effect(s) that we find in reality?
Figure 3.1 shows our conceptual model from focal farmer perspective. We
apply three modelling levels (system, agent and interaction level) as described
in (Dignum, 2004). System level characteristics include informing behaviour
of the governmental Livestock Bureau Official (LBO) and the availability of
suitable supply chain and network (SCN) partners, i.e. pig buyers, and other
farmers (friends). Interaction level characteristics entail opportunities to meet
business partners and friends. Agent level characteristics include personality
characteristics (motivations and abilities) that influence the actual application
of acquired information (Osinga et al., 2010b).
We assume that more information leads to higher quality pigs, provided
that (a) the information reached the farmer and (b) the farmer chose to apply
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the knowledge. We also assume that a farmer with a social network can share
his friends’ knowledgemore easily than a farmer who has no such connections.
For the sector as a whole, representation of farmers in all market segments
is desirable. The best system behaviour is not simply to attain a total pig quality
as high as possible. Demand varies with respect to specific products and also
depends onmarketing channel. Certain pork products require high quality pig
meat (e.g. cutlets for restaurants), but it is more practical to use lower qual-
ity for other pork products (e.g. sausages for the fresh market). Ideally, there
is a balance between supply and demand for certain quality. When demand
changes - a global, system level change - farmers should take decisions as well
- at local level - in order to adapt.
The system level intervention we select for our what-if experiment is to di-
minish the demand for low quality pigs, inspired by the news article we used
in the introduction of this paper. Based on the situation and how they evaluate
it (resulting in a certain state), farmers decide to take action. They can choose
(a) to do business as usual and face the consequences, (b) to change to another
pig quality level - provided that they have the required information - and (c) to
quit pig farming.
In order to determine system behaviour, outputs of model versions are
compared with respect to the total quality of pigs in the system as well as total
farmer’s satisfaction, determined by market conditions and farmer personality.
3.3 Methodology
For developing (versions of) the agent-based simulation model, we apply prin-
ciples of incremental software design. For the specific agent-based develop-
ment steps we follow state-of-the art ABM-modelling principles as laid down
by Gilbert (2008). We designed a basic version of the agent-based model, the
so-called base-ABM.This is a computermodel containing all elements specified
in the conceptual model. We then inspected the behaviour of the base-ABM by
means of a sensitivity analysis that investigates all relevant parameters’ and their
combined values’ effect on the observables. For this paper, we implement the
selected what-if scenario in the base-ABM, resulting in a new model version
(experimental ABM). We run the experimental ABM and compare the out-
puts with those from the base-ABM, with respect to the observables specified
earlier. We interpret the results and draw conclusions for each of the research
questions.
3.3.1 Mechanism
We implemented the base-ABM model according to the MASQ frame-
work (Ferber et al., 2009). MASQ divides agent logic into Mind and Bodies,
which communicate inside a Space (Fig.3.1). Culture gives the common pat-
terns employed inminds for interpreting interactions that take place in a space.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual model for our agent-based model from viewpoint of
focal pig farmer, with multiple levels (system, agent, interaction). References
to MASQ-architecture (mind, bodies, spaces, culture) are explained in section
3.3.1.
Themain logic of an agent is located in itsmind. The (one ormore) bodies serve
for communicating with other agents and (one or more) shared environments.
Each body receives stimuli from a space, and produces actions in a space. Com-
munication with other agents is mediated by the space. The idea in MASQ is
that each different kind of interaction takes place in a specialized type of body.
Thus one agent has one mind but as many bodies as necessary to define the
different kinds of interactions.
For the model described here, we have three types of agents: pig farmers,
SCN partners (buyers), and Livestock Bureau Officials (LBO). Currently, we
have only elaborated the behaviour of the pig farmers. The other types of agents
communicate with the pig farmers (mediated by spaces), but not with agents
of their own type. Pig farmers communicate with other pig farmers in several
ways for various purposes. For each kind of communication, a pig farmer agent
has a separate body.
In our model implementation we use a message passing mechanism where
all messages between agents are buffered in corresponding spaces. In this way
the operations of all agents are decoupled and it is easy to organize the behavi-
oural logic of agents. The effect of a body receiving a message is that the agent
registers a change of state, which in turn influences all decisions made from
that moment on. Decision making resides in the mind of the agent. So the
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mind interprets all information perceived through bodies and combines that
information with its current state to alter the state and potentially send out in-
formation to spaces through one or more bodies.
Effectively, the possible actions of an agent are defined by the state of the
agent when amessage is processed - not necessarily when it is received. The full
state of an agent is defined by the (values of) all its state variables. To specify
behaviour, we distinguish two levels: at an aggregated level the kind of beha-
viour differs essentially between actions, whereas at a detailed level behaviour
is expressed in terms of all state variables.
The model is set up as follows. Agent types are: farmer, buyer and LBO.
Every month, each farmer has a fixed number of pigs of certain quality for sale.
Quality is reflected as an integer value in the range [1, 100]. The quality is an in-
dicator for the worth of the pig, i.e. its recommended price. Each month, every
farmer tries to sell his pigs for this price. Whether a farmer succeeds depends
on the demand: whether he can find a buyer who needs this quality. When de-
mand is not sufficient, the farmer will not sell (all of) his pigs, and, as a result,
he will be less satisfied. When his satisfaction drops below a certain threshold,
he may decide to change his pig quality: either go up or down, dependent of
demand. To go down in quality is without cost, but as a consequence, he will
receive a lower income. To go up in quality requires that the farmer has enough
know-how, expressed as units of information. With each information unit, the
farmer’s pigs quality level increases by 1. The farmer can obtain information
units either from the LBO or from farmer friends.
Buyer agents try to fulfil a demand each month: buy an amount of pigs of
certain quality. Demand is defined at system level. At system level, the model
works with demand classes, e.g. low, medium and high, specified as contiguous
subsets of the total quality range. For each quality class, a parameter at system
level specifies the total number of pigs required in that class each month. Dur-
ing a model run, the total demand specified at system level is divided evenly
over the buyers in the model. Buyers broadcast messages to all farmers, who
may respond with an offer. The buyers evaluate the farmers’ offers, and choose
the best one, according to their criteria.
LBO agents reflect governmental influence. There is currently one LBO
agent in the model. He visits a number of farmers each day, as specified by a
parameter. The LBOcarries a list containing all information units in the system.
He supplies a number of information units to each farmer he visits, dependent
on his support level (another parameter). Only new information adds up to
a higher quality level. There are 100 unique information units in the system,
equal to the maximum possible quality level. During the initialization of each
model run, a number of information units is handed out to the farmers. The
remaining units reside with the LBO.
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3.3.2 Personality characteristics of agents
Agent types have personality characteristics that affect their evaluations and de-
cisions. In contemporary psychology, the “Big Five” factors represent five broad
domains or dimensions to describe human personality: Openness, Conscien-
tiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness andNeuroticism (OCEAN) (Costa and
McCrae, 1992). Currently, our model only works with ‘openness’ (the tendency
to try new things or to accept new ideas) and ‘extraversion’ (the tendency to
share informationwith others). For farmer agents, personality affects their level
of (dis)satisfaction, and consequently their decision to change quality. Person-
ality also affects the probability that farmers will aim for a higher quality class
(representing something unknown to them). For buyer and LBO agents ac-
tions are currently not affected by personality. LBO agents have a ‘support level’,
which should be seen as a system level parameter, because it reflects a society’s
current practice for institutional support to farmers.
3.3.3 Cultural aspects of agents
For agent-based simulations, comparativemodels of culture that condense cul-
tures into a limited number of basic issues, and assign comparative scores to
cultures, are suitable modelling devices (Hofstede et al., 2010a). The most
widely used and validated of these is the model by Hofstede et al. (2010b),
and currently consists of six dimensions: Identity, Hierarchy, Aggression and
gender, Otherness and truth, Immutability versus pragmatism and Gratifica-
tion of drives. The dimensions are social patterns, not personality traits.
At system level, our model supports investigating culture effects as well.
The cultural dimensions parameters may affect evaluations, decisions and ac-
tions of agents. Currently, our model only employs the first dimension, Iden-
tity: individualism versus collectivism. This parameter affects the way farmer
agents accept other farmers as friends, or select buyers to offer their pigs to: in
a collectivistic population, farmers tend to prefer agents who belong to their
group, whereas in an individualistic population farmers tend to prefer agents
whose quality level is close to their own. Our model allows to divide agents
over groups, the default being that they all belong to the same group.
3.4 Simulation experiments and results
One simulation run in our model reflects the passing of a number of months,
specified by a parameter. Eachmonth consists of a fixed number of ticks. Every
month, agents choose to do specific actions. Each action costs time: choosing
one means that there may not be enough time for another action. Buyers and
LBOs have only one possible action, but farmers can choose between finding a
buyer (sell pigs), improving quality (apply information), socializing (exchange
information with farmer friends) and extending friends network (finding new
43
Experiment Total demand Total demand Total demand
in Q-class 1 in Q-class 2 in Q-class 3
base 100 50 10
nr 1 0 0 160
nr 2 50 100 10
nr 3 30 60 70
Table 3.1: An overview of the demand variations, each time with 10 farmers, 3
buyers and 1 LBO. Total demand over all classes is equal for each experiment.
friends). An action effectively leads to sending messages to other agents. After
each tick, all messages are processed, resulting in possible state changes of the
agents concerned.
Once every month, the farmers evaluate their situation. They update their
satisfaction according to the reinforcement mechanism in 3.1. The value of Et
is based on how well they succeeded in selling their pigs, while their their per-
sonality determined the reinforcement weights (r+ and r−). If necessary, they
may decide to aim for another quality class. To improve quality, they will have
to check whether they have enough information units to go there. The effect
of arriving at another quality class is that in the next month they will deal with
different buyers.
St = r+Et + (1 − r+)St−1 if Et > 0
St = r−Et + (1 − r−)St−1 otherwise (3.1)
As a base-ABM, we choose a scenario where demand is approximately 80%
of supply, where lower quality is preferred over medium quality, and high qual-
ity is rarely demanded. We define quality classes as follows: low [1,40], medium
[41,80] and high [81,100]. The base-ABM contains 10 farmers and 3 buyers (one
in each quality class). The farmers all start in the lowest quality class. Every
month they have 20 pigs for sale, so supply is 200 per month. The LBO visits 2
farmers each tick. The model runs for 30months, 30 ticks per month. All other
parameters are set to neutral default values.
Our experiments focus on demand variations, by changing the parameters
for total demand in each class. Table ?? gives an overview of demand variations
used; overall demand is the same for each demand class variation. Below the
table, we give an interpretation of the findings.
• The basemodel experiment results in satisfied farmers, who are comfortable
in Q-class 1 and do not move. See Figure 3.2.
• In experiment 1, farmers do not move out of Q-class 1 either, but this time
they are very dissatisfied. But it makes no sense to move to Q-class 2: there
is no demand there. Q-class 3 is too far away from their starting situation.
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• In experiment 2, the majority of the farmers moves to Q-class 2, because
there is a high demand and it lies within reach. None of the farmers moves
on to Q-class 3, mainly because they are satisfied in Q-class 2.
• In experiment 3, demand is going up along with Q-classes. The effect is that
all farmers gradually increase their quality and change Q-class. Some end in
Q-class 3. See Figure 3.3.
Each day, the LBO visits a number of farmers. Howmany farmers the LBO
visits per day is a system level parameter. We repeated the above experiments,
with a value of 10 for this parameter, to reflect that the LBO can be fully in-
formative to all farmers. The results of this change are especially interesting in
the base situation and in experiment 3:
• In the base situation, a highly frequent LBO speeds up the process ofmoving
up to the top quality level of class 1, but still no farmer advances to another
Q-class. See Figure 3.4.
• In experiment 3, a highly frequent LBOmanages every single farmer to end
up in Q-class 3. So the LBO effectively increased the number of farmers that
moved to another Q-class. See Figure 3.5.
3.5 Conclusions and discussion
This paper introduced agent-based modelling as a promising method to gain
insight into the relationship between system level interventions and agent-level
behaviour. We described simulation experiments that led to the insight that if
a change of quality class is desired for a population of farmers, then the ‘goal’
demand should be posed in such a way that farmers have both the incentive
and the possibility to move. A high demand in the goal class (higher than in
the current class) serves as an incentive. The possibility to move implies that
the goal class should be within reach of the farmers’ current situation, since
farmers can change quality only gradually.
The effect of increased LBO visitation level is high, especially in situations
where demand already gives farmers an incentive to change quality class. In
such cases, the LBO can make the difference for certain farmers who would
stay behind without this extra ‘know-how’. When there is no incentive in the
demand situation, the LBO does not have so much influence. However, as the
average quality within the quality class increases, the total quality in the system
still increases.
Our research questions were: Can we adequately represent the real-world
case, and: can we implement the selected scenario and how plausible are the
effect(s) that we find in reality? The real-world case at hand was derived from a
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Figure 3.2: Results of the base experiment: all farmers stay in Q-class 1 (low), so
boundaries between quality classes are at 100% (small crosses at top of figure).
Figure 3.3: Results of experiment 3: all farmers increase quality and some reach
Q-class 3.
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Figure 3.4: Results of the base experiment but with visitation level 10. Still, no
farmer moves.
Figure 3.5: Results of experiment 3 with visitation level 10: all farmers end up
in Q-class 3 (high).
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newspaper article referred to in the introduction of this paper, reporting large-
scale dissatisfaction among the citizens. In our model, we could not include
all factors leading to this event, but we could represent demand change in our
experiments andwe observed a low level of satisfaction (see experiment 1). Also
the effect of exchanging information - one way or another - can be represented
and investigated by means of our model.
In its current state, our agent-based model has rather rigid decision rules,
and could benefit from substantial fine-tuning. Continuing work on ourmodel
will include further developing the agents’ decision rules and actions repertoire,
e.g. the earliermentioned option to quit pig farming altogether, and elaborating
on the effects of personality and culture. Strengthening the role of agent net-
works (farmer friends networks, but also buyer-farmer and buyer-buyer net-
works) will presumably add interesting dynamics to the agents population and
simulation outcomes.
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Part II - Cases
• Chapter 4 - Case: Pork cycle
• Chapter 5 - Case: Information & networks
• Chapter 6 - Case: Information quality
• Chapter 7 - Case: Policy intervention
De mier en de eekhoorn en nog een paar dieren zaten aan deoever van de rivier toen er een reusachtige taart voorbijdreef.
Het was een witte taart, met verdiepingen, er droop room af en
overal glinsterden suikerkorrels en blauw glazuur in de zon. Zoete
geuren kringelden van de taart af en zweefden naar de oever.
[...]
’Wie zou die taart eigenlijk gemaakt hebben?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
’Die taart is niet gemaakt,’ zei de mier. ’Zo’n taart ontstaat.’
’Ontstaat?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
’Ja,’ zei de mier. ’Sommige dingen ontstaan.’
’Hoe is hij dan ontstaan?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
’Zo maar,’ zei de mier, terwijl hij met gefronst voorhoofd van de
ene voet op de andere sprong.
Zo maar, dacht de eekhoorn, wat is zo maar ook maar weer...
Maar de mier stak plotseling zijn hoofd in de grond, zodat de eek-
hoorn hem niets meer kon vragen.
T he ant and the squirrel and some other animals were sit-ting by the river when a colossal cake floated by.
It was a white cake, with tiers, dripping with cream, and every-
where sugar pearls and blue icing sparkled in the sun. Sweet smells
wafted from it and drifted to the bank.
[...]
’Who do you think made that cake?’ the squirrel asked.
’That cake wasn’t made,’ the ant said. ’A cake like that comes
into existence.’
’Comes into existence?’ asked the squirrel.
’Yes,’ the ant said. ’Some things come into existence.’
’How did it come into existence?’ the squirrel asked.
’Just like that,’ the ant said, frowning and hopping from one
foot to the other.
Just like that, the squirrel thought, what does just like that
mean again...
But suddenly the ant buried his head in the ground, so the
squirrel could no longer ask him anything.
Preface to Chapter 4
Case: Pork cycle
Op een dag wilde de slang zich in duizend bochtenwringen en vroeg de mier of hij wilde tellen. De mier zei wel
dat dat goed was, maar hij had niet veel zin om tot duizend te
tellen en toen de slang zich in drie bochten gewrongen had zei hij:
‘Duizend.’
‘Dat is vlug!’ zei de slang. ‘Zijn het er echt duizend?’
‘Ja hoor,’ zei de mier.
‘Tel nog eens goed.’
‘Een, twee...’ telde de mier, ‘brm, krm, snr, duizend. Het klopt
precies.’
‘Dat had ik niet gedacht,’ zei de slang en hij maakte er van
louter vreugde nog één bocht bij.
Chapter 4 was published as:
Osinga S.A., KramerM.R., Hofstede G.J., Beulens A.J.M., 2011. An agent-based
information management approach to smoothen the pork cycle in China. In:
Osinga S.A., Hofstede G.J., Verwaart T. (Eds.), Emergent Results of Artificial
Economics. Springer, Heidelberg. Volume 652 of Lecture notes in Economics
and Mathematical Systems, pp. 27-38. DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-21108-9_3
One day the snake wanted to make a thousand waves,and he asked the ant if he could count.The ant said he would,
but he didn’t feel much like counting up to a thousand, and after
the snake had made three waves, he said: ‘One thousand’.
‘That is quick!’ the snake said. ‘Are you sure it’s a thousand?’
‘Sure enough,’ the ant said.
‘Count again.’
‘One, two...’ the ant counted, ‘brm, krm, snr, one thousand. It
was exactly right.’
‘I never would have thought,’ said the snake, and out of sheer
joy he made one more wave.
Chapter 4
An agent-based information
management approach to
smoothen the pork cycle in
China
Abstract. The objective of our research is to study the relationship between (a)
the spread of information at farmer level and (b) the emerging behaviour at sector
level, applied to the case of the pork cycle in China, using an agent-based model.
For this paper, we investigate the effect of farmers’ individual supply decisions on
the overall supply pattern in the sector. We apply a basic agent-based supply- and
demandmodel populated with pig farmers, where supply is based on price expect-
ations that include a time lag. The farmers decide upon their future supply (at farm
level) using the price expectations they are able to make based on the information
at their disposal. We compare our agent-based model with the classical cobweb
model, which exhibits periodical over- and under-supply. This periodicity is not
desirable, as is illustrated by a realistic example from the pork sector in China. The
Chinese government tries to smoothen the overall supply and demand pattern by
acting as a speculator as soon as price imbalance at total system level exceeds a
threshold value, hence intervening at system level. Our agent-based model dis-
plays similar behaviour, and we can conclude that smoothening the supply curve
by diminishing periodicity is also possible at individual level. An emergent result
from the comparison is that mapping of economic supply and demand functions
to individual agents’ decisions is not straightforward. Our model is a fruitful basis
for further research, whichwill include social interaction, imitation behaviour and
a more sophisticated information diffusion process that reflects the rate at which
a farmers population adopts information.
4.1 Introduction
To run their businesses, farmers take decisions for which they needinformation. Information includes a wide range of product and mar-ket information, managerial and technological know-how, knowledge
of how to comply with legal requirements and regulations, and more. Inform-
ation management is defined as the activity of acquiring and applying inform-
ation to improve business performance. In this research we assume that better
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use of information management strategies will improve business performance
(Osinga et al., 2010b).
Information management theory applies to activities within business firm
environments, and often assumes state-of-the-art development (Laudon and
Laudon, 2009). Family farms usually work with only basic information man-
agement systems, if at all. However, availability of adequate and accurate in-
formation and the know-how to apply it is of vital importance to any farmer’s
business performance (Isaac et al., 2007). Similar to an innovation diffusion
process (Rogers, 2003), such information spreads over a population: a percent-
age of innovative farmers learn and decide to adopt, while others adopt later
due to social influence, i.e. by imitating behaviour of others. The speed of dif-
fusion depends among other things on social relationships between farmers:
they may exchange information with geographical neighbours, with friends,
or with both.
The objective of our research is to study the relationship between (a) the
availability of information at farm level and (b) the emerging behaviour at sec-
tor level, applied to the case of the pork cycle in China, using an agent-based
model (Gilbert, 2008). For this paper, we investigate the effect of farmers’ in-
dividual supply decisions on the overall supply pattern in the sector. We apply
a basic agent-based supply- and demand model populated with pig farmers,
where supply is based on price expectations that include a time lag. The farm-
ers decide upon their future supply (at farm level) using the price expectations
they are able to make based on the information they have at their disposal. We
compare our agent-based model with the classical cobweb model, which ex-
hibits periodical over- and under-supply. This periodicity is not desirable, as is
illustrated by a realistic example from the pork sector in China. The Chinese
government tries to smoothen the overall supply and demand pattern by act-
ing as a speculator as soon as price imbalance at total system level exceeds a
threshold value, hence intervening at system level.
It is assumed that the quality of farmers’ price expectations depends on the
amount of information they have at their disposal: the emergent result of an
information diffusion process. Individuals are modelled at the level of stylized
facts to yield a mid-range model (Gilbert, 2008). Heterogeneous attributes, or
personality characteristics such as personality (‘openness’) and susceptibility to
social influence, affect the outcome of decision processes (McCrae and Costa,
2003). At individual level, these attributes affect each farmer’s decision to adjust
supply according to price expectations. At population level, the mean values of
these attributes express the cultural characteristics of the population (Hofstede
et al., 2010a). The model in this paper does not include yet personality and
culture heterogeneity.
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4.2 Background literature
In economics, the term pork cycle, or hog cycle, describes the phenomenon
of cyclical fluctuations of supply and prices in livestock markets (Hanau, 1928;
Coase and Fowler, 1937). A classical model to study this phenomenon is based
on the cobweb theorem (Ezekiel, 1938; Kaldor, 1938). When prices are high,
producers have an incentive to invest in more pigs, but with delayed effect due
to the necessary breeding time. Next, the market becomes saturated, which
leads to a decline in prices. As a result of this, production is reduced, which in
turn takes time to be noticed, and then leads to supply falling below the demand
and results in higher prices. This procedure repeats itself cyclically. The result-
ing supply-demand graph resembles a cobweb. The cobwebmodels distinguish
several expectation schemes by which farmers predict future prices: naive ex-
pectation (assuming that price remains the same as it was), adaptive expect-
ation (including previously made forecasting errors) and rational expectation
(including all currently available information).
The cobweb model has been extended in several directions over the past
decades. Westerhoff andWieland (2010) describe a model that introduces het-
erogeneous speculators into the traditional cobweb framework. They argue that
most primary producers in commodity markets are mainly concerned with the
production process, but that speculators (e.g. in stockmarkets) actively predict
commodity price movements. The speculators may apply technical analysis
(extrapolating past price trends) or fundamental analysis (assuming that prices
converge towards their fundamental values, i.e. the equilibrium price in a per-
fect market). Westerhoff and Wieland conclude that speculators may indeed
have an impact on price dynamics: in most cases the impact is destabilizing,
but in some situations it may stabilize the dynamics.
4.2.1 Pork cycle in China
More than half of the world’s pork is produced and consumed in China. The
pork cycle also occurs in the Chinese market (Nie et al., 2009). The seasonal
fluctuation is significant: every year prices are high in January, then drop un-
til the summer, then start increasing again for a second peak in October (see
Figure 4.1a). This fluctuation is closely related to meat consumption patterns:
when temperatures becomehigher,more vegetables are available andmeat con-
sumption decreases; after the summer, the weather turns cold and traditional
festivals stir up the price (Spring Festival in January,Moon Festival inOctober).
Price fluctuations also occur due to unexpected events or contingency shocks,
e.g. after a disease outbreak, or when the grain price goes up (see Figure 4.1b).
Grain price is a direct indicator of feed price, which represents half of the costs
for pig production in China (ThePigSite.com, 2007).
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Figure 4.1: a (left): Regular, seasonal fluctuation; b (right): Irregular fluctuation.
Graphs are based on the monthly pork price (Jan 1996 to May 2009), taken from
(Nie et al., 2009).
4.2.2 Interventions from government
The Chinese government is taking an effort to control these fluctuations. In
January 2009, a dedicated commission together with the ministries of Finance,
Agriculture, and Commerce and others jointly issued a document containing
intervention measures (USDA, 2009): if the ratio of so-called hog to grain
prices falls below 6.0 for more than four weeks, the government will consider
purchases for reserve stocks to reduce market supply and increase prices, to set
them out in the market again in times of supply shortage. Indeed, at least two
such government purchases to restrain supply and bump up prices were made
in April 2009 (USDA, 2009), and interventions occurred in 2010 as well (Meat
Trade News Daily, 2010). Newspapers reported by the end of 2010 that pork
supply and demand were essentially in balance in 2010 thanks to the govern-
mental interventions (Swineweb.com, 2010). However, industry experts ques-
tion the long-term feasibility of these short-term solutions and fear even worse
imbalance (China Economic Review, 2010).
4.2.3 Information management based approach
Instead of using the overall ratio of hog to grain price, which is the key indic-
ator for the government to intervene, intervention can also be divided over the
population of farmers. Themajority of Chinese pork is produced by small-scale
farmers, who run a family business of pig farming (Fabiosa et al., 2005). Im-
proving information management, i.e. to make use of available information,
may help to increase farmers’ awareness and knowledge of how to estimate fu-
ture prices, hence to anticipate the cyclical nature of demand and supply. In
this way, the overall pork demand and supply curve will exhibit the emerging
result of all individual farmers’ adjusting behaviour, instead of the result of gov-
ernmental control. Price expectations are calculated based on information, but
not each farmer has the same information at his disposal, nor acts upon the cal-
56
culated outcome in an equal way. This approach is different from Westerhoff
andWieland (2010), who include a different agent-type, i.e. the speculator, into
their model. In our approach, their are no explicit speculators, but differences
in price expectation occur due to heterogeneity among the farmers’ accuracy
of predicting future prices.
4.3 Research questions
The research questions of this paper are:
1. Can the periodic pattern of cyclical supply and demand fluctuations as de-
scribed in the literature be generated by means of an agent-based model?
2. As an alternative to government intervention, can this periodicity be elim-
inated when farmers use improved price expectations?
3. What is the impact of heterogeneous information diffusion among farmers
on the periodicity, assuming that more information leads to more accurate
price expectations?
4.4 Model
For our agent-based model of the pork cycle in line with the cobweb theorem,
we apply a basic linear demand and supply system:
Qd = D0 − hD ∗ P (4.1)
Qs = S0 + hS ∗ P (4.2)
where Qd and Qs , D0, S0, hD and hS are the quantities, intercepts and slopes of
the linear demand and supply functions, respectively. The actual values for in-
tercepts and slopeswere taken from a textbook example (Perloff, 2009), chapter
2. P represents the price. Assumingmarket clearing, Qd equalsQs , hence there
exists an equilibrium price. When a time lag is involved, the cobweb problem
arises: when price turns out to be not at equilibrium level, quantities are either
too high or too low, resulting in a cyclical demand and supply pattern. At each
time step, price and supply are calculated as:
Pt = D0 − SthD (4.3)
St = hS ∗ Pt−5 − S0 (4.4)
where the value 5 represents a time lag of 5 time steps, i.e. Pt−5 is the price farm-
ers assume to receive for pigs that still need a maturing time of 5. The expected
price for each farmer is based on all information available to him. When there
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is no information available, farmers adopt naive expectation, i.e. equal to the
current observed price. With more information available, the expected price
becomes a better estimate.
In the supply- and demand equations, when hD > hS , the periodic cycle is
divergent, which in themovement along the (linear) supply and demand curves
resembles a cobweb starting in the centre and spiralling outwards. When hD <
hS , the cycle is convergent, which resembles a cobweb starting from the outside
and spiralling inwards. When the slopes are equal (hD = hS), a stable cycle
results. As we wish to investigate the effect on a stable situation, hS and hD
were set to equal values for all our models.
4.4.1 Information management approach
We assume in this research that better informationmanagement leads to better
price estimates. In our model, each farmer receives a number of information
items during setup. The more different information items available, the better
accuracy for the estimated price. No information items available is equivalent
to using the current price, maximum information is equivalent to using the
(perfect) equilibrium price that is expected to exactly match supply and de-
mand, and anything between minimum and maximum information leads to a
proportional accuracy of the equilibrium price.
Accuracy (α) is calculated per farmer i as
α i = in f o-items i∑i in f o-items (4.5)
where in f o-items i is the number of information items that farmer i has avail-
able, and ∑i in f o-items is the total number of information items available in
the system.
The estimated price is calculated as:
EP = α ∗ Peq + (1 − α) ∗ Pt (4.6)
where α is in interval [0, 1]; Peq is the equilibrium price, and Pt is the current
price.
4.4.2 Research models
To answer the research questions we develop three models, each using a differ-
ent price expectation on which farmers base their supply decisions:
1. the current-price-model, where EPt+5 = Pt
2. the perfect-price-model, where EPt+5 = Peq
3. the estimated-price-model, where EPt+5 = α ∗ Peq + (1 − α) ∗ Pt
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In fact, the current-price-model is the estimated-price-model with a value of
α equal to 0, and the perfect-price-model is the estimated-price-model with a
value of α equal to 1.
4.4.3 Decision to restock
In our model, farmers without stock decide every time step whether they will
restock or not. If they restock, they do so with a fixed capacity, which is the
same for all farmers. After restock, pigs need 5 time steps to mature, during
which time no restocking decision can be made. In reality, farmers maintain
several pig batches of different age, but we assume that this refinement would
not fundamentally lead to different outcomes at system level, hence we prefer
the simpler model. Also, farmers would have different restock capacities, but
we keep this value equal for simplicity reasons.
The decision to actually restock or not depends on the total supply S that
will be needed, which each farmer calculates according to equation 4.7 using
his estimated price (which differs per model):
Restock = r < S
maxS
(4.7)
where r is a discretized random number uniformly drawn from interval (0, 1),
and maxS is the maximum supply possible, i.e. the supply in case all farm-
ers currently without stock would choose to restock. This implies that farmers
know how many other farmers are currently making the decision to restock,
but they do not know the actual outcome of the other farmers’ decisions.
4.4.4 Simulation process
Before simulations start, farmers are created with attributes stock, pig-age, info-
items and estimated-price. There are 5 batches of farmers, each having pigs of
a certain age. Their info-items attribute is assigned to them at random. The
higher the number, the more informed they are. At each time step:
• farmers sell their pigs if these have reached maturity, which is the case for a
different batch of farmers at each time step. When the pigs have been sold,
those farmers’ stock becomes 0, so they will be the ones who later must de-
cide whether they will restock or not.
• the current price Pt is calculated according to equation 4.3.
• maxS is calculated, i.e. the total capacity of all farmers who currently have
no stock.
• in the estimated-price model, farmers calculate their estimated price, based
on their number of info-items. In the other two models, the previous price
or the equilibrium price are used, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: (a) Simulation output and (b) Fourier frequency diagram for the
current price model.
• farmers decide to restock or not according to equation 4.7, and update their
stock accordingly.
• total supply currently present in the system is the sum of all stock of farmers
who now have mature pigs.
Because the total supply changes at every time step, the price also changes,
which in its turn affects the decision to restock or not. This determines the
total supply present at each time step, and defines the pattern in the resulting
graph.
4.4.5 Fourier transformation
Simulation outputs ofmodel runs show total stock changes per time step, which
sometimes appears to be a periodical wave, and sometimes resembles a random
walk. In order to determine whether a waveform is still periodical or not, we
transform the total stock data from the simulation output into frequency dia-
grams, using Fast Fourier Transformation. FTT diagrams show the frequencies
within the waveform period, from which it is much easier to identify period-
icity.
4.5 Results
The models were implemented in Netlogo and were all run with 500 farmers.
Figure 4.2 shows the results for the current price model. In this model, where
farmers use the current price to estimate future stock, the pattern is clearly
periodical, as expected (figure 4.2a). The Fourier frequency graph (figure 4.2b)
confirms this.
Figure 4.3 shows the results for the perfect pricemodel. In thismodel, farm-
ers use the equilibrium price to estimate future stock, and only their decision
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Figure 4.3: (a) Simulation output and (b) Fourier frequency diagram for the
perfect price model.
Figure 4.4: (a) Simulation output and (b) Fourier frequency diagram for the
estimated price model, with information parameter α set to 0.5.
to restock or not was randomized. The result of this seems to be a random
walk (figure 4.3a), as expected. However, in the Fourier frequency graph (fig-
ure 4.3b) we can observe that there is still a small remainder of periodicity left
in the model.
Figure 4.4 displays the results for the estimated price model. In this model,
we experimented with several values for the information parameter α. The
more information available, the less periodicity we expected to appear. This
was consistent with the outcomes. Figure 4.4a shows the result with α set to
0.5. We can observe that periodicity has indeed diminished when compared
with figure 4.2a, but that it is clearly more present than in figure 4.3a. The Four-
ier frequency graph (figure 4.4b) confirms that some periodicity is left in the
model.
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4.6 Conclusion and discussion
Coming back to the research questions, we can conclude that the pattern of cyc-
lical supply and demand fluctuations as described in the literature can indeed
be generated by means of an agent-based model. When farmers assume naive
expectations, there is clearly a periodic pattern that resembles the literature, as
figures 4.2a + 4.2b show.
However, there are differences as well. The mapping of economic supply
and demand functions to individual agents’ decisions is not straightforward.
The theory works with average total supply quantities at each time step. But
on individual agent level, each farmer will not restock an average quantity of
pigs. More likely is that he will decide either to (a) fully restock his stables
when (expected) prices are worth the effort, or to (b) not restock at all and find
income from alternative labour until prices increase. The alternative labour
option is realistic in the Chinese situation (Wang and Watanabe, 2008). The
fact that restock is a discrete choice and happens at full capacity, is an emergent
property from modelling at individual level.
An implicit result from this finding is that the number of farmers actually
involved in restocking may be limited, dependent on the ratio of farmers, and
their maximum capacity, with respect to total demand. When this ratio is high,
only a few farmers restock, and the others have to find alternative labour. This
was also the case in our model experiments. In models that do not include
individual farmers, the issue that a majority of farmers may be out of business
does not appear. But in the real world, such a scenario would cause huge social
problems. It would be worth experimenting in the model with the parameter
values for maximum restock capacity and number of farmers with respect to
demand, to obtain a model with a higher average of participating farmers. The
agent-based model easily allows for such experiments.
There is an interesting transition point present in our model: with the cur-
rent settings, there is no periodicity when there are fewer than 185 farmers,
because then all farmers always restock at maximum capacity, which is still less
than demand. So the cyclic pattern only appears when there is actually an over-
capacity of stock. This is another emergent result from the agent-based model.
As for the second research question, we can conclude from figure 4.3 that
periodicity would indeed almost be eliminated if farmers were able to use the
perfect price in their estimations. The small remaining periodicity visible in
the Fourier frequency graph may be a result of the fact that our model works
with batches of farmers who have pigs of the same age. When the pigs reach
maturity, batches of farmers make the decision to restock or not, which may
cause some periodicity.
The third research question addresses the issue to what extent heterogen-
eous information diffusion among farmers leads to diminishing periodicity,
assuming that more information leads to more accurate price expectations.
Figure 4.4 shows that heterogeneous distribution of information over farm-
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ers leads indeed to a decrease in cyclical pattern. The more information, the
stronger the effect.
The inspiration for this paper was the government intervention that hap-
pens in China in order to smoothen the over- and under-supply pattern. From
our research questions, we can conclude that an alternative way to smoothen
that pattern could be to improve the price expectations among farmers by well-
informing them. Our model is too rudimentary to make a serious claim here,
but it offers a good start for further refinement.
An addition to the model would be to include external influence, which
happens event-wise instead of in regular cycles. Oneway to do that is to actually
use the grain price in the model, which we currently assume as constant. Grain
price changes as an independent variable, and is responsible for 50% of the
farmer’s pig production costs, which would be an additional factor in farmers’
decision whether to restock or not.
Our model currently contains no explicit interaction mechanisms. How-
ever, there is implicit interaction, because we assume that farmers know what
the maximum possible supply is. It would be interesting to see what actual
interaction and information exchange would lead to. We tried this (in a rudi-
mentary way), but we did not reach a point beyond ‘what we put in, is what
we get out’. We would need to add network structures among the farmers to
be able to observe worthwhile interaction effects. It is realistic to assume that
farmers let their decision to restock or not influence by what their peers - those
in their social network - decide. Heterogeneous personality attributes and cul-
tural population attributes that affect decision making would make the model
reflect social behaviour both at individual and at population level. Finally, it
would be interesting for future research to include a more sophisticated in-
formation diffusion process, reflecting the rate at which a population of farmers
adopts information.
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Preface to Chapter 5
Case: Information & networks
Op een dag kwam de eekhoorn erachter dat het onver-standig was om niet verder te kunnen tellen dan tot vijf. Hij
ging naar de school aan de voet van de eik in het midden van het
bos en vroeg aan de mus die daar onderwijzer was of hij hem tot
tien wilde leren tellen.
[...]
Na een week kon de eekhoorn tot zes tellen. Vol trots vertelde
hij dat aan de mier. Maar de mier was niet onder de indruk.
Na een maand kon hij tot zeven tellen. Maar de mier was nu
nog minder onder de indruk.
[...]
[Hij was] zo moe geworden van het leren dat hij de volgende
dag aan de mus zei dat hij niet meer naar school kwam.
‘Jammer,’ zei de mus, ‘want acht is een prachtig getal. Vooral
als je er langzaam naar toe telt.’
‘Maar wat is acht dan?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
‘Tja,’ zei de mus en trok een geheimzinning en geleerd gezicht,
alsof hij zeggen wilde: daar kom je pas achter als je acht echt hele-
maal kent. Maar hij zei niets meer.
De eekhoorn ging naar huis. Hij dacht die dag grondig na,
maar hij kwam geen stap verder, laat staan dat hij begreep waar-
over hij nadacht. De volgende dagen vergat hij zeven en zes weer,
zodat hij al spoedig weer even ver was als de mier die al jaren tot
vijf kon tellen.
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One day the squirrel realized that it was unwise not to beable to count to more than five. He went to the school under
the oak tree in the middle of the forest and asked the sparrow who
taught there whether he could teach him to count to ten.
[...]
After a week, the squirrel could count to six. He proudly
reported this to the ant. But the ant was not impressed.
After a month, he could count to seven. But now the ant was
even less impressed.
[...]
[He had] become so tired from all the studying that the next
day he told the sparrow that he wouldn’t be coming to school
again.
‘That’s a pity,’ said the sparrow, ‘because eight is a beautiful
number. Especially if you count up to it slowly.’
‘But what is eight, then?’ asked the squirrel.
‘Well,’ the sparrow said, and he put on a mysterious and
learned face as if he wanted to say: You’ll find out when you really
get to the bottom of eight. But he left it at that.
The squirrel went home. He thought things through for a
long time that day, but it didn’t get him anywhere, let alone
that he understood what he was thinking about. Over the next
few days he forgot seven and six, so in a little while he was on a
par with the ant again, who had been able to count to five for years.
Chapter 5
Multi-dimensional
information diffusion and
balancing market supply: an
agent-based approach
Abstract. This agent-based information management model is designed to
explore how multi-dimensional information, spreading through a population of
agents (for example farmers) affects market supply. Farmers make quality de-
cisions that must be aligned with available markets. Markets distinguish them-
selves by means of requirements which are expressed over multiple quality di-
mensions. In order to supply to a market, a supplier’s information should match
the market’s requirements. Information diffusion is affected by network struc-
ture among agents, and by information turnover. Research questions concern the
effect of information turnover and network structure on market supply. Results
show that there is a huge effect of information turnover. The percentage of suppli-
ers having to resort to the dump market decreases when information supply rate
(ISR) and average number of friends (NFR) increase. The higher the values of ISR
andNFR, the higher the percentage of suppliers able to reach high markets. There
is an influence of network structure: the more connections, the better the results
with respect to market supply, but the nature of these connection seems to be of
lesser importance. Contrary to our expectations, there is hardly an effect of net-
work topology. With sufficient information in the system, differences in diffusion
process appear to be not significant.
5.1 Introduction and background literature
Pig farmers must make numerous decisions regarding the desiredquality of their product. A farmer has to align his intended pork qualityand his desired price with the demand of market channels available to
him (Wever et al., 2010). Deciding which quality to aim for is not straightfor-
ward, since quality is a multi-dimensional concept, including product-related
aspects, societal concerns, and market requirements (Bonneau and Lebret,
2010). To make profitable decisions, farmers need to be sensitive and respons-
ive to information throughout the production chain (Verbeke, 2001; Verdouw
et al., 2011). This information covers the whole quality spectrum. The adequate
use of information for taking the most profitable decisions can be seen as an
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optimization problem. However, farmers exhibit bounded rationality, meaning
that “in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited by the informa-
tion they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount
of time they have tomake a decision” (Simon, 1957). In other words, farmers do
not have the time, the resources, or the mind set to behave like rational optim-
izers. A recent study on information use amongGerman pig farmers concludes
that factors like a farmer’s intrinsic motivation and competence have a signi-
ficant influence on their information use (Arens et al., 2012). In the discussion,
they mention that most influential on farmers’ decision making is other farm-
ers’ behaviour as well as educational activities (Theuvsen, 2003).
This implies that farmers consider other farmers and ‘educators’ as import-
ant sources of information, and that their personalities influence their inform-
ation use. To model farmers’ decision making under these assumptions, us-
ing agent-based modelling (ABM) as a method is an appropriate choice. Gil-
bert (2008) defines agents as autonomous, heterogeneous individuals who ex-
hibit bounded rationality and have social interactions. Thatmakes farmers very
suitable examples of real-life human agents. Valbuena built an ABM of farm-
ers’ individual decisionmaking regarding land-use/cover change, showing that
policy is influenced by farmers’ decisions (Valbuena, 2010). Valeeva and Ver-
waart (2011) and Verwaart and Valeeva (2011) modelled farmers’ decisions to
adopt food safety practices in the dairy sector in an ABM. Farmers’ decisions
were based on their attitudes, social network influences, and perceived avail-
ability of resources and opportunities. In the pork sector, Osinga et al. (2010b,
2011) used an ABM tomodel pig farmers’ quality choices based on information
in their network, showing emergent sector behaviour.
The present study will contribute to this body of research, but will focus on
the multi-dimensional aspect of information with respect to making quality
decisions leading to emergent market supply. The setup of the model is gen-
eric in such a way that it is applicable not only to the pig farmer case, but
to any situation that involves autonomous suppliers who select markets with
multi-dimensional criteria and associated information requirements. Multi-
dimensional information has also been used by Gilbert et al. (2001), who de-
veloped SKIN, a model of innovation networks in which agents have ‘kenes’
that symbolize their stock of knowledge and expertise. Kenes consist of in-
formation triplets, representing capability, ability and expertise. However, they
are deployed at firm level, not at individual level, and aremeant to sell products
to one another, focussing on innovation. In our approach, individuals exchange
information, are all competing for the same markets, and do not focus on in-
novation but on quality that matches demand. Furthermore, we study the ef-
fect of varying network structures between agents on information diffusion and
market supply. Also, turnover of information (i.e. new information entering,
outdated information leaving the system) influencing the information diffu-
sion, and how this affects decision outcomes, is taken into account.
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5.2 Problem definition
In this study, we explore how diffusion of multi-dimensional information
among farmers (or any other autonomous suppliers) affects market supply, an
emergent property at sector level. Suppliers make quality decisions that must
be aligned with available markets. Markets distinguish themselves by means of
requirements which are expressed over multiple quality dimensions. In order
to supply to amarket, available supplier’s quality information shouldmatch the
market’s requirements. Information diffusion is affected by network structure
among agents, and by information turnover.
The research questions for this paper are the following:
1. Design question - Can we design an agent-based model with plausible be-
haviour that includes multi-dimensional quality information which diffuses
through a population of suppliers, who all compete for the same markets?
2. What is the influence of information turnover (new information coming into
the system through an information agency, and losing information as well)
on emergent market supply?
3. How do network structures between suppliers influence the diffusion of in-
formation, hence the outcome of their decisions, hence emergent market
supply?
5.3 Model
In terms of Gilbert (2008) this project is a case of a mid-range model: the aim
is neither to exactly model the farmers in a certain region, nor to make a purely
theoretical point. Stylized facts about system-level tendencies emerging from
the simulations should be recognizable by real-world experts, without having
to match any specific situation one-on-one.
Central in the model are the information items, or info-items for short.
These consist of triplets holding id, type and value. The id is meant to distin-
guish info-items from one another, and to determine when they become ob-
solete. The type refers to a quality dimension (e.g. feed, health). The actual
number and nature of these types is arbitrary, since the model treats them in a
generic way. (For our experiments we used letters A, B, C, D for the types of
information.) The value refers to the value that this info-item has to its current
owner, on a scale of 0 to 100. For example, [24, B, 40] represents info-item nr
24, which is of type B, and for which the owner scores a value of 40%. When an
info-item is exchanged between agents, the new owner receives a copy of the
info-item, but its value diminishes. This reflects the fact that agents are hetero-
geneous and cannot simply copy information use fromone another, but instead
have to build up some expertise in using it for themselves.
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Figure 5.1: A time step in the simulation, with farmers as suppliers.
New info-item is... Condition: Resulting value:
not yet present − random[0, newvalue]
already present newvalue < oldvalue old value remains
already present newvalue > oldvalue randomvalue[oldvalue , newvalue]
Table 5.1: Calculating info-item’s new value after exchange.
The model distinguishes three agent types: suppliers (in the model called
farmers), markets and an institution. The institution is the source of informa-
tion and considered expert: it possesses a list of all info-items, which initially
all have maximum value, and it can generate new information.
Markets represent a certain quality, which is expressed as required combin-
ations of information types and associatedminimum values. Markets cover the
available quality spectrum and are partially ordered. For example, one market
may only require a high value on health, whereas another one requires a high
value on feed and a moderate value on hygiene, yet another one requires high
values on all three. The model is generic in the sense that number of markets
and number of quality attributes required per market are flexible. Markets also
have a price associated with them, which agents receive when they supply their
product at this market. This price depends on total supply, as we will elabor-
ate on later. There is also a dump market where suppliers can deliver if they
cannot meet the requirements of any other market. The dump market sets no
requirements, but pays nothing either.
One attribute of suppliers is their network, consisting of family (static),
neighbourhood (static), and friends (dynamic). Their further attributes in-
clude a list of info-items; a number of products (in our case, pigs); an amount of
money; and their current market. Their current market is the last market they
supplied to. Initially, suppliers receive a fixed number of random info-items.
When they exchange info-items with other suppliers (or the institution), new
info-items are combined with the old ones. That occurs according to Table ??:
The sequence per time step in the simulation is illustrated in Figure 5.1. At
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each time step, the institution supplies a number of new info-items (dependent
on the information supply rate, a parameter) to suppliers. At the same time,
outdated information is disposed of. Then all suppliers (in turn) make a step,
which is a sequence of actions: they adjust their network (in particular, their
friends network); they exchange information with other people in their net-
work (i.e. family, neighbours and friends); they update their market and offer
their products to that market.
At each time step, a number of suppliers, defined by the information supply
rate, receive one random information item from the institution. Also, at each
time step, all suppliers request one random information item from every other
supplier to which they are connected. Information items that have reached
their expiry become obsolete.
As opposed to static connections, friends can be lost and gained during a
simulation. At each ‘adjust network’ step, suppliers try to find a friend among
friends’ friends, or at random among all suppliers when this fails. Friends are
dropped at random when the average number of friends exceeds the required
population mean (a parameter). There may be large individual differences,
some having few or none and others having many friends.
To identify theirmarket, suppliers choose one new candidatemarket at ran-
dom. When that market’s expected price (i.e. its last price) is higher than the
price the supplier received at his current market, the supplier will opt for the
new market, which only succeeds if he meets the new market’s requirements.
Otherwise, he will remain at his current market, if he still meets its require-
ments. If that is no longer the case, he will try to find another one. The dump
market is always a last resort.
After all suppliers have determined their markets, the total supply Q per
market is known and the markets can determine their price. The price is cal-
culated according to Equation 5.1:
price = b + c ∗ e−kQ (5.1)
where b equals the base-price for that market (i.e. the price - related to market
quality - suppliers still receive when supply is endless), c is a constant related to
the price at low supply, and k is a measure for price elasticity. When the price
is determined, suppliers sell the products they offered, collect their money and
replenish their stock (in our case, buy new pigs). The amount of stock they will
purchase is a random number between 1 and the maximum capacity they can
hold, maximized to what they can afford.
5.3.1 Agent-based properties
Heterogeneity, bounded rationality, agent interaction and emergence are typ-
ical properties of agent-based models. In our model, they are present in the
following way.
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• heterogeneity: Suppliers have similar attributes and similar decision mech-
anisms, but they are heterogeneous in a few respects: the number of info-
items, the value those info-items have for them, their current market and
the number of other suppliers in their network.
• bounded rationality: Suppliers try only one new market per time step. By
opting for only one candidate new market, the supplier runs the risk that
there is a better market available which he will not find. But given the
bounded rationality condition, it is assumed that suppliers have no time to
check all availablemarkets. Suppliers also show bounded rationality because
they do not know the price they will actually get for their products, as this
price depends on total supply for that market. This is in contrast with ana-
lytical models, where total supply is a given.
• agent interaction: Information exchange occurs between suppliers who are
in the same network, and also (at random) between suppliers and institu-
tion. There is implicit interaction in the fact that market choice is balanced
according to supply.
• emergence: Balancing market supply, as in distribution of market choice, is
an emergent property at sector level. It is the result of the decisions of all
individual suppliers.
5.4 Simulations
To see the effect of information turnover and network topology onmarket sup-
ply, we experimentedwith themodel in a structured way. Elements to be varied
were static network topology (family), available markets, information supply
rate (ISR), and dynamic network (number of friends, NFR). Neighbours, i.e.
static network members similar to family but based on geographical distance,
were not included in these experiments. All experiments were run with 100
suppliers. Network topologies and markets were not derived from empirics,
but abstracted in such a way that it was possible to draw conclusions on their
influence. Simulations were run with all combinations of settings described
below, for 2000 time steps.
5.4.1 Network topology
To set up the static networks, four different topologies were selected. To make
the networks comparable, the overall connectivity degree was equal (except for
isolated). Selected topologies are:
• ring10d: Suppliers are equally divided over 10 disjoint clans, within which
they are connected ring wise. Consequently, the distance between clan
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members ranges from 1 to 5. Each clan member has 2 direct connections.
There is no (static) inter-clan connectivity.
• clan10-2d: Suppliers are equally divided over 10 disjoint clans, within which
they are connected at randomwith 2 other clanmembers. Itmay happen that
some clan members have many direct connections and others have none at
all. There is no (static) inter-clan connectivity.
• tree1-10: One supplier is connected with 10 others, who are each connec-
ted with 9 yet other suppliers. They are a fully connected clan, the distance
between any two members only ranging from 1 to 4. Again, on average sup-
pliers have 2 connections, 89 of themhaving 1 direct connection, the remain-
ing 11 having 10 direct connections.
• isolated: There are no static connections at all. All connectivity comes from
friends, if any.
5.4.2 Market sets
In principle, market sets could differ from each other with respect to number
of markets, information types involved, required quality information levels per
market, and price parameters. For our experiments, we defined 4 sets of mar-
kets. For comparability reasons, each set contained 4 information types and 8
markets. As for price parameters, we only varied the base-price (b in Equation
5.1); Values for c and k were set at 200 and 0.1, respectively. The market sets
selected for our experiments are:
• ext-diff : Extreme markets paying a differentiated price. Markets 1-4 are
defined as low quality markets, requiring quality level 10 on one of type A,
B, C, or D (respectively), and 0 on the remaining types. They have a base-
price of 10. Markets 5-8 are high quality markets, requiring quality level 80
instead of 10 on one type. They have a base-price of 80.
• ext-same: Extreme markets, with identical base-prices. This one is a duplic-
ate of the ext-diff set, but now with uniform base-price of 50 for all markets.
• unif-inc: Uniformly increasing markets. Market 1 requires quality level 10
on all types A, B, C and D, and pays a base-price of 10. Market 2 requires
20 on all types, with base-price 20, and so on, until market 8. Markets 1-3
are defined as lowmarkets, markets 4-5 are defined as mediummarkets, and
markets 6-8 are defined as high markets.
• rand-inc: Randomly increasingmarkets with increasing base-price. Markets
have different random requirements on types A, B, C, and D, but the average
of required quality levels equals 10 for market 1, 20 for market 2, and so on.
For comparibility’s sake, the total required quality level per type A-D are
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balanced as well. The base-price is identical to the average required level.
Low, medium and high markets are defined as in unif-inc.
5.4.3 Information supply rate
For the experiments, we varied the ISR with values of 10, 50 and 90.
5.4.4 Dynamic network
For the experiments, we varied NFR with values of 0, 0.5, 1 and 3.
5.5 Results
For each of the 192 combinations (4 network topologies, 4 market sets, 3 values
for ISR and 4 values for NFR) we performed multiple runs. The performance
indicator for each result is the amount of suppliers active at each market seg-
ment throughout the simulation. Some typical sample graphs are presented in
Figure 5.2. The graphs show that the percentage of suppliers having to resort to
the dump market decreases when ISR and NFR increase. The higher the val-
ues of ISR and NFR, the higher the percentage of suppliers able to reach high
markets.
To evaluate the effect of network structure and information turnover on
market supply, each run was summarized into 4 numbers: total number of sup-
pliers active on dump, low, medium and high market segments, accumulated
over time. An overview of these numbers over all runs was represented in a
graph. A small subset of this graph is presented in Figure 5.3.
Observations from the summarized results are:
• Varying the information supply rate ISR has a substantial, consistent effect
on market performance for every combination of network topology, market
set or number of friends. The higher the ISR, the more markets are within
reach of suppliers.
• At low ISR, varying the number of friends NFR has a similar effect. Con-
sistently, the more friends, the more markets become within reach. This
phenomenon is not observed with higher ISR.
• It is difficult to see a clear effect from network topology, except for the isol-
ated topology, which performs worse than other topologies under any cir-
cumstance. Only at low ISR and low NFR, tree1-10 performs slightly better
than the other topologies.
• With market set ext-diff, suppliers reached a higher market segment than
with ext-same. For low ISR and NFR, the difference was minimal.
• Market set unif-inc performed slightly better than rand-inc, consistently.
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Figure 5.2: The graphs represent six simulation runs, showing the amount of
suppliers active at each market segment during 2000 time steps. White (bot-
tom) represents the dump market, followed by low (red), medium (green) and
high (yellow) market segments, if present. Also, the average money of farmers
is shown (black). These are the combinations of market set unif-inc, topology
clan10-2d, information supply rates (ISRs) of 10, 50 and 90, and average number
of friends (NFRs) of 0 and 1. Quality increases from top to bottom (increase of
ISR) and also from left to right (increase of NFR).
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Figure 5.3: A snapshot of the overview of runs, with suppliers active on dump,
low,medium and highmarket segments, accumulated over time. This ismarket
set unif-inc, topology clan10-2d, ISRs of 10, 50 and 90, andNFRs of 0 and 1. Per
combination, 4 runs are shown.
In an attempt to quantify the effect of network topology, the results summary
was post-processed. For each combination of ISR, NFR and market set, the
network topologies were pairwise compared with respect to percentage of sup-
pliers able to supply to the high markets segment. The same was done with
respect to percentage of suppliers having to supply to the dump market. These
comparisons can be seen as indicators of how powerful and how poor certain
network topologies are in the high and low end of the market spectrum, re-
spectively. Observations after post-processing are:
• Varying market settings have a substantial effect on the results, but varying
network topologies shows hardly any differentiation.
• isolated performs consistently worse than the other three network topolo-
gies.
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• In almost all situations, tree1-10 performs only slightly better than both
clan10-2d and ring10d. In those cases where tree1-10 performs worse, there
were hardly any suppliers at all present in the high market segment.
• clan10-2d and ring10d perform very similarly. Sometimes clan10-2d is
slightly better, but this could very well be a random seed effect.
Additional observations from comparisons in the dump segment are:
• With ISR = 50, there is no clear distinction between tree1-10, ring10d and
clan10-2d. They alternately perform slightly better.
• With ISR = 90 andNFR = 3, there is no network effect whatsoever anymore.
5.6 Conclusion and discussion
Coming back to the first research question, our ABM seems to show indeed
plausible behaviour. Although results are not always very explicit, there are no
counterintuitive results either. Initial differences in possession of info-items
and market options disappear over time; the diffusion of multi-dimensional
info-items as described in the paper leads to a balanced distribution of market
supply that differs according to the parameter settings.
As for the second research question, information turnover has a huge ef-
fect. When the information supply rate equals only 10%, a large percentage of
the suppliers has to resort to the dump market, a minority is able to supply to
low quality markets, and only a tiny minority shortly reaches medium qual-
ity markets. When the information supply rate equals 50%, we see that most
suppliers can avoid the dump market and reach low or medium markets, and
a minority can manage to supply to high markets. When the information sup-
ply rate equals 90%, hardly any suppliers need the dump market anymore and
markets are pretty well balanced.
There is an influence of network structure, which was the third research
question: the more connections, the better the results with respect to market
supply. However, the nature of these connection seems to be of lesser import-
ance. Contrary to our expectations, there is hardly an effect of network topo-
logy, i.e. the static family network. This is partly due to the influence of the
dynamic friends network, when present. Given the fact that all network to-
pogy settings in the simulations have an average of 2 connections per supplier,
increasing NFR to 1 or 3 on average practically doubles a supplier’s network,
thus overshadowing family influence. But also in a situation with no friends,
the network topology does not seem to make a significant difference. Only
when ISR is low, there is a small network topology effect. As soon as ISR goes
up, network topology does not make much difference anymore.
Another conclusion of this study is that, with sufficient information in the
system, differences in diffusion process are not significant. Only a low number
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of connections between agents is sufficient to distribute the information within
due time. When everybody has all the necessary information, markets balance
out, driven by the price mechanism.
An interesting observation is that niche markets are attractive, despite high
requirements, even when the base-price is low. In our experiments with the
same base-price for all markets, still some suppliers prefer markets with higher
requirements. When there are few competitors, a market with a relatively low
base-price is still more attractive than a market that must be shared with more
colleagues.
Further research is needed to investigate the role of ISR and NFR at both
ends of their respective ranges. Interesting extsensions of this study include
scalability of the model (number of suppliers as well as number of markets),
and introduction of local markets.
In future, we plan to further distinguish the multi-dimensional informa-
tion items in their effects on behaviour. Different kinds of information can be
applied to perform different actions. Personality of agents may influence the
effectiveness of information as well.
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Preface to Chapter 6
Case: Information quality
Op een dag lag de eekhoorn in het gras aan de rand vanhet bos naar de lucht te kijken toen een woord hem ontschoot.
‘Ach!’ riep hij, zonder dat iemand hem hoorde, want hij was
helemaal alleen.
Welk woord is het nou ook maar weer, dacht hij. Zand, gras,
schors, krabben, dik...
Hij kon het zich niet meer herinneren. Het was en bleef weg.
[...]
‘Pas ben ik nog iets voorgoed vergeten,’ zei de zwaluw [...].
‘Wat dan?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
‘Ja... als ik dat wist...’
‘Maar hoe weet je dat je het voorgoed vergeten bent?’ vroeg de
eekhoorn.
‘Omdat ik het overal heb gezocht,’ zei de zwaluw. ‘Ik heb niets
overgeslagen.’ Hij zweeg even en zei toen: ‘Maar ik vind het nu
niet erg meer.’
Chapter 6 was published as:
Osinga S.A., Kramer M.R., Hofstede G.J., Beulens A.J.M., 2013. Influence of
losing multi-dimensional information in an agent-based model. In: Leitner S.,
Wall F. (Eds.), Artificial Economics and Self Organization: Agent-Based Ap-
proaches to Economics and Social Systems. Springer, Heidelberg. Volume 669
of Lecture notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, pp. 233-244. DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-00912-4_18
One day the squirrel was lying in the grass at the edge of theforest, looking at the sky, when a word slipped his mind.
‘Oh dear!’ he cried, even though nobody heard him, because
he was all alone.
What was that word again, he thought. Sand, grass, bark,
scratch, thick...
He couldn’t remember anymore. It was lost and gone forever.
[...]
‘The other day, I forgot something for good,’ the swallow
said [...].
‘What was it?’ the squirrel asked.
‘Well... if only I knew...’
‘But how can you be sure that you forgot it for good?’ asked the
squirrel.
‘Because I’ve been looking all over for it,’ the swallow said. ‘I
didn’t miss a spot.’ He was silent for a moment and then said: ‘But
I don’t mind so much anymore.’
Chapter 6
Influence of losing
multi-dimensional
information in an agent-based
model
Abstract. This agent-based study investigates the effect of losing information
on market performance of agents in a marketplace with various quality require-
ments. It refines an existing model on multi-dimensional information diffusion
among agents in a network. The agents need to align their supply with avail-
able markets, the quality criteria of which must match the agents’ information.
Turnover (information entering and leaving the system) had a significant effect
in the former model. Information items became obsolete based on age, causing
a risk for the agents to lose valuable information. In the refined model presen-
ted here, an information item may become obsolete based on two additional as-
pects: (1) whether it is ‘in use’ for meeting the agent’s current market criteria, and
(2) its value, reflecting its owner’s experience or skill with the information item.
The research questions concern the influence of these two aspects on model out-
comes. Two key parameters are value-threshold, below which items are candidate
for disposal, and keep-chance, indicating the probability that in-use items are not
disposed of. Simulation results show that value-threshold is a more influential
parameter than keep-chance. An interesting pattern suggesting a tipping point
was observed: with increasing value-threshold, agents initially reach higher qual-
ity, but then the quality diminishes again. This pattern is consistently observed for
the majority of parameter settings. An explanation is that agents with only high-
valued information cannot afford to lose anything. The sensitivity analysis adds
insight to where keep-chance and value-threshold are most influential, and where
other parameters are responsible for observed outputs. The sensitivity analysis
does not provide any further insight in why the observed tipping point occurs.
The paper also aims to highlight methodological issues with respect to refining an
existingmodel in such away that results of successivemodel versions are still com-
parable, and observed differences can be attributed to newly introduced changes.
6.1 Introduction
Autonomous producers, like farmers, make quality decisions re-garding their product that must be aligned with available markets(Wever et al., 2010). Markets distinguish themselves by means of re-
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quirements which are expressed over multiple dimensions. For example, in
the case of pig farmers, markets set requirements with respect to the product
(e.g. taste, leanness), price, societal concerns (e.g. animal welfare, antibiotics
use), environmental concerns (e.g. carbon footprint), and so on (Bonneau and
Lebret, 2010). Since these requirements are partially ordered, the farmer can-
not achieve an optimal score for all quality aspects at the same time, so he must
make a choice of which market to aim for.
To make profitable decisions, a farmer needs to be sensitive and respons-
ive to information throughout the production chain (Verbeke, 2001; Verdouw
et al., 2011). Information in this case represents the whole market requirements
spectrum. Information can be seen as data (e.g. price information), knowledge
(e.g. which breed gives certain meat characteristics, how to calculate carbon
footprint), and skills (e.g. raising animals in optimal conditions, farm man-
agement). Information can disseminate through a population: farmers can ex-
change what they know with other farmers, agencies can educate farmers on
new approaches or techniques. Although information can be shared, it does
not have the same value to every owner. A farmer cannot simply copy some
other farmers’ knowledge or skill, but needs to build up expertise to be able to
adequately use that information for his own situation. Not all farmers appre-
ciate all information in the same way: personal preferences and differences in
circumstances affect its worth (Arens et al., 2012).
Information has a lifetime, meaning that it can become obsolete. It makes
sense that information loses its value over time. Some information is time re-
lated, like market information. Other information needs to be revived now
and then, for example information on adopting a new technology. If nobody
speaks about it anymore, then it was probably a hype that has blown over. But
if it keeps going around, then the technology may be well worth considering.
At the Artificial Economics 2012 (AE2012) conference, Osinga et al. intro-
duced the concept of multi-dimensional information in an agent-based model
to align market supply with available markets (Osinga et al., 2012). The setup
of this model is such that it is applicable not only to the pig farmer case, but
to any situation that involves autonomous suppliers who select markets with
multi-dimensional criteria and associated information requirements. The fo-
cus of the paper was on the effect of varying network structures between agents
on information diffusion and market supply. Information turnover was mod-
elled as well: new information entering the system and outdated information
leaving the system. An interesting conclusion of this study was that when there
is sufficient information in the system, the effect of network topology is no
longer significant: markets balance out, driven by the price mechanism. Also,
the effect of information turnover was very significant.
When the sheer presence of information appears to be determinant for bal-
ancing market supply, then a fair question to ask is: does it make any difference
which information is present in the model?
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6.2 Problem definition
The present study is a refinement of the AE2012 model. It investigates the effect
on emergent market supply of varying the conditions under which informa-
tion becomes obsolete. In the AE2012 model, obsoleteness was unrelentingly
determined by age, so agents ran the risk of losing information that allowed
them to supply to a certain market, if it had not been renewed recently. For the
present study, we investigate what difference it makes (a) when old information
can be protected from becoming obsolete when it has proven its use, and (b)
when young but low-valued information can become obsolete as well, instead
of only old, unprotected information.
Given the assumptions of the AE2012 model, the research questions are:
1. What is the influence of protecting useful information from becoming obsol-
ete on emergent market supply?
2. What is the influence of disposing of low-valued information, in addition to
disposing of unprotected old information, on emergent market supply?
An additional, methodological purpose of this study is to describe the steps
needed to refine an existing model in such a way that the results of the new
model are comparable to those of the old model and differences can be attrib-
uted to the model changes.
6.3 AE2012 Model
A short summary of the AE2012 model is provided here. For full details see
(Osinga et al., 2012).
Information items are represented as triples of id, type and value. Id is
meant to distinguish information items from one another and to indicate their
age. Type refers to the quality dimension to which this information item be-
longs. This could be anything that is meaningful in the domain, e.g. health or
feed in the case of pig farmers. In our model, we use abstract types A, B, C and
so on. Value refers to the value that this information item has for its current
owner, since different owners may have different knowledge or expertise to put
the information item to use. For example, [24, B, 40] represents information
item with id 24, of type B, which has a value of 40% to its owner. When an in-
formation item is exchanged between agents for the first time, the new owner
receives a copy, but with diminished value. Information items become obsolete
over time by age.
Markets represent a certain quality, and are defined as combinations of
selected information types and required minimum values. Markets together
cover the available quality spectrum and are partially ordered. Markets have a
base price and elasticity associated with them. The price further depends on
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total supply, an emergent property at each time step. There is a dump market
that sets no requirements, but pays nothing either.
Agents start out with a random collection of information items. At each
time step, they receive one item from each network peer or from the institu-
tion (being the source of new information items that initially have maximum -
expert - value). With their current set of information items, agents try to supply
to a market for which they meet the requirements set, using bounded ration-
ality. An agent has a current market, which is the last market to which he was
able to supply. This implies that his current set of information items covers his
current market’s requirements.
6.4 Adjusted model
This version of themodel introduces a fourth attribute to the information items:
in-use. This attribute is set to value True when the information item contributes
to the agent’s current market, and to False otherwise. Instead of disposing of
old information only, the model now considers two additional criteria.
The first consideration concerns the value of the information item. As de-
scribed above, this value reflects its owner’s experience or skill with the inform-
ation item. Whenever the agent receives an itemwith the same id from another
agent during an information exchange event, the associated values are com-
bined to either the same or a higher value, indicating an increase in experience
and a revival of the item; see for details the AE2012 paper, (Osinga et al., 2012).
This implies that low-valued information items are of relatively small use to the
owner. All items below the value-threshold, which is a parameter of the model,
are candidates for disposal.
The second consideration concerns the protection of an information item
that is in-use, meaning that its type is required for its owner’s current market.
There are now two possible causes of losing information: age (an information
item can reach its expiracy date), or value (its value can become lower than the
value-threshold). In both situations, when the item is in use, it can be saved
from disposal by a certain keep-chance, another parameter. If the keep-chance
is 100%, the item will never be disposed of when it is in use. If the keep-chance
is 40%, the item runs a 60% chance of being discarded, despite its in-use status.
When value-treshold and keep-chance are both set to 0, themodel is equivalent
to the AE2012 model.
In summary: All items below the value-thresholdwill be disposed of, except
those that are in use for the current market. The ones in use are protected by a
keep-chance: the higher the keep-chance, the higher their survival rate.
Refining the mechanism for information disposal triggered a change in the
order in which agents perform their actions. Figure 6.1 presents the new order
of actions. The four actions in the fat-lined ovals used to be part of one action
‘farmer step’. In effect, one farmer changed his network, then updated inform-
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Figure 6.1: A simulation time step, with farmers as suppliers. In the former
AE2012 model the four fat-outlined ovals were taken together in one ‘farmer
step’. The oval ‘assess info’ was added.
ation, updated market, and finally determined his market offer before the next
farmer executed these same actions. In the new model, all farmers adjust their
network, and then they all update information using the adjusted network, and
so on.
The step indicated by the oval ‘assess info’ is new relative to the AE2012
model. In this step all farmers determine which information they need to fulfil
the requirements of their current market. Here the in-use attribute of info-
items gets its value.
Another change to the model concerns the information window, which in-
dicates the number of information items that an agent takes into account when
determining his market options. This window is by default set to 5, meaning
that for each type, the average value of the 5 highest information items is con-
sidered to see whether market requirements are met.
6.5 Methodological issues
Compared with the AE2012 model, the new model required a number of
changes. Some mechanisms involve drawing random numbers, e.g. using
keep-chance to determine whether an information item becomes obsolete. But
most new mechanisms can be set to reproduce exactly identical results to a
model without that mechanism, e.g. by setting the value-threshold to zero.
To ensure that the new model outcomes would be comparable to the old
outcomes, and different results could be fully attributed to the model changes
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and not to unintended other effects, we followed a strict procedure. After each
change to the model, the model was run with settings corresponding to the
previous version, to verify that outcomes did not change. Whenever possible
at all, the outcomeswere checked by file comparison to determinewhether they
were exactly identical.
Special attention has to be paid to the role of randomnumbers in themodel.
In all model runs, we set the seed for the randomnumber generator explicitly, if
only to be able to reproduce interesting results. When introducing new random
effects, results cannot be identical because of these random effects. But also
when the order of execution of steps changes, the effects of random numbers
are no longer identical. Therefore, we concentrated all (relatively few) changes
of these two types into one model development step.
All other development steps - before as well as after this special step -main-
tained strictly identical results for corresponding settings. For example, we
could already add the mechanism for recording the in-use attribute without
affecting model outcomes.
For the single model development step that influenced random numbers,
we verified that model outputs were statistically equivalent as follows. Even
with the same random seed, outcomes were not strictly identical. Instead, we
statistically compared outcomes of multiple runs of the model versions imme-
diately before and after this step, to verify that no essential changes were intro-
duced inadvertently.
6.6 Simulation results
For the simulations, a base case was defined in which the already presentmodel
parameters were fixed to a combination that yielded results representative for
theAE2012 experiments. Only the parameters of study of the newmodel, value-
threshold (thr) and keep-chance (kch), were systematically changed. The base
case was set up with 100 farmers in a static network of 2 neighbours each and a
dynamic network of an average number of friends (NFR) of 1; an information
supply rate (ISR) of 50, and a market set consisting of 8 markets with randomly
increasing quality requirements on 4 different information types. (Referring
to the AE2012 model, the network was ring10d and the market set rand-inc).
With a thr of 0 and a kch of 0, the base case corresponds to the AE2012 model
behaviour.
The elements to be varied were thr and kch. After evaluating some test-
runs, thr was set to values 0 through 80 in increments of 10; kch was set to
0, 30, 60, 80, 90, 100. All combinations of these parameters were repeated 10
times to mitigate the effects of randomness. The result figures below each show
one run, with agents active on dump, low, medium and high market segments,
accumulated over time.
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Figure 6.2: Result of one simulation run with kch = 0 and varied thr. The bars
indicate the percentages of farmers active on dump, low, medium and high
market segments, accumulated over time.
Figure 6.2 shows one of the runs with kch 0 and increasing thrs. The top
line, thr 0, reflects the behaviour of the AE2012 model (the base case). The kch
is 0, meaning that information items that are in use have no special protection,
which allows us to see the influence of thr. We observe that a higher thrmeans
a considerable shift in market balance. With a thr from 0 up to about 40, we
observe that the market share with highest quality increases. But when thr in-
creases further, we observe that the high market share decreases again, the low
market share gains ground, and agents even have to take resort to the dump
market. We can explain this phenomenon as follows: when thr is low, any in-
formation item that is disposed of has a low value, which will not hurt the agent
very much. But when thr is high, only precious high-valued items remain, and
whatever item is disposed of will be a loss to the agent. Without it, he may not
be able to maintain the requirements of his high quality market anymore. We
consistently observe this pattern of initially improving and subsequently losing
quality with all values for kch tested, except value 100.
Figure 6.3 is another example result where kch was set to a fixed value
(60 this time), and thr was varied up to 80. We see that the typical pattern
of increasing and decreasing high qualty segments is clearly visible again. In
comparison with Figure 6.2, we observe that a higher kch protects information
slightly better so that the reached quality level is higher.
Figure 6.4 shows results for varying kch with a constant thr of 0. Again,
the top line reflects the base case. With thr 0, age rather than low value is a
reason for disposal, which allows us to see the influence of kch. A higher kch
increasingly protects the agent from losing information that he currently has
in use, enabling him to maintain or improve his current market. Only when
kch is 100, the agent can keep a successful set of information items forever, and
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Figure 6.3: Similar to Figure 6.2, but now with kch = 60 and thr varied up to
80. The same pattern of increasing and then decreasing high market segments
is visible.
Figure 6.4: Result of one simulation run with thr = 0 and varied kch. The bars
indicate the percentages of farmers active on dump, low, medium and high
market segments, accumulated over time.
we see indeed that high quality market shares are relatively large. In situations
where kch is lower and his useful information items become of old age, the in-
formation items that an agent holds will not be sufficient tomaintain his quality
anymore. We observe that a lower kch means that agents are less able to sup-
ply to high quality markets, and that medium and low quality markets gain in
market share.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show similar results as Figure 6.4, but now with
thresholds set to a fixed value of 40 and 80, respectively, and with kch varied
over less values. For thr of 40 (Figure 6.5), we observe that agents reach higher
quality segments than with thr of 0. This makes sense, because the low-valued
items are disposed of and high-valued items are the ones that remain. How-
ever, when thr is 80 (Figure 6.6), this effect turns against itself. There are no
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Figure 6.5: Similar to Figure 6.4, but nowwith thr = 40 and varied over less kchs.
The higher market segments are larger, compared with thr 0, because disposed
items are the low-valued ones.
Figure 6.6: Similar to Figure 6.5, but now with thr = 80. Except for kch = 100,
when there is no disposal at all, quality is much lower than with thr 40. When
thr is high, only high-valued items remain, and disposal of any item is a loss to
the agent.
low-valued items left to dispose of, and loss of any item is a problem. As a res-
ult, agents cannot maintain the high qualities anymore and even have to resort
to the dump market. Only when kch is 100, and all items are protected, agents
can still supply to high quality markets.
6.7 Sensitivity analysis
We performed a local sensitivity analysis in order to see how sensitive to para-
meter changes our results are - and especially the apparent tipping point for
varying kch visible in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. We varied the parameters shown in
Table 6.1 one at a time, with the values shown there. Only kch and thr were
varied both one at a time and together. For one at the time variation, thr was
set to 0 and kch from 0 to 100 in steps of 10, and the other way around. When
they were varied together, their values were set to all combinations of 0, 30,
60 and 90. Each run of a particular parameter set was repeated 10 times. The
mean result of these runs is reported as outcome. The parameters in the list of
Table 6.1 are the number of farmers in the simulation (farmers), the informa-
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parameters low base high
farmers 90 100 110
ISR 45 50 55
NFR 0 1 2
steps 1000 2000 3000
window 4 5 6
kch
thr see text
Table 6.1: Settings chosen for local sensitivity analysis.
tion supply rate (ISR), the average number of friends that a farmer has (NFR),
the number of time steps that the simulation lasted (steps) and the information
window that farmers have (window).
The sensitivity of the parameters to the outcomes were expressed according
to the formula shown in Equation 6.1 and normalized according to Equation
6.2:
sensitivity = vhi − v l o
phi − p l o (6.1)
normalized sensitivity = vhi − v l o
phi − p l o ∗ pbvb (6.2)
In these equations, v represents themean value for the variable over all runs
(output), and p represents the parameter that was varied (input). The subscript
b stands for the value of the base case. Subscripts lo and hi indicate the lower
and higher than base case values for the parameter, respectively.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
Figure 6.7 shows the combined influence of kch and thr, when varied together.
The left panel shows the relative influence of all parameters under consideration
on the dump market share. The right panel shows this influence on the high
market share. For conciseness reasons, we do not show the relative parameter
influences on low and medium market shares.
We observe that the thr parameter has a relatively larger influence than kch.
For the dump market, a thr from value 30 onwards is very dominant. We see
that other parameters are responsible when thr is not yet so dominant, of which
initially the number of farmers seems most influential, and also the informa-
tion supply rate (ISR). The farmer influence is negative, meaning that when the
number of farmers increases, fewer farmers resort to the dump market. With
our current analyses we cannot explain why this happens.
For the high markets, we see that the thr parameter is dominant from value
90 onwards. When thr has value 90, all information items below 90 are thrown
away, so effectively nothing happens anymore. As a consequence, no other
parameter has any influence. Two other parameters have a relatively high influ-
ence as long as thr is not yet dominant. These are the information supply rate
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Figure 6.7: Relative sensitivity of parameters varied according to Table 6.1; kch
and thr varied simultaneously. Left: dump market; right: high markets.
Figure 6.8: Relative sensitivity of parameters varied according to Table 6.1; kch
and thr varied one at a time. Left: kch = 0, thr varied (dump market); right:
thr = 0, kch varied (high markets).
(ISR) and the information window. This makes sense: the more information in
the system, the more high quality markets come within reach (as was also an
AE2012 conclusion). And for window: when we vary the number of informa-
tion items that are taken into account during decision making, this is expected
to be especially sensitive for high quality requirements. It alsomakes sense that
the number of steps, the number of farmers, and the number of friends do not
have a significant influence (the latter also being an AE2012 conclusion).
The left panel in Figure 6.8 shows the results of local sensitivity analysis
with a kch of 0 and a varying thr, for the dump market segment. From the
absolute results, shown in Figure 6.2, we know that farmers start to enter the
dump markets when thr value is about 40 or higher. That is consistent with
what we see here: from about value 50, the influence of thr is increasing and
becomes very dominant. It is indeed the treshold value that is responsible for
farmers having to supply to the dump market.
The right panel in Figure 6.8 shows similar results, but now for the high
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market segment, and with thr set to 0 so that the influence of kch can be ob-
served. For the major part of the graph, with low and medium kchs, the para-
meters ISR and window are dominant. For values higher than 70, kch becomes
an influential factor for the high markets. In the absolute results, shown in
Figure 6.4, we saw that the high market segment is increasing with kch. With
the sensitivity analysis results, we can add the insight that kch is only respons-
ible for this when it has a value higher than 70. Below that value, parameters
ISR and windowmainly determine whether farmers are able to supply to high
markets.
6.8 Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we reconsidered the way agents dispose of their information in
our model. Next to expiracy because of age, an information item can now also
be disposed because of too low value, indicated by a value-threshold. An in-
formation item can receive the special status of in-use that indicateswhether the
information item is needed for an agent to keep his current market. The keep-
chance indicates the probability that in-use items will be saved from disposal.
We ran simulationswhere we focussed on the value-threshold and keep-chance
parameters. We also performed a sensitivity analysis of the results. Returning
to our research questions, of which question 1 referred to the keep-chance and
question 2 to the value-threshold, we can conclude that the influence of value-
threshold is very significant, and the influence of keep-chance is moderate.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the influence of most other model paramet-
ers is according to expectation. Parameters ISR and NFR behave according to
the AE2012 model outcomes. The information window has an influence where
it makes sense. The number of steps in the simulation has almost no influence.
Sensitivity of networks and markets is difficult to establish, since they are not
numerical, but those were tested and reported in our AE2012 model. The only
deviation is the number of farmers, which seems to have an influence, but for
the explanation of which we need further investigations.
The sensitivity analysis results add insight to the simulation results, with re-
spect to the relative influence of value-threshold and keep-chance. Sometimes
their influence is quite absolute, but sometimes other parameters are more in-
fluential. The sensitivity analysis results do not give any cause to interpretation
conflicts. The simulation results showa consistent patternwhere a tipping point
is suggested. However, the sensitivity analysis gives no decisive explanation for
or insight in this phenomenon.
An additional goal of this paper was to highlight some methodological as-
pects, especially concerning the procedure for guarding comparability of res-
ults from successivemodel versions. This is a particular concern in agent-based
models, where the order in which agents execute their actions requires careful
attention.
92
Preface to Chapter 7
Case: Policy intervention
Geachte dieren,Hierbij deel ik u mede dat ik vanaf heden al mijn werk-
zaamheden een halt toeroep.
Ik doe het niet meer.
Iedereen breekt maar doormidden, wil twee slurven, andere
gedachten, een kelder, ogen op zijn stekels, één schub, nieuwe
vleugels, noem maar op, en ik ben er altijd weer goed voor.
Vanaf heden ben ik dicht.
De boktor
Chapter 7 was published as:
Osinga S.A., Kramer M.R., Hofstede G.J., 2014. Sustainable animal welfare:
does forcing farmers into transition help?. AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge,
Culture and Communication, Accepted: 17 January 2014. Published online: 25
February 2014. DOI: 10.1007/s00146-014-0538-7
Dear animals,I hereby inform you that, as of today, I put a stop to all
my activities.
I am not doing it anymore.
Everyone just keeps breaking in half or demanding two trunks,
second thoughts, a basement, eyes on their quills, a single scale,
new wings, you name it, and I am always the one to fix it.
As of today, I am closed.
The longicorn
Chapter 7
Sustainable animal welfare:
does forcing farmers into
transition help?
Abstract. Dutch society is changing, and so is its attitude towards animal wel-
fare. Meat retailers respond by laying downminimum-quality criteria for farmers
who wish to supply to supermarkets - forcing them to either aim for higher quality
or lose their market. Policy-wise this is a top-down measure that leads to a redis-
tribution of markets. From farmer perspective, a transition with more individual
freedom to adapt seems more sustainable. By means of an existing agent-based
model, this paper investigates two policies for such a market switch: immediate
transition - ‘sudden death’ (SD)- versus gradual change - ‘graceful degradation’
(GD). Both farmers and available markets are modelled as agents. Each farmer
has a collection of multidimensional information items, under certain conditions
exchangeable with other farmers in his network, representing his knowledge and
skills. Information items are a farmer’s key to themarket, as market criteria are ex-
pressed in terms of information requirements. We tested the effect of SD and GD
policies onmarket redistribution, varyingmarkets sets, available information, and
network size. Results show that policy does not matter for final market redistribu-
tion, but that GD policy indeed allows more farmers to keep away from poverty,
especially in information-poor situations. With GD, we see a temporarily higher
inequality of income distribution over individuals (Gini) worth exploring. Study-
ing transitions with respect to both individuals and the system as a whole may
be promising for other domains as well. The model is applicable to any situation
that implies aligning heterogeneous suppliers with a multi-dimensional demand
spectrum.
7.1 Introduction
Dutch society no longer seems to tolerate violation of animal wel-fare. In the Netherlands, animals nowadays literally have a voice: thepolitical Party of the Animals, founded in 2002 and advocating to treat
animals respectfully, won two seats in parliament in November 2006 and kept
them during subsequent elections (Partij Voor De Dieren, 2013). Animal wel-
fare was long considered ‘inconvenient’, because how to deal with farm animal
welfare concerns when other issues compete, such as economics, international
trade, environmental concerns, and food safety (McGlone, 2001)? As of re-
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cently, opinions prevail that animal production systems can only be sustainable
if animal welfare is taken into account (Broom, 2010).
Dutch public debates on animal welfare in livestock production entailed
long-lasting controversies between involved societal actors such as primary
producers (farmers) and concerned citizens (Frewer et al., 2005; te Velde et al.,
2002). These debates eventually resulted in serious attention for better hus-
bandry systems and creating newmarket segments (Buurma et al., 2012). Con-
siderable research efforts were made to develop and design more animal-
friendly husbandry systems that would take animals’ natural needs as a starting
point and would make interventions in the animals, such as tail-cutting, less
necessary (de Greef et al., 2011; Bos et al., 2011; Elzen et al., 2011). The European
Union funded projects to investigate farmers’ current animal welfare practices
(Bock and Van Huik, 2007). Farmers themselves, represented by the Product
Board Livestock andMeat (LTO), which is theDutch farmers’ association, drew
up a set of rules and principles to express their view on sustainable farmingwith
respect to animal welfare (LTO Nederland, 2008).
Despite these apparent developments in favour of animal welfare and sus-
tainability, there are still problems to be solved. Farmers who wish to imple-
ment novel husbandry systems need to make considerable investments, but an
expectedly better price for their more sustainable meat product at a higher-
quality market should compensate for that. Unfortunately, consumers often
show a discrepancy between perceptions and daily practices, meaning that al-
though - as concerned citizens - they share the impression that the living condi-
tions of livestock animals deserve improvement, most of them - as frugal con-
sumers - still buy and eat meat from the meat industry (te Velde et al., 2002;
Bauman, 2009; de Bakker and Dagevos, 2012). Currently in the Netherlands,
an interesting transition with respect to this discrepancy seems to be taking
place. ADutch animal protection organization broadcasted alarming commer-
cials showing the poor conditions in which animals live before they become
food products, appealing to the audience’s sense of compassion, and yielded
a series of successes: white (anaemic) veal (2008), bargain meat packs (2010),
and battery hens (2012) have been reduced or removed from most supermar-
kets’ shelves (WakkerDier, 2012). Whether they want it or not, consumers can
no longer pay the minimum price for meat in most regular supermarkets, thus
allowing the farmers to engage in more animal-friendly production.
With respect to bargain meat packs, all joint Dutch food retailers consider
the time ripe to support this initiative even further. InMay 2013, they agreed to
raise theminimumquality standard for all pork to so-called ‘good farming star’
level, which is currently the case in one large supermarket chain only (Central
Bureau Of Food Retailers, 2013). They defined minimum criteria, published
and explained in trade specialist journals, that pig farmers must meet in order
to be allowed to supply to supermarkets. They also agreed to make an effort to
further increase other market shares of evenmore sustainable meat types, such
as organic pork.
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This has its consequences for all pork farmers: all of a sudden their ‘business
as usual’ has to change. The farmers who used to produce for lowest-quality
markets can no longer supply there, because the market will disappear. They
are forced to fulfil the new criteria and aim for higher markets if they do not
want to lose their business. In order to make this transition, they need to get
acquainted with what is required of them, take the time to select a new mar-
ket, and invest in new husbandry systems. Both ‘hard’ technological changes
and ‘soft’ changes such as adopting a flexible attitude may be required (Jin and
Bai, 2009; Somers and Stapleton, 2013). The farmers who already produce for
highermarkets will face newly entering competitors andmust take into account
that they may likely receive a lower price for their product than they were used
to. Policy-wise, one could argue that society as a whole, including animal pro-
tection organizations, retailers and even farmers’ organizations, consider this
transition towards more sustainable, animal-friendly markets as a top-down
event, treating the farmer population as a group, not taking into account what
it means for individual pig farmers to have to comply. The farmers themselves
feel stressed. A third of them expects not to be able to continue their farm, and a
majority expects serious financial and practical problems having to adapt their
business in order to comply with the new welfare regulations (Varkensbedrijf,
2013). Here, the social aspect of sustainability comes in, implying that no policy
can be considered sustainable if the people involved (i.e. the farmers) are un-
able to make a long-term living out of farming (Morse and McNamara, 2013).
Could a more farmer-oriented, bottom-up approach (i.e. not to close the low-
quality market without mercy but to allow for a voluntary transition towards
the desired higher-market spectrum) be considered as an alternative policy?
7.2 Agent-based modelling, agri-business and markets
Agent-basedmodelling (ABM) is particularly appropriate as amethod to study
the behaviour of autonomous, heterogeneous individuals who have bounded
rationality and exhibit social interactions (Gilbert, 2008). That makes farm-
ers examples of real-life human agents that seem suited to be modelled in
ABMs. Current literature on ABM in agriculture shows that farmers’ decision-
making and policy issues are a frequent combination of study. Models often in-
clude a spatial component, deploying data from geographical information sys-
tems. Valbuena (2010) built an ABM of farmers’ individual decision-making
regarding land-use/cover change, showing that policy is influenced by farm-
ers’ decisions. Schouten et al. (2013) uses ABM to evaluate agri-environmental
policies in rural areas where farmers respond to these policies. Valeeva and
Verwaart (2011) and Verwaart and Valeeva (2011) modelled farmers’ decisions
to adopt food safety practices in the dairy sector in anABM.Osinga et al. (2011)
used anABM tomodel the classical pork cycle from farmer perspective and the
potential of information management measures in the sector.
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The concept of ‘market’ has various interpretations in ABMs. For example,
there are many models for financial and stock markets (Lux, 2012), housing
markets (Geanakoplos et al., 2012), and electricity markets (Weidlich and Veit,
2008). Such models tend to focus on price mechanisms, auctions, and negoti-
ation sequences, and less on markets in the sense of finding the right channel
to supply to. Ross andWestgren (2009) is an example of an agent-based model
in the context of the agricultural supply chain, modelling agrifirms with entre-
preneurial behaviour and firm interactions who aim for wealth creation. There
are parallels with our work in the sense that the agents in Ross’ model have at-
tributes that influence their behaviour and that the context is a set of markets
characterized by norms and regulations. Ross’ model focusses on individual
firms who perform an exhaustive search within a spatial environment for the
optimal market, only limited by their own capabilities. It does not take any
system-level outcomes such as market performance into account. The aspect
of agents who distinguish themselves by knowledge and skills and who seek to
thrive within a supply chain is implemented in the SKIN innovation model as
well (Ahrweiler et al., 2004). Here, the agents are (large) business firms, not
small entrepreneurs, who seek to sell products to each other while focussing
on innovation. There are no explicit markets in the SKIN model.
Markets where farmers seek to supply to in a context of animal welfare and
sustainability are perhaps best compared to the labour market (Tsan Sheng and
Yong Chuen, 2013). Also on the labour market, departments may close, and
employees need to be placed elsewhere. Sustainability is certainly an issue, both
in the sense of labour quality and in the sense of societal balance.
7.3 Research questions
The aim of this paper is to apply ABM to simulate the described market switch
from the perspective of the individual pig farmer, who finds himself (a) con-
fronted with shifting or disappearing markets, (b) having to respond by choos-
ing a new market, and (c) limited by market criteria that require knowledge,
time, and investments. Can this ABM capture the dynamics of shifting market
shares on population level as well, in a way that allows studying the effect of
alternative transition policies i.e. how to switch a farmer population from one
market situation to the other?
This paper elaborates on the following research questions:
1. Does it make a difference by what policy farmers are encouraged or forced to
switch market? Candidate transition policies are (a) top-down, by ‘sudden
death’ (SD): the low-quality market is no longer available starting from a
fixed date or (b) bottom-up, by ‘graceful degradation’ (GD): the low-quality
market is discouraged but still available from a fixed date onwards, and it is
up to the farmers themselves whether they will still want to supply there or
not.
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2. Which policy serves sustainability and animal welfare best, both for the
farmers and for society as a whole, if we take into account not just the fi-
nal result but also the way towards that result?
7.4 Model
To model this complex adaptive system - capturing individual decision-
making, interactions, market shifts, and price dynamics - requires covering a
range of disciplines: economics, policy making, domain knowledge, and hu-
man behaviour. The model should be rich where differentiation is needed, but
aim at abstraction where possible in order to keep it tractable. The core of the
model presented here has been previously applied in the domain of informa-
tion diffusion and market choice (Osinga et al., 2012, 2013). In terms of Gilbert
(2008), this is a mid-rangemodel: the aim is neither to exactly model the farm-
ers in a certain region, nor to make a purely theoretical point. Stylized facts
about system-level tendencies emerging from the simulations should be recog-
nizable by real-world experts, without having to match any specific situation
one-on-one.
The model distinguishes three agent types: farmers, markets, and a food
quality agency (‘the institution’). Main attributes of farmers are: current mar-
ket, friends, information items, number of pigs, andwealth. The currentmarket
is the market which the farmer is currently able to supply to; friends are other
farmers in his network with whom he can exchange information items; inform-
ation items represent the farmer’s knowledge and skills (see below); number of
pigs is the amount of product the farmer has to supply; and wealth denotes his
financial situation. Main attributes ofmarkets are: quality, price, last price, total
supply, and availability. Quality is specified as a list of criteria with required
minimum values that suppliers have to satisfy; price is the price that this mar-
ket pays to suppliers, consisting of various price determinants (see below); last
price is the last price that this market paid, based on which farmers evaluate the
market; total supply is the amount of farmers supplying to this market (which is
also a determinant of the price); and availability indicates whether this market
is available to farmers or not (especially relevant when the low market is to be
closed). The institution’s only attribute is the list of all information items.
Central in the model are information items, of which each farmer has a
private collection, under certain conditions exchangeable with others in his
network. A farmer’s information items are his key to the market, since market
criteria are expressed in terms of combinations of selected information types
and required minimum values (see below). Each market thus represents a cer-
tain quality; markets together cover the available quality spectrum. Quality in
this context stands for ‘level of animal welfare’ and other sustainability aspects.
The institution is the source of information and considered expert: it pos-
sesses a list of all information items, which initially all have maximum value,
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and it can generate new information items. The institution brings informa-
tion into the system at an information supply rate (ISR), which is a parameter
of the model. The institution is a proxy for all information sources in reality:
livestock bureaus, technical journals, experts, web pages, information systems,
etc. Farmers can also receive information items from other farmers in their
network. Each farmer has a dynamic network of friends; the average number
of friends (NFRs) on population level is another parameter of the model. The
rationale behind this is that farmers seldomwork alone in strategicmatters, but
that they talk with each other and take suggestions from each other.
The information items themselves are the abstraction of everything a
farmer has to acquire ormake an effort for before he qualifies for a newmarket.
Information items are represented as triples of id, type, and value. Id ismeant to
distinguish information items from one another and to indicate their age. Type
reflects the dimension to which the information item belongs. In the model,
we use abstract types A, B, C, and D, but the number of types is flexible. A-D
are dimensions for which agents can acquire information or expertise during
the simulation. In our sustainability context, these could be read as the farmer’s
knowledge and skills concerning (A) feeding issues, (B) animal health issues,
(C) housing issues, and (D) farm management. ‘Attained animal welfare level
of the pigs’ and ‘environmental impact of the farm’ are examples of properties
that would typically be emergent, not to be used as ‘input’ for dimensions A-D.
Value refers to the value that this information item has for its current owner.
For example, [24, B, 40] represents an information item with id 24, of type B,
which has a value of 40% to its owner. When an information item is exchanged
between agents, the new owner receives a copy of the information item, but
its value diminishes. This reflects the fact that agents are heterogeneous and
cannot simply copy knowledge and skills from each other, but instead have to
build up some expertise for themselves. Information items become obsolete
over time by age. This reflects the dynamic nature of regulations, knowledge,
and skills: farmers need to continuously adapt over time.
Markets’ quality criteria are expressed in terms of the same types and values
as the information items. The market specification states which types this mar-
ket requires minimum values for. Table 7.1 shows an example of how markets
are specified. Not all types need to be present in everymarket specification (val-
ues can be zero). Several markets together form a markets set. This set defines
the range of available markets for the farmer population. The markets set can
be considered a parameter of the model: the same model can be tested with
various markets sets. This is what we investigated in an earlier application of
the model (Osinga et al., 2012). Since there are multiple dimensions (types) in
each market description, there is no linear ordering of markets in a set: they
are partially ordered. In a general sense, the higher the required values for a
market’s selected types, the higher the quality of that market. There is not ne-
cessarily a correlation between the quality and the price for the market, but it
makes sense to associate a higher price with a higher-quality market. There is
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ID price required information
properties items
b c k A B C D
low- m1-lo 20 200 0.1 20 20 20 20
mar- m2-lo 30 200 0.1 30 30 30 30
kets m3-lo 40 200 0.1 40 40 40 40
set m4-lo 50 200 0.1 50 50 50 50
high- m1-hi 20 200 0.1 20 20 20 20
mar- m2-hi 40 200 0.1 40 40 40 40
kets m3-hi 60 200 0.1 60 60 60 60
set m4-hi 80 200 0.1 80 80 80 80
Table 7.1: Specifications of two markets sets; b, c and k are price properties (see
Equation 7.1); A, B, C and D indicate the required criteria for this market, for
which values can range from 0 to 100.
a dumpmarket (not specified in the markets set) that has no requirements, but
pays nothing either. Apart from a last resort, the dump market is also a proxy
for the other options a farmer may have, for example, to start an alternative
trade alongside his farm, or to close his business.
7.5 Model mechanism
The sequence per time step in the simulation is illustrated in Figure 7.1. At each
time step, all farmers adjust their friends network; the institution supplies a
number of new information items to farmers and makes old information ob-
solete; the farmers exchange information items with a friend; they update their
market and offer their pigs to that market. Markets determine the price based
on supply; farmers sell the pigs they offered, collect their money, and replenish
i.e. buy new pigs. The amount of pigs they will purchase is a random number
between 1 and the maximum capacity they can hold, maximized to what they
can afford.
To identify their market, farmers choose one new candidate market at ran-
dom. When that market’s expected price (i.e. its last price) is higher than the
price the farmer received at his current market, he will opt for the newmarket,
which only succeeds if he meets the newmarket’s requirements. Otherwise, he
will remain at his current market, if he still meets its requirements. If that is no
longer the case, he will try to find another one. If nothing else works, he will
turn to the dump market. Farmers on the dump market do not leave the sys-
tem but can always return to a real market when they meet the criteria again.
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Figure 7.1: A time step in the simulation.
Themodel adopts a standard pricemechanism from economics (Perloff, 2009).
The pig price is calculated for each market according to Equation 7.1:
price = b + c ∗ e−kQ (7.1)
where b equals the base-price for that market (i.e. the price - related to market
quality - suppliers still receive when supply is endless), c is a constant related to
the price at low supply, and k is a measure for price elasticity (i.e. how the price
changes when the quantity changes). Q stands for total supply, an emergent
property at each time step. Each market has its own b, c, and k associated with
it.
The two policies to be tested, ‘sudden death’ (SD) versus ‘graceful degrad-
ation’ (GD) of the market with lowest criteria (excluding the dump market),
are implemented as a shock event during the simulation. A parameter in the
model allows specifying the time step at which this shock should occur. For SD,
at the moment of the shock, the lowest market is instantly made unavailable to
all farmers, meaning that no farmer can choose that market anymore from the
next time step onwards. All farmerswhohave the lowestmarket as their current
market are referred to the dump market instead. For GD, the market becomes
unavailable to newcomers at themoment of the shock, but existing farmers can
still keep using it as their current market. As soon as those farmers voluntarily
leave the market, they are not allowed to come back.
The first policy (SD) assumes that the low market becomes instantly un-
available, as if it were an unexpected natural disaster. In reality, a policy change
like this will be well announced beforehand, allowing farmers to anticipate and
prepare themselves for such a change. In our research, we do not take such
anticipation into account.
To have a measure of the distribution of wealth over the population of
farmers, as a sustainability indicator, the Gini coefficient is implemented in the
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model. This is a wellknown technique used by economists (Cowell, 1995). The
Gini coefficient is best described by a Lorenz curve. A Lorenz curve plots the
cumulative proportion of the total population against the cumulative propor-
tion of total income when the population is ordered from lowest to highest
income. In an equal society, this plot is a straight diagonal line (the line of
equality). The further a Lorenz curve deviates from that diagonal, the more
inequality there is in the population. The Gini coefficient is calculated as twice
the area between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve. In our implement-
ation, the Gini coefficient is a number between zero i.e. complete equality, and
100 i.e. complete inequality.
7.6 Agent-based properties
The model is agent-based in the sense that it exhibits heterogeneity, bounded
rationality, agent interaction, and emergence.
• Farmers are heterogeneous in a few respects: the number of information
items, the value those information items have for them, their current market
and the number of other farmers in their network.
• Bounded rationality is assumed when farmers try only one new market per
time step. By opting for only one candidate newmarket, the farmer runs the
risk that there is a better market available which he will not find. But given
the bounded rationality condition, it is assumed that farmers have no time
to check all available markets.
• Farmers also show bounded rationality because they do not know the price
they will actually get for their pigs, as this depends on total supply Q for that
market, which can only be calculated after all farmers have made a decision
(based on the expected price). Total supplyQ is therefore an emergent prop-
erty of the system, which is in contrast with analytical models where total
supply is a given.
• Agent interaction occurs through information items exchange between the
institution and farmers and between befriended farmers. The fact that
choice of market is influenced by total supply from all farmers can be con-
sidered implicit interaction.
• The outcome of all individual farmers’market decisions is an emergent prop-
erty at sector level: the distribution of farmers over availablemarkets. Higher
markets represent a higher level of animal welfare. Attained animal welfare
level or sustainability is therefore also emergent at sector level.
103
Figure 7.2: Sample convergence plot (in this case time step 300, Gini coefficient)
showing how the difference between successive average values converges as the
number of runs increases.
7.7 Simulation
For the simulations, we tested the two proposed policies: SD versus GD of the
market with lowest-quality criteria.
Naturally, the outcome of these tests is influenced by the other parameters
in the model. We therefore tested the model systematically with various input
parameters on both policies. The elements to be varied were the policy itself,
the available markets set, the information present in the system as controlled
by ISR, and the size of the friends network NFR.
As available markets, we alternated between two sets of our uniformly in-
creasing markets. One set was rather moderate on criteria, the other set was
more challenging. Table 7.1 shows the details of both markets sets (‘low’ and
‘high’).
All simulations were run with 100 farmers, and lasted 800 time steps. At
time 400, we introduced the shock. From pilot runs, we learned that 400 time
steps is more than enough to obtain a stable picture of the situation before a
shock. Another 400 time steps after a shock is sufficient to see what happens
afterwards.
For each of the 48 scenarios (all combinations of 2 policies, 2 markets sets,
4 values for ISR, 3 values for NFR) we ran 128 simulations. We started out with
64 simulations, but then carried out a simple convergence test to see whether
this number of simulation runs was sufficient. The convergence test was done
according to Troitzsch (2013a,b) which entails visual inspection of graphs plot-
ting the differences between successive average observables against increasing
run numbers. Figure 7.2 shows a sample convergence plot, depicting the dif-
ferences between successive average Gini coefficient values, as the number of
runs increases. We randomly inspected plots, from which we concluded that
64 is not but 128 runs is sufficient for our simulations.
The model was implemented in Netlogo 5 (Wilensky, 1999)). To do the
simulations, we wrote a program in Java to control the NetLogo model, using
104
NetLogo.jar. Our Java program takes input files containing the run specifica-
tions, passes all parameter settings to the NetLogo model, starts the run, col-
lects outputs from the model, and produces summarized output files for every
run, together with overall summary files. We chose to summarize run outputs,
because storing all raw data from all simulation runs is too costly with respect
to disc space. Using Java, we could also easily control Netlogo’s random seeds,
enabling reproduction of results. We used Python programs to further post-
process the summary files. Running the model on our common office PCs re-
quired about 1min per simulation run. For the research presented in this paper,
we needed 128 runs of 48 parameter sets i.e. 6,144 runs, which would require
roughly 100 h if we had run them sequentially. Running multiple parameter
sets in parallel reduced this to a manageable amount of time.
7.8 Results
The results of the simulations show consistently that there is no significant dif-
ference between the two policies as to what market farmers ultimately end up
supplying to. When only the end result counts, it does not matter which policy
to choose. As could be expected, the transition period following right after the
shock is consistently different for the respective policies. All simulation results
applying a SD policy show an abrupt, straight line decline of the lowest market
m1 at the time of the shock (400) and a simultaneous and equally abrupt rise
of the dump market. Instead, the simulation results from scenarios applying
the GD policy show a more gradual decline of the low market m1 (stretching
the decline over roughly 100 time steps) and a similar increase of the dump
market. After the shock, markets balance out into a new equilibrium, the ex-
tent of which depends on the other parameters. The average NFR and ISR are
responsible for the level of information in the system. The more information
in the system, the larger the share of higher markets will be: higher markets are
not reached when there is little information in the system (Osinga et al., 2012).
It also depends on the used markets set (high or low) whether farmers can or
cannot gather sufficient information items to fulfil the markets’ requirements.
Figures 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 each present two sample result graphs out of a total
of 48, one for every tested scenario. The graphs show the averages of all 128
simulation runs that were performed for that particular scenario. Each figure
displays the SD policy on the left, and the GD policy on the right-hand side.
Figure 3 shows a simulation scenario of no dynamic network (NFR = 0), an ISR
of 50% and a set of low markets. All available markets are within reach; after
the shock, in the GD policy scenario, market m1 still remains active for about
100 time steps.
Figure 7.4 represents an ‘information rich’ scenario with an average of 3
friends for each farmer (NFR = 3), an ISR of 50%, and the low-markets set. The
dump market is nearly absent (apart from an artificial peak with SD policy at
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Figure 7.3: Markets reached for NFR = 0, ISR = 50, low-markets set. SD (left)
versus GD policy (right).
Figure 7.4: Markets reached for NFR = 3, ISR = 50, low-markets set. SD (left)
versus GD policy (right).
shock time). Themajority of farmers supply to highestmarketm4, whose share
further increases after lowest market m1 falls out.
The scenario of Figure 7.5 is comparable with that of Figure 7.3 (no dynamic
network, evenhigher ISR) except that farmers have to dealwith the high instead
of the low-markets set. Figure 7.5 shows that farmers supply here mainly to the
lower markets: top market m4 is absent, and low markets m1 and m2 have
the highest shares. After the shock, m1’s share is almost entirely taken over by
the dump market. At the moment of shock, SD policy shows a slight increase
in m2, an increase absent with GD policy. All m1 farmers in SD are forced
elsewhere after the shock. Those who qualify for it can switch to m2 (which
explains the slight increase), whereas the others have no choice but to go to the
dump market. In contrast, in the GD, no farmers are forced to leave. A small
group remains supplying to m1, for almost 200 time steps even. The effect is
temporary though, in the long run, the m2 market share is at an equal level for
both SD and GD.
Plots of the average Gini coefficient of all simulation scenarios show a re-
markable difference between SD and GD policies. In a number of scenarios,
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Figure 7.5: Markets reached for NFR = 0, ISR = 75, high-markets set. SD (left)
versus GD policy (right).
Figure 7.6: Average Gini coefficient with standard deviation for NFR = 3, ISR =
50, low-markets set. SD (left) versus GD policy (right).
most clearly in those using the low-markets set, we observe a ‘bubble’ in the
GD policy scenarios, right after the shock, roughly between time 400 and 500.
Figure 7.6 shows a sample Gini coefficients plot for the same scenario as that
from Figure 7.4. The bubble shows a temporary higher Gini coefficient, indic-
ating a higher wealth inequality among the population.
Table 7.2 shows a quantification of the size of the Gini-bubble for half of the
scenarios. For conciseness reasons, the not so exciting scenarios with ISR = 25
and ISR = 100 were left out. The table shows the average Gini coefficient that
was calculated over all runs for each simulation scenario (as specified with the
parameters NFR, ISR, low- or high-markets set and SD or GD policy) during
three successive time frames: one before the shock (time 300-400), one right
after the shock (time 400-500), and one after that (time 500-600)when equilib-
rium has been re-established. The table also gives the standard deviations from
each average Gini coefficient. The differences between the average Gini coeffi-
cients of the two policies after the shock are largest in the low-market scenarios.
The difference remains visible also in time frame 500-600, well after the shock.
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low markets high markets
t 300-400 t 400-500 t 500-600 t 300-400 t 400-500 t 500-600
nfr isr policy avg stdev avg stdev avg stdev avg stdev avg stdev avg stdev
0
50 SD 37.93 0.35 39.25 0.70 39.98 0.31 41.55 0.81 45.40 1.54 47.67 0.78
GD 38.11 0.37 40.57 1.07 40.57 0.59 41.14 0.80 45.97 2.14 47.97 0.91
75 SD 37.69 0.28 38.17 0.28 38.29 0.21 42.34 0.51 45.56 0.81 46.79 0.64
GD 37.65 0.32 39.05 0.63 40.41 0.38 42.84 0.80 46.38 1.16 48.07 0.65
1
50 SD 37.62 0.33 38.11 0.29 38.19 0.25 39.86 0.38 42.89 0.78 43.29 0.34
GD 37.52 0.30 38.91 0.45 40.00 0.41 40.21 0.36 42.97 0.82 45.14 0.72
75 SD 38.69 0.31 39.08 0.31 39.01 0.23 56.52 1.19 58.03 0.93 58.65 0.71
GD 38.59 0.29 40.82 0.78 40.63 0.47 55.51 1.25 58.32 0.97 58.93 0.45
3
50 SD 38.78 0.30 39.14 0.31 39.09 0.25 48.85 0.95 50.41 1.11 50.34 0.78
GD 38.79 0.27 40.66 0.71 40.85 0.48 48.38 0.75 50.92 1.48 51.57 0.79
75 SD 38.87 0.28 39.06 0.35 38.98 0.24 47.31 0.48 48.45 0.67 48.48 0.47
GD 38.88 0.28 40.37 0.54 39.44 0.51 47.22 0.65 49.57 0.89 49.11 0.56
Table 7.2: Overall average and standard deviation of Gini coefficients for each
simulation scenario (specified byNFR, ISR, low- or high-markets set and policy
SD or GD) during three successive time frames; policy shock at t=400.
7.9 Answering the research questions
The research questions of this study were (1) whether it makes a difference by
what policy (SD or GD) farmers are encouraged or forced to switchmarket and
(2) which policy serves sustainability and animal welfare best, when not only
the final result but also the way towards that result is taken into account.
The answer to these research questions is:
1. Yes, policy matters. Looking only at the final outcome, there is no signific-
ant difference between the two policies. Both with SD and with GD policy,
the low market will disappear eventually, with or without forcing farmers
away from it. The remaining markets will find a new balance, dependent
on the other parameters of the model. This new ‘end’ balance is highly sim-
ilar for the two policies. Looking at the time of transition though, there is
a difference. With GD policy, the farmers are able to keep away from the
dump market a little bit longer. This is especially true in information-poor
situations, where farmers choose to linger on in the low market before the
market eventually disappears.
2. From a social sustainability perspective, GD is preferred over SD. For in-
dividual farmers, it makes a huge difference whether they can sustain their
business longer underGD, even though they will eventually leave themarket
anyway.
Comparing the Gini coefficients of both scenarios, there is a distinct differ-
ence between policies. It depends on the cause of the inequality whether this
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can be considered good or bad for the farmer population and for sustainability
in general.
7.10 Concluding remarks
The model we used for this study was not specifically developed for this pur-
pose, but seems to serve well for answering our research questions. There is
always the trade-off between richness of a model and clarity of simulation res-
ults i.e. to be able to allocate a relationship between model input and output
to the studied effect. In this case, the conceptual model of associating acquired
information items with required markets quality criteria appears to work well
in the case of excluding a market in the context of animal welfare policy and
sustainability developments.
One result of this work is that itmakes no differencewhich transition policy
is followed when only the final market redistribution is concerned. The result-
ing market redistribution after the shock shows no big surprises. Although
this seems not a very noteworthy result, it is in line with findings from resi-
lience research among farms’ responses to shocks: systems often show a re-
markable capability to retain similar structures and functionality after disturb-
ances (Peerlings et al., 2014). Being able to reproduce this phenomenon with
an agent-based model - employing the grow it to show it adage from Epstein
(2006) - is reassuring for the plausibility of the model.
An unexpected but salient result is the ‘Gini-bubble’, appearing in the GD
policy scenarios, showing a temporary higher Gini coefficient. A higher Gini
coefficient indicates wealth inequality, but it depends on the cause of the in-
equality whether this can be considered good or bad for the farmer population.
Is the inequality caused because very few ‘lottery winners’ get richer, and the
large majority remains poor or gets even poorer? Then, the population as a
whole does not benefit from the policy, which is unattractive. Or is it that the
people who become richer are entrepreneurial farmers who innovate freely and
get rewarded for it? Then, they constitute an example for their fellow farmers,
which can be considered an attractive side effect of the policy.
So an important question remains: what is the cause of this temporal in-
equality? With our current method of processing simulations, it is not pos-
sible to inspect in hindsight each individual farmer’s wealth at each moment in
time for every simulation run. Only an aggregated wealth indicator is available,
which tells us nothing about its distribution. It is, however, possible to identify
how many farmers are able to supply to each market during each moment in
time, so also during the time of the Gini-bubble. Farmers’ current market can
serve as a proxy for their wealth: if there is a substantial increase of number of
farmers supplying to a higher market, then this observation supports the ‘en-
trepreneurial’ explanation. If we see only little difference for the higher-market
segments (one or two farmers extra are hardly visible), then this supports the
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‘lottery winners’ explanation. We randomly inspected the market distributions
during the Gini-bubble which seem to be in favour of the explanation that the
observed Gini-bubble gives indeed rise to entrepreneurial feelings in the pop-
ulation. But to claim a better grounded explanation for this effect, we need to
examine it more deeply. Specifically, we need to inspect the distribution of in-
dividual farmers’ wealth during all time steps. Our model does generate this
information during simulation runs, but currently stores it only on an aggreg-
ated level, for conciseness and tractability reasons.
Other topics for further research include investigating what happens if
farmers could explicitly leave and (re-) enter the sector. Another interesting
extension would be if markets were more dynamical: that new markets would
appear on top of old markets becoming unavailable. This also better reflects
reality in the pork sector, where entrepreneurial farmers always search for un-
explored alleys.
Returning to the starting point of this research, which was initiated by a
current policy change in the Dutch pork sector, the conclusion of the research
seems applicable here. Instead of closing the lowest market by changing the
minimum requirements, farmers can be allowed a transition period in which
they are still able to supply to their usual market. In the long run, it makes no
difference for the level of animal welfare how exactly the low-quality market
is closed, if our conclusion is valid in practice. From individual perspective
though, the GD policy is much more farmer-friendly. The farmer population
as a whole will be more robust this way, which would mean a higher social
sustainability level.
We could ask ourselves how expandable this model is to other societies.
Would the Dutch situation apply to other European or world countries? A re-
cent paper on a project studying European farmers (Ingenbleek et al., 2013)
indicates that there are considerable differences between European countries
where animal welfare is concerned. Animal welfare depends on more than the
things we studied in our model, but Ingenbleek’s paper supports our view that
economic drivers and markets do have an impact alongside of policy interfer-
ence.
As for the usefulness of this research for other application domains, the
aforementioned domain of labour markets could be a candidate. The structure
of the model already seems to apply to labour markets: SD may be equival-
ent to closing a department immediately, while GDmay correspond to finding
new jobs for existing employees. What would need to change or be added to
the model to make it suitable for the labour market? It would be interesting to
investigate whether our model can be used for other transitions, both in agri-
culture and elsewhere.
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Part III -
Synthesis
• Chapter 8 - Revisit cases
+ multi-level analysis
• Chapter 9 - General discussion
Geachte boktor,Zoudt u zo vriendelijk willen zijn mij eens anders in
elkaar te zetten? Ik zit namelijk niet zo goed in elkaar.
Als ik goed nadenk klopt er niets aan mij: alles zit óf op de
verkeerde plaats óf doet maar wat. Voelsprieten, tenen: noem
maar op.
Ik zou ook graag eens een dunnere jas willen hebben. Mijn
huidige jas belemmert mij namelijk bij het vliegen. Hebt u mij
ooit hoog zien vliegen? In de wolken?
Ik niet.
En tenslotte ben ik niet tevreden over mijn gedachten. Ik
zou wel eens iets heel anders willen denken. Maar wat? Ja, als
ik dat wist, dan dacht ik het wel.
[...]
De krekel
Dear longicorn,Would you be so kind as to reconstruct me in a
different way? I seem to be somewhat misconstructed at the
moment, you see.
When I think about it, nothing seems right about me:
things are either in the wrong place or they just do whatever
they like. Antennae, toes - you name it.
I would also like to have a thinner coat, please. My present
coat hinders me when I am flying. Have you ever seen me fly
high? Up in the clouds?
I haven’t.
And, finally, I am not happy with my thoughts. I would
like to think of something completely different for a change. But
what? If I knew, I would’ve thought of it already.
[...]
The cricket
Preface to Chapter 8
Revisit cases +multi-
level analysis
Als je nou eens precies achter mij loopt, olifant,’ zei deeekhoorn, ‘dan bots je nergens meer tegenaan.’
‘Dat is goed,’ zei de olifant en hij liep achter de eekhoorn aan.
Een hele tijd ging het goed en iedereen keek vol verbazing
naar de eekhoorn en de olifant die vlak achter elkaar van de ene
kant van het bos naar de andere kant liepen. Ze liepen langs
slingerende paden, maar ze botsten nergens tegenaan.
De zon scheen en de builen op het hoofd van de olifant
slonken.
‘Lopen we eigenlijk wel goed?’ vroeg de olifant na een tijd.
‘Moet ik niet af en toe ergens tegenaan botsen?’
‘Maar je vindt het toch erg dat je overal altijd tegenaan botst?’
vroeg de eekhoorn verbaasd.
‘Ja, dat is zo,’ zei de olifant.
Ze liepen een tijd verder en zeiden niets.
De olifant werd somber. Ben ik zonder botsen mijzelf nog wel?
dacht hij. Hij wist nooit precies hoe hij zichzelf het meeste was.
Hij zuchtte diep.
Ten slotte hield hij het niet meer uit en sloeg plotseling rechtsaf.
Chapter 8 has been submitted to an ISI-rated journal:
Osinga S.A., Kramer M.R., Hofstede G.J., Beulens A.J.M. The knowledge man-
agement arena: agent-based modelling of an SME sector.
Maybe if you’d walk right behind me, elephant,’ the squirrelsaid, ‘then you wouldn’t bump into things anymore.’
‘All right,’ said the elephant, and he walked right behind the
squirrel.
It worked for quite some time and everyone watched in
amazement while the squirrel and the elephant walked right
behind each other from one end of the forest to the other. They
followed winding roads, but didn’t bump into anything once.
The sun was shining and the bumps on the elephant’s head
were dwindling.
‘Are you sure we’re doing this right?’ the elefant asked after a
while. ‘Shouldn’t I bump into something every now and then?’
‘But I thought you didn’t like to bump into things all the time?’
the squirrel asked, astonished.
‘That’s true,’ the elephant said.
They walked on for a while and didn’t say anything.
The elephant started to get glum. Am I still myself without
bumping? He never knew how exactly to be the most himself. He
sighed deeply.
In the end he couldn’t hold out any longer and suddenly turned
right.
Chapter 8
The knowledge management
arena: agent-based modelling
of an SME sector
Abstract. This article is concerned with knowledge representation in a case
of information management. We represent knowledge diffusion through a pop-
ulation in an SME sector. A sector consisting of small entrepreneurs is not man-
aged by an executive board. What occurs in the sector as a whole is the collect-
ive result of independent decisions taken by individuals, who work from a con-
text of friends, peers and other sector actors. Agent-based modelling as a method
comes very natural to this case, because it allows modelling individual behaviour
(exchanging knowledge and decision-making). The objective of this study is to
gain insight in the multi-level relationship between knowledge-rich decision be-
haviour of individuals and emergent sector level outcomes. This generic question
is applied to the case of the Dutch pig sector, specifically of farmers choosing a
(quality) market to supply their pigs to, where knowledge is assumed to be a pre-
requisite for market entry. A secondary aim of this article is methodological: it is
to convey the merits of applying agent-based modelling to this type of multi-level
research problem. Three specific research questions are investigated, taking into
account the multi-level perspective: the effect on farmers’ decision outcomes of
(1) knowledge exchange and (2) knowledge quality; and (3) the effect of imposing
a sector-level policy on the farmer population. Results show that (1) the presence
of sufficient knowledge in the system is more important than the network struc-
ture between knowledge exchanging agents for emerging quality market shares;
(2) efficient knowledge management improves quality, but there is a limit to that
efficiency; and (3) imposing policies on a sector the hard way is not necessarily
more effective than making gradual changes, while the latter is more friendly for
the individuals. For each of these questions, individual-level inspections provide
sector level insights, which is the added value of our multi-level approach.
8.1 Introduction
Small entrepreneurs frequently take decisions to run their busi-ness for which they need knowledge, such as market information or tech-nological know-how. They find themselves confronted with requirements
and obligations on the one hand, and the need to seize opportunities by mak-
ing use of offered support on the other. Requirements and obligations cover
the whole range of animal health and welfare concerns, consumer demands,
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societal pressure, peer pressure, and environmental, financial, legal and cer-
tification constraints. Business opportunities are positively fuelled by sup-
port offered such as good farming practices, smart breeding programmes, cus-
tomized nutrition, modern housing and environmental technologies (Scholten
et al., 2013). Surrounded with knowledge, it is the farmer’s task to make busi-
ness decisions.
Now let us consider the role of governments. From a policy perspective, a
strategic decision taken for the entire sector must be managed over a popula-
tion of entrepreneurs, who are autonomous decision makers. Such a strategic
decision could be to raise the minimum required quality level of meat, as re-
cently happened in theNetherlands in response to animalwelfare concerns (Pig
Progress, 2014). Another example of a strategic decision concerns tracking and
tracing of meat products and their provenance, which was a relevant issue in
the recent horsemeat scandal (Reuters, 2014). Although the government might
sometimes wish they could act as executive board of ‘the livestock firm’, the
farmers in the sector cannot be managed nor controlled like employees.
This article addresses themanageability issues of a sector consisting of indi-
vidual producers whomake the decision of what quality market to supply their
product to. Knowledge is assumed to be a prerequisite formarket entry. Know-
ledge in this sense subsumes both requirements and obligations, and the know-
how and capabilities involved to act in line with them. Manageability could be
a concern for government, sector-related organizations or other stakeholders
such as associatedNGOs. Complications formanageability are, in this case, the
multiple level perspectives and the feedbackmechanisms, explained as follows.
Individual producers act from their personal context, influenced by peers and
by what goes on in sector or society. As a feedback, their (joint) decision out-
comes have consequences for the producers themselves, for the sector, and for
society as a whole.
The generic manageability question is here applied to the case of the Dutch
pig sector - in particular to the case of farmers choosing a quality market for
their pigs. We define a quality market as a market segment that is well defined
in terms of specifications of the products, of the processes and resources used
andof a set of (legal and certification) requirements and conditions thatmust be
satisfied. Examples range from quality markets for bargain meat, regular meat,
market concepts such as ‘good farming star’ (a Dutch certified indication that
a minimum level of animal welfare has been respected) to fully qualified or-
ganic meat. Together, the available quality markets in a sector form the market
spectrum. The sum of farmers choosing for a certain quality market defines the
market’s share, which is an emerging property, changing over time. The pork
market spectrum is very dynamic. As of the 1970s, Dutch pork price hasmainly
been determined by production costs, disregardingmeat quality and sustainab-
ility aspects, and hence pork was sold ‘too’ cheap (Reinders et al., 2013). Under
influence of a society that becomes more food-aware and concerned about an-
imal welfare, and of a sector that has suffered from animal disease and food
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scandals, demand for sustainably produced higher quality meat is increasing.
Since pigs need time to grow, it is difficult for farmers to anticipate on the price
theywill get for a pig of certain quality, i.e. howmarket developments will affect
their return on investment later. Besides taking the chance of choosing for an-
other quality, farmers also need to have the knowledge and know-how to sup-
ply to that market. Markets have quality requirements for their suppliers, and
farmers can only opt for a certain market if they can meet that market’s condi-
tions. Higher quality markets pay higher prices, but price also depends on total
supply, which is an emergent property of all farmers’ joint decisions, unknown
at the time of deciding for a certain market. Moreover, it is not always clear
what ‘higher quality’ means, because some criteria require trade-offs, such as
animal welfare versus environmental impact (Scholten et al., 2013; Commissie
van Doorn, 2011).
Policy makers aiming at changing quality market shares within a sector can
do this only by means of indirect measures. They may find it worth investing
in (1) strengthening farmers’ networks to facilitate knowledge exchange, (2)
educational and training activities among farmers to increase their knowledge
level, and (3) imposing top-down measures in a sector that affect farmers’ op-
tions. These three issues have been translated into specific research questions:
(1) How much impact does knowledge exchange between farmers have for the
emerging result of all their individual market choices? (2) Does increasing the
quality of farmers’ knowledge lead to their opting for higher quality markets?
And (3) How effective is it for a government to impose a policy decision on the
farmer population, and what does that mean for individual farmers? For each
of these questions, sector level perspective as well as individual and peer level
perspectives are relevant.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, our methodo-
logy is explained. Then, model requirements are articulated. The next section
gives an overview of concepts derived from literature with respect to decision
making of farmers and the role of knowledge therein. Then themodel is presen-
ted, based on the concepts presented earlier. To investigate the three specific re-
search questions, structured simulation experiments and their results are then
described. Results are validated bymeans of expert validation, which is presen-
ted next. Conclusions based on model outcomes are then given. Finally, policy
implications are presented and discussed.
8.2 Methodology
The objective of our study is to investigate the manageability of a knowledge-
rich sector consisting of autonomous decision makers, by scrutinizing the re-
lationship between the sector and the behaviour of the individuals it consists
of. According to Epstein and Axtell (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 2006),
it is difficult to test such a relationship between individuals and the system
117
as a whole, because controlled experiments are hard to do in social sciences.
Highly aggregate models used to represent social processes ‘filter out’ time dy-
namics and the consequences of heterogeneity (Squazzoni et al., 2013). A com-
putational approach, like agent-based modelling (ABM), is considered a good
alternative to study this kind of phenomenon (Miller and Page, 2007). One
reason why ABM is well-suited as a method is because it allows for taking on a
bottom-up (individual level), side-out (peer level) and top-down (sector level)
perspective (Gilbert, 2008). Miller and Page summarize the goals for compu-
tational models of these kind of problems as: to uncover key insights into the
behaviour of these systems; to understand the behaviour of both the agents
within the systems and of the systems themselves; to make models as simple
and accessible as possible; and to make use of computational modelling to en-
hance understanding of the system (Miller and Page 2007). Our methodology
agrees with this approach.
8.2.1 Agent-based modelling in literature
There are several examples of ABM applied in agricultural domains. Ziervogel
et al. (2005) investigate the impact of using climatological information on crop
yields of farmers in Lesotho. This impact appears to depend on the farmers’
initial household characteristics, what response options they choose, and the
trust they place in the forecast (which in turn depends on their ability to learn
and to follow their neighbours). Ross Ross and Westgren (2009) present an
example of an ABM in the context of the agricultural supply chain, modelling
agricultural firms with entrepreneurial behaviour and firm interactions who
aim for wealth creation. Schouten et al. (2013) use a spatially explicit ABM to
study the resilience of a rural area with high quality nature managed by farm-
ers, and the effect of policy interventions in that area. Monticolo et al. (2014)
give an example of an ABM in the context of knowledge use. In their model,
knowledge within an innovative company is captured according to the roles of
the professional actors.
Knowledge-rich applications in other sectors include Roozmand et al.
(2011), whouseABMto study consumer decisionmaking based on culture, per-
sonality and human needs, showing differences in car purchasing across eleven
European countries. Gao et al. (2012) use an ABM to support urban manage-
ment, assessing various inspection strategies (district-first, community-first,
cooperative or random inspection). They claim that their ABM improves as-
sessment of the effectiveness of strategies and the distribution of their impacts.
These applications concern modelling individual behaviour. For most of
them multi-levelness is not explicitly an issue. It is addressed in Roozmand’s
application, where consumers’ individual behaviour is placed within culture,
i.e. group-level behaviour. It is also present in Schouten’s model, where indi-
vidual farmers’ land use decisions are modelled under both a hierarchical gov-
ernance regime and self-governance. The latter is very much in line with our
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research. The differences lie in the fact that Schouten observes land use change
as the result of farmers’ decision-making, and positions the model in a specific
geographical region. Land use change happens within a long-term time frame,
it is a ‘slow’ variable (Schouten, 2013). Our application observes the dynam-
ics of market shares, where the geographical component is absent. Changing
market is not an everyday decision for farmers, but it happens more often than
making land use changes decisions.
8.2.2 Middle-range model
In terms of Gilbert (2008) the model in this research is of middle range: the
aim is neither to model the behaviour of specific farmers in a certain region,
nor to make a purely theoretical point, but to show model behaviour that is
believably comparable to that of a range of corresponding real-world systems.
System-level phenomena emerging from simulations should be recognizable
by real-world experts, without having to match any specific situation one-on-
one. Agent-based modellers tend to refer to these system-level phenomena as
‘stylized facts’: broad, but not necessarily universal generalizations of empirical
observations that describe essential characteristics of a phenomenon (Rails-
back and Grimm, 2012). The term ‘stylized facts’ is borrowed from economics
(Kaldor, 1961), where it is used both to motivate the construction of a model
and to validate it.
Figure 8.1 shows ourmodelling framework; the numbers in it are explained
below. We first state the system-level phenomenon (or phenomena) of interest,
i.e. a pattern (1). In our case, this concerns the emerging range of qualitymarket
shares constituting the pig sector, the manageability of which we are interested
in. We assume a relationship with individual actors’ behaviour, in this case the
farmer deciding what market to aim for (2), and it is exactly this relationship
that we seek to gain insight in (3). We hold assumptions concerning this rela-
tionship that we have transformed into research questions. In our case, these
hypotheses are: (i) if farmers exchange more knowledge with each other, more
farmers will supply to higher quality markets; (ii) if the average quality of farm-
ers’ knowledge increases, more farmers will supply to higher quality markets;
and (iii) a top-down measure imposed on the farmer population is effective.
From literature about individual farmer behaviour, concepts are deduced (4)
to justify (5) the design choices (6) for the ABM. Guided by these choices, the
agents and their behaviouralmechanisms are designed through abstraction and
selection (7), and implemented into an ABM (8). For each research question,
appropriate simulation scenarios are executed, generating synthetic data to be
analysed (9). From these results, a pattern may emerge, dependent of the sim-
ulation scenarios (10). If the generated pattern matches the pattern of interest,
judged by means of expert validation (11), we have gained something. What
we have gained is insight in the relationship between this pattern and the agent
behaviour underlying it (12), because our simulation results allow inspection to
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Figure 8.1: Modelling framework; numbers are explained in section 8.2.2.
explain how and why this pattern emerged. This insight can itself be validated
by experts (13).
A secondary aim of our article is to convey the methodology of applying
agent-basedmodelling to this type of research problem, since it is not common
practice within the agent-based modellers’ community to report each model-
ling step. This article makes explicit the steps from research questions tomodel
requirements (section 8.3), to assumptions for the model taken from literat-
ure (section 8.4), to a model description (section 8.5) including design choices
and implementation steps to arrive at the ABM, to genesis and analysis of syn-
thetic data (section 8.6), and presentation and visualisation of results on dif-
ferent levels of analysis (section 8.7), while keeping in mind consistency and
comparability of successive model versions, and the role of expert validation
(section 8.8).
8.3 Model requirements: concepts and relationships
Table 8.1 shows per research question the required concepts and relationships
to define.
Most elements in Table 8.1 can be derived from literature, such as: what
market options do farmers have, or: what knowledge is involved when making
a decision? Some can be empirically supported, like the decision mechanism
and the type of knowledge and exchange mechanism farmers use. Other ele-
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Research question Concepts and relationships to define
What individual, peer and sector • Multi-level decision making context
level influence do farmers of farmers:
experience when they make their • individual level influence
market decision? • peer level influence
(generic research question) • sector level influence
How much impact does knowledge • knowledge (of what kind?)
exchange between farmers have on • exchange mechanism (which?)
the emerging result of all their • between farmers (by which connections?)
individual market choices? • market (what are the options?)
(research question 1) • choice (by what decision mechanism?)
• emerging result (how to represent?)
• influentual (how to measure?)
Does increasing the quality of • increase knowledge quality (how to
farmers’ knowledge lead to their represent?)
adopting higher quality markets? • quality of a market (how to represent?)
(research question 2) • adopting (by what decision mechanism?)
• higher (how to measure?)
How effective is it for a government • government (how to represent?)
to impose a policy decision on the • policy decision (how to represent?)
farmer population? • impose (how?)
(research question 3) • effective (how to measure?)
Table 8.1: Required concepts and relationships to define per research question.
ments concern representation of results, for example: how can ‘emerging result
of market choices’ be represented as a simulation experiment outcome.
Table 8.2 further summarizes Table 8.1. It presents per concept or mechan-
ism the assumptions for which to find empirical support from literature. Num-
bers refer to sections.
8.4 Assumptions
The assumptions for the model are treated in line with Table 8.2. For each
concept or mechanism, selected literature is presented, from which relevant
findings are summarized into assumptions to guide the ABM design.
8.4.1 Influence structure
Farmers are not alone. They have family, friends and peers. They have their dir-
ect suppliers, like feed suppliers, and their direct customer, being a slaughter-
house or processing company (called ‘market’ here). There are governmental
bodies that provide a legal framework, sector organizations, certification in-
stitutes, veterinarians, and banks. There are consumers who buy the meat, cit-
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Concept / mechanism Assumptions to derive from literature
Influence structure What personal, peer and sector level influences
8.4.1 do farmers experience when making decisions?
Decision mechanism What mechanism adequately describes the
8.4.2 decision making process of farmers; what
is relevant for their market choice?
Knowledge use How do farmers collect and apply knowledge
8.4.3 while making decisions?
Knowledge type What kind of knowlege is involved in pig
8.4.4 farmers’ market decision making?
Exchange mechanism What connections exist between farmers and
8.4.5 other actors in the field; in what way do they
exchange knowledge with each other?
Markets What are farmers’ options; what are markets’
8.4.6 quality requirements & price mechanisms?
Table 8.2: Overview of concepts for which to find empirical support; numbers
refer to sections.
izens who have concerns, andNGOs. For an overview of stakeholders and their
structural relationships, see (Hofstede et al., 2004, p. 16).
Arens et al. (2012) describe the influences German pig farmers experience.
Their findings include that farmers’ intrinsic motivation is the most important
driver, and that it is influenced by ‘role model farmers’, for instance successful,
widely known farmers, as well as by educational activities. Alarcon et al. (2013)
studied British pig farmers. The farmers indicate that they highly value what
they hear from other farmers, even though these tend to ‘tell only the good
things, not the bad things’. They perceive the veterinarian as the most trusted
information source on disease control.
In order tomanage their farm successfully amidst thesemany stakeholders,
farmers need to recognize opportunities and acquire required knowledge and
other resources. Scholten et al. (2013) summarize the constraints within which
farmers need to operate. They introduce the concept ‘livestock farming with
care’, which integrates four principles of sustainability: health (healthy and safe
for animals and humans), customized care (from the individual animal’s per-
spective and integrity), no nuisance (from an environmental and societal per-
spective) and credible performance (from an economic and public prospect).
The first three translate into requirements for the farmer: the processing com-
pany or slaughterhouse may not accept his product if he disregards the rules.
The fourth one is a requirement in the sense that a farm needs to be econom-
ically viable or it cannot survive.
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Relevant for model design:
a) Farmers experience influence from peers and other actors in the field.
b) Role model farmers and educational activities influence farmers’ in-
trinsic motivation.
c) Peers are perceived as a reliable source of information.
d) The veterinarian is perceived as a reliable source of information.
e) Farmers can only opt for a market if they qualify for what it requires.
f) Any decision is subordinate to keeping the farm economically viable.
8.4.2 Decision mechanism
An often used theory to describe behaviour is the theory of planned behaviour
(TPB) (Ajzen, 1991, 2011). It states that attitude toward behaviour, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioural control together shape an individual’s be-
haviours. The TPB has been applied in studies that involve decision making of
farmers, for instance regarding the use of climatological information by Iranian
farmers (Sharifzadeh et al., 2012), regarding the intention of Dutch dairy farm-
ers to take action with respect to cow foot health problems (Bruijnis et al. 2013),
and regarding English pig farmers’ decision-making process for disease control
(Alarcon et al., 2013). Sharifzadeh et al. found that farmers often did not use
climatological information at all, even though considerable effort was made to
make this information available to them, and that ‘attitude’ toward use of in-
formation was the most prominent driver for farmers’ behaviour. Bruijnis et
al. found that the most important driver for farmers to improve dairy cow foot
health was cost-effectiveness, and that feed advisors and foot trimmers were
most influential. Alarcon et al. report that pig mortality, a ‘feeling of enter-
ing an economically critical situation’, animal welfare concerns and a ‘feeling of
despair’ were drivers for pig farmers to take action. Also they found that lack of
awareness was a barrier, as well as difficult access to current scientific research
output.
Although these three studies all applied theTPB to farmer decisionmaking,
the outcomes are highly dependent on their design. Only drivers and barriers
that were taken into account could be reported as influential. Nevertheless all
studies demonstrate that farmers do have different attitudes that influence their
behaviour, that information use (and access to information)makes a difference,
that there is social influence from peers and other actors in the field, and that
economic aspects (cost-effectiveness) are important.
Farmers need to manage their farm in such a way that continuity is en-
sured. To that end, a minimum requirement is for the farm to be economically
viable. Farmers have a management plan and periodically reconsider their op-
tions. Simon introduced the concept of bounded rationality: people do not
weigh all their options like a Homo economicus, but are constrained by time,
resources, personal circumstances or cognitive abilities; they use a satisficing
rather than an optimizing approach to make decisions (Simon 1957). There is
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ample evidence from sociology that farmers’ decision behaviour is influenced
by behaviour and norms from other people such as family, peers and friends
(Commandeur, 2006; de Rooij et al., 2010; Ambrosius et al., submitted). Social-
izing is an important driver for farmers’ decision behaviour. Jager and Janssen
(2012) elaborate on this idea also in their ‘consumat’ approach in consumer
studies.
Relevant for model design:
g) Farmers are heterogeneous decision makers, influenced by attitude.
h) There is social influence; some actors in the field are more influential
than others.
i) Information use makes a difference with respect to decision making.
j) Farmers do not always use information that is available to them.
k) Economic aspects are driving forces for farmers to take action.
l) Farmers have bounded rationality.
8.4.3 Knowledge use
Anthropologist Paul Richards intensively studied farmer behaviour in various
agricultural contexts (Richards, 1989, 1993), especially in cases where taking
action, or ‘performance’, is associated with knowledge and technology. He ar-
gues that farming has a technical dimension (use of skills, tools, knowledge
and techniques to accomplish certain ends), a social dimension (management
and control of e.g. the labour process), and an economic dimension (how to
be productive according to market conditions). It makes little sense to talk
about technology without context (‘an axe in the hand of a tree feller is a dif-
ferent tool than an axe in the hands of a confused, deceived lover’). Richards
makes use of the term ‘situated action’, introduced by Suchman (1987), to argue
that “every course of action depends in essential ways on its material and so-
cial circumstances”. Not only the intrinsic characteristics of tools and artefacts,
but the process of using them to make something, including knowing-that and
knowing-how, are needed to perform. And: no single individual has complete
knowledge of all steps involved in a specific process, but knowledge is divided
over a team of individuals involved in that process.
Relevant for model design:
m) Knowledge has multiple dimensions (technological, social, economic).
n) Knowledge resides over multiple individuals, and is exchanged between
individuals.
o) Knowledge is not absolute. It is dependent of subject, time and situation.
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8.4.4 Knowledge type
Schulze et al. (2006b) apply the framework of explicit versus tacit knowledge
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) to describe information use by German pig farm-
ers with respect to market coordination. They state that pork production em-
ploys primarily explicit knowledge, such as development of pig prices and state-
of-the-art disease treatment, often provided on an on-going basis by producer
associations or publicly subsidized institutions. Pork production strongly de-
pends on good animal health and biological performance indicators such as
daily weight gain and feed conversion efficiency.
Arens et al. (2012) describe the use of information regarding health man-
agement on German pig farms. They mention: prices, costs, product quality,
expected supply and demand, orders and delivery dates. They further find that
farmer’s competence, information quality and frequency of use are influential
factors.
Alarcon et al. (2013) investigate what kind of knowledge and information is
involved in British pig farmer’s decisionmaking from the perspective of disease
control. The farmers indicate that it is hard to come by reliable information.
Scientific knowledge is hardly accessible or incomprehensible to them; they do
not trust knowledge coming from commercial sources because they suspect
conflicts of interest.
Relevant for model design:
p) Explicit knowledge is more predominant in spot markets than implicit
or tacit knowledge.
q) Types of knowledge are: prices, costs (e.g. disease treatment), product
quality (e.g. weight gain, feed conversion efficiency), expected supply
and demand, orders, delivery dates.
r) Information access is not always easy. Information may be unavailable,
or not comprehensible.
8.4.5 Exchange mechanism
Richards’ notion that knowledge is distributed overmultiple individuals within
a community (see 4.3) is shared by the theory of diffusion of innovations (Ro-
gers, 1962, 2003). In the context of this article, an innovation could be a novel
technology, idea, or practice known to some farmers, which allows them to
supply to certain markets. Adoption would mean that the innovation not only
becomes known to a farmer, but that the farmer also decides to act upon it. Dif-
fusion is the process by which an innovation spreads through the community.
There is a social component to this theory in the sense that individuals may in-
fluence each other as to whether or not to adopt the innovation. Brudermann
et al. (2013) studied farmers’ decision processes with respect to adopting photo-
voltaic installations. They identified that economic considerations dominate
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the decision making process, and that socio-dynamic factors are particularly
important in the information collection process prior to the decision to adopt
or not.
Relevant for model design:
s) Knowledge diffuses through a community by an exchange mechanism.
t) Individuals may influence each other during the exchange.
u) Socio-dynamic factors are important when collecting information prior
to adopting.
v) Knowing something does not necessarily imply acting upon it.
8.4.6 Markets
Market choice matters to a pig farmer. This choice is influenced by the terms
and conditions of the available markets, and also depends on how the relation-
ships between farmers and markets are coordinated. Decision-oriented organ-
ization theory addresses the need for coordinating between decision makers
at firm level (McCann and Galbraith, 1981) or at supply chain level (Lazzarini
et al., 2001).
Schulze et al. (2006b, 2007) use this theory to position empirical results
from their study on decision behaviour of pig farmers with respect to mar-
ket coordination. Two coordination models are predominant in the main pork
producing countries: spotmarkets and contract farming. Spotmarkets are pre-
ferred in many European countries where pork production chains are compar-
atively loosely organized in short-term agreements. Those allow easy change of
buying and selling behaviour - although often there is a long-term relationship
with a limited number of livestock dealers or slaughterhouses. In other import-
ant pork producing countries (United States, Brazil, Denmark, Spain) contract
farming prevails, making the farmers dependent on centralized decisions from
processors. Schulze argues that the spotmarket is favourable for German farm-
ers because they can keep their entrepreneurial freedom, and transactions re-
main transparent.
The main driver for market coordination is price. Output or performance
control mechanisms (such as carcass grading systems) are used to communic-
ate expected qualities to farmers, and rewards are immediate and dependent on
market success. Intrinsic motivation, and exchange of tacit knowledge, is more
necessary for other types of market mechanisms with a higher degree of co-
ordination, as are group identity, loyalty and commitment. Schulze praises the
extrinsically motivated, explicit-knowledge-oriented characterization of Ger-
man pork production, because of its high autonomy, high flexibility and high
incentive intensity. The situation for Dutch pork farmers is similar to that of
the Germans.
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Relevant for model design:
w) The predominant market coordination mechanism of Dutch and Ger-
man pork production is the spot market.
x) Price is the main driver of the spot market mechanism.
y) Markets communicate expected qualities to farmers by means of output
control mechanisms, in terms of explicit knowledge.
8.5 Model description
8.5.1 Design choices
In line with Gilbert’s middle-range criterion, the model needs to be sufficiently
rich to represent the real-world situation and to answer the research questions,
but also parsimonious enough to be interpretable. For every item collected
from the literature in section 8.4, design choices were made. They are listed in
Table 8.3.
Representation of knowledge
An example of how the literature findings result in design choices, see Table 8.3,
is the representation of knowledge in the model. Based on the literature find-
ings, we reasoned as follows. Knowledge plays a role in farmers’ decision mak-
ing process (i). Knowledge has multiple dimensions (m), but is mainly explicit
knowledge (p) of different types (q) that has a different value to different people
at different times (o). Not all knowledge is available to all people (r) and if it is
available it is not always used (j): knowing something is not the same as acting
upon it (v). Knowledge is exchangedwith other people (n) and diffuses through
a population (s). It comes either from an independent, trustworthy source (like
the veterinarian), who can also explain it when it is incomprehensible scientific
knowledge (r), or it comes from peers (c). Having the right knowledge plays a
key role for market entry (e).
Based on these characteristics, we modelled knowledge as a collection of
information items, or info-items for short, of which each farmer has a private
collection. Info-items are represented as triplets of id, type, and value. Id is
meant to distinguish info-items from one another and to indicate their age.
Type is the abstract dimension to which the info-item belongs. Value refers
to the value that this info-item has for its current owner. For example, [24,
B, 40] represents an info-item with id 24, of type B, which has a value of 40
to its owner. A farmer can exchange info-items under certain conditions with
peers in his network (the size of which is a model parameter). When a farmer
exchanges an info-item with somebody else, the new owner receives a copy of
the info-item, but its value diminishes. This is to reflect the fact that farmers
cannot simply copy knowledge and skills from each other, but instead have
to build up some expertise for themselves. New info-items are brought into
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the system by ‘the institution’, an abstraction of the veterinarian or any other
independent information source, at a certain rate that is a model parameter.
Info-items become obsolete over time by age, reflecting the dynamic nature of
regulations, knowledge, and appropriate skills.
Markets are mainly defined by a collection of quality criteria. These are
expressed in terms of the same types and values as the info-items. Markets may
require minimum values for selected information types. Eachmarket thus rep-
resents a certain quality; markets together cover the available quality spectrum.
Collected from literature Design choices for the ABM
Influence structure (8.4.1) • Farmers are connected with peers with
• Farmers experience influence from whom they can exchange info-items;
peers and other actors in the field (a) no distinction between family, neigh-
• Role model farmers and educational bours or friends
activities influence farmers’ intrinsic • Connections change at random
motivation (b) • Other actors (government, bank,
• Peers are perceived as a reliable source veterinarian, feed supplier, etc.) are
of information (c) abstracted to ‘the institution’
• The veterinarian is perceived as a • Farmers can be educated (= receive
reliable source of information (d) info-items) by connected peers or by the
institution
Decision mechanism (8.4.2)
• Farmers are heterogeneous decision
makers, influenced by attitude (g)
• There is randomness involved in farm-
ers’ decision behaviour
• There is social influence; some actors
are more influential than others (h)
• Social influence is proportional to the
number of connections that an agent has
• Information use makes a difference
with respect to decision making (i)
• Farmers do not use all info-items they
have when making decisions
• Farmers do not always use information • Decisions are based on info-items
that is available to them (j); information
access is not always easy (r)
• Economic aspect: make sure that
farmers have a minimal income
• Economic aspects are driving forces for
farmers to take action (k); any decision is
subordinate to keeping the farm
• Bounded rationality: farmers consider
only one option for improving their
market at every time step
economically viable (f) • Farmers need to qualify for a market
• Farmers have bounded rationality (l) in terms of minimal values for
• Farmers can only opt for a market if
they qualify for what it requires (e)
required info-items
Knowledge use (8.4.3) • Info-items have multiple dimensions,
• Knowledge has multiple dimensions i.e. types
(technological, social, economic) (m) • Info-items can reside with more
• Knowledge resides over multiple individuals and can be exchanged
individuals, and is exchanged between • The value of info-items differs per
individuals (n) farmer and changes after exchange
• Knowledge is not absolute. It is depen- • Info-items can become obsolete
dent of subject, time and situation (o) • Info-items are ‘in use’ or not
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Knowledge type (8.4.4)
• Explicit knowledge is more predomin-
ant in spot markets than implicit know-
ledge (p)
• Info-items each have a type, represent-
ing a knowledge dimension, best suit-
able to represent explicit knowledge
• Types of knowledge are: prices, costs
(e.g. disease treatment), product qual-
ity (e.g. weight gain, feed conversion ef-
ficiency), expected supply and demand,
orders, delivery dates (q)
• The types are abstract in the model,
and can be filled in for a specific applica-
tion. Thismakes the representation suit-
able for a pig farmer case as well as e.g.
a housing market case
Exchange mechanism (8.4.5) • There is an exchange mechanism
• Knowledge diffuses through a com-
munity by an exchange mechanism (s)
between connected farmers; new know-
ledge comes in through the institution
• Individuals may influence each other
during the exchange (t)
• Socio-dynamic factors are the connec-
tions that exist between famers; these
• Socio-dynamic factors are important are partly dynamic
when collecting information prior to • A decisions is based on priorly
adopting (u) collected knowledge
• Knowing something does not necessar-
ily imply acting upon it (v)
• Farmers act upon info-items only if
their values reach a required minimum
Markets (8.4.6)
• The predominant market coordination
mechanism of Dutch and German pork
production is the spot market (w)
• The market mechanism reflects the
spot market: ad hoc ‘bargains’, no fixed
contracts
• Price is themain driver of the spotmar-
ket mechanism (x)
• Farmers evaluate a market through an
expected price mechanism
• Markets communicate expected qualit-
ies to farmers by output control mechan-
isms, in terms of explicit knowledge (y)
• Markets set quality requirements in
terms of minimum values for certain
types of info-items
Table 8.3: Design choices based on collected relevant findings from literature
(see section 8.4).
Abstraction
The trade-off between capturing the richness of the real world and maintain-
ing clarity in the ABM behaviour requires making choices on what to repres-
ent explicitly and what to aggregate into a generic representation. Some design
choices are more general than what the literature findings suggest. In those
cases, the gain of maintaining clarity in the model outweighed the cost of sac-
rificing representation power. For example, the conceptual richness of farmers
collecting information, deciding what to do and acting upon it has been mod-
elled partly by randomization. Randomly assigning info-items with random
values to farmers is the abstract generalization of modelling the variation of
deliberate choices that each farmer makes based on personality and circum-
stances, the specific details of which are not our primary concern.
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8.5.2 ODD protocol
To describe the ABM, we present a concise ODD (Overview, Design concepts,
and Details) protocol. It was first introduced in the ecological individual-based
modelling community and is nowmore commonly used by ABMmodellers in
general to communicate model specifications (Grimm et al., 2006, 2010).
General purpose
The model aims to investigate the emerging range of quality market shares, in
a knowledge-rich sector, as the joint outcome of agents’ market choices. De-
cisions are based on multi-dimensional knowledge which agents collect and
exchange within their network, brought into the system by an independent
source (‘institution’). The model is generic: agents, products and markets are
applicable to multiple domains. In our case, the agents are farmers selling pigs
to meat quality markets.
Entities, state variables and scales
Agent types and their main attributes:
Farmers: current market: market to which farmer currently supplies and
qualifies for; friends: other farmers in network (to exchange info-items with;
info-items: private collection of triplets [id, type, value] (see 8.5.1); number of
pigs: amount of product a farmer has for sale; wealth: farmer’s earnings.
Markets: quality: a list of criteria with requiredminimum values for info-items
of selected types; price: the price this market currently pays (represented by
three price constituents, see price mechanism); last price: last price of this
market, by which farmers evaluate the market; total supply: total amount of
farmers supplying to this market;
Institution: info-items: all available info-items, with maximum value, to be
handed out to farmers at a supply rate (ISR).
Spatial resolution: The model is not spatially explicit.
Temporal resolution: 1 time step is the time needed for pigs to mature, which
is about 6 months. The simulation length is adjustable; standard runs last 2000
steps. The first 100 steps are neglected.
Process overview and scheduling
Figure 8.2 illustrates the model cycle of one time step. The steps are explained
as follows, starting after the ‘tick’ (a new time step).
Adjust network: Farmers pick one new friend among friends’ friends, or a ran-
dom friend if this fails. When the average number of friends per farmer within
the population (NFR) becomes too high, friends are dropped at random.
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Figure 8.2: The model cycle; one time step in the simulation.
Supply info: The institution creates one new info-item and adds it to the col-
lection of info-items. It supplies a random number of farmers with a random
info-item, according to the information supply rate ISR.
Update info: Each farmer evaluates one random market. If its expected price
(i.e. last price) is higher than his current market’s price, and he qualifies for it,
he will change market. If not, he keeps his current market, if he still qualifies,
because due to loss of information that may no longer be the case. If all else
fails, the commodity market remains, that has no requirements but farmers do
not get paid anything either.
Offer pigs to market: Offer pigs to the market; now total supply becomes
known.
Determine price: Markets can determine their actual price based on a fixed
part (the base price) and an elastic part, dependent on total supply.
Sell: Farmers receive money (based on the actual price) for their pigs.
Replenish: Farmers buy new pigs (at a fixed price). They buy a randomnumber
between 1 and maximum capacity, maximized to what they can afford.
Model parameters
ISR: the information supply rate at which the institution supplies new inform-
ation to farmers ([0,100]).
NFR: the number of friends, a population average, expressed per farmer. On
population level the friend ratio equals NFR at all times. Individual farmers
have various numbers of friends, changing over time.
thr: the value-threshold ([0,100]); any info-items with a value lower than thr
will be disposed of, so that only high-valued items remain.
kch: the keep-chance by which info-items currently in-use (i.e. used to qualify
for the current market) are protected from disposal ([0,100]).
shock-at: the time step at which a shock is introduced, after which a market
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closes and the degrading factor becomes active. If shock-at is larger than the
run length, there is no market degradation.
degrading: when the shock occurs, the degrading factor [0,100] defines the
percentage of farmers allowed to keep a closed market as their current market
until they voluntarily leave (after which they cannot return).
network: farmers’ static connections (non-numeric, a list of other farmers).
They also have a dynamic network of friend connections, controlled by NFR.
Static connections could be interpreted as family relationships.
markets set: the range of available quality markets (non-numeric). Each mar-
ket is defined as a list of 3 price constituents followed by requirements on vari-
ous types. There is no limit to the number of types.
random seed: defining randomization in the model, saved for all runs, thus
allowing for reproducibility.
Design concepts
Emergence
• The outcome of the model (range of market shares) is emergent.
• Total supply is emergent. The price a market pays depends on total supply,
which is calculated after all farmers made their decision.
Adaptation
• Farmers opt for one new market at every time step and evaluate it based on
its price, which is an emergent property.
• Farmers adjust their network by gaining a new friend (where friends’ friends
have priority) and dropping friends at random when the NFR is too high.
New friends offer an opportunity to gain new info-items.
• Markets’ actual price depends on total supply. Farmers who choose amarket
with little supply (a niche market) receive higher price, even if the market’s
base price is low.
Objective
• Farmers have no other objective than to earn as much money as possible.
Learning
• Farmers do not change their decision behaviour. But they learn in the sense
that their collection of info-items changes, reflecting experience and skills.
The longer they live, the more likely it is that they will qualify for a new
market.
Prediction
• Farmers use an estimated price, i.e. its last price, to evaluate a new market.
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Interaction
• The institution interacts with farmers at random to supply an info-item.
• Farmers interact (exchange info-items) with farmers only within their net-
work (both static and dynamic).
• Implicit interaction occurs because total supply determines amarket’s actual
price.
Stochasticity
• Most agent’s choices involve some randomness. This is an abstraction of the
variation in a population of agents who make deliberate choices that we do
not explicitly model.
• The order in which agents carry out tasks within one time step is random.
• All randomness is controlled by a random seed that is registered, so simula-
tion runs are reproducible.
Observation
• Main observable is the amount of farmers supplying to each market at each
time step in the simulation. Simulation data are summarized during ana-
lysis, but detailed data can be inspected when desired.
• Another observable is theGini-coefficient, a system-levelmeasure of the dis-
tribution of wealth over a population; it is calculated from each farmer’s in-
dividual wealth (Cowell, 1995).
• Other observables are farmers’ wealth, networks, and information items.
Initialization
In the simulation runs, input parameters of interest are systematically varied,
dependent of the research question. The main input parameters that are kept
constant are: number of farmers (100), number of institutions (1), number of
time steps (2000), total number of information items (100), average amount of
initial information items per farmer (20).
Input data
The model does not use any external data. Input parameters of interest are
systematically varied between runs, dependent of the research question, see
the description of simulation experiments in section 8.6.
Sub models
Info-itemexchangemechanism: When farmers exchange info-itemswith other
farmers (or the institution), new info-items are combined with the old ones.
That occurs according to Table 8.4:
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New info-item is... Condition: Resulting value:
not yet present − random[0, newvalue]
already present newvalue > oldvalue randomvalue[oldvalue , newvalue]
already present newvalue < oldvalue old value remains
Table 8.4: Calculating an info-item’s new value after exchange.
Price mechanism: The model adopts a standard price mechanism from eco-
nomics (Perloff, 2009). The pig price is calculated for each market according
to Equation 8.1:
price = b + c ∗ e−kQ (8.1)
where b equals the base-price for that market (i.e. the price, related to market
quality, suppliers still receive when supply is endless), c is a constant related to
the price at low supply, and k is a measure for price elasticity (i.e. how the price
changes when the quantity changes). Q stands for total supply, an emergent
property at each time step. Each market has its own b, c, and k associated with
it.
Market qualification mechanism: To evaluate whether a farmer qualifies for
a market, his info-item values are compared with the market’s required min-
imum values per selected type. A farmer may have several info-items of the
same type. The farmer considers the average value of his 5 highest information
items per type to see whether he meets the market requirements. This value of
5 is the default information window value.
8.6 Simulation experiments
For each research question a simulation experiment was defined. These exper-
iments have been described in previous studies, two of them using preliminary
versions of the current model. The purpose of re-doing the experiments is that
we examine themmore closely nowbymeans of additionalmulti-level analyses.
The three experiments are:
• Experiment 1: How much impact does knowledge exchange between farm-
ers have on the emerging result of all their individual market choices? This
experiment is described in detail in (Osinga et al., 2012), using a preliminary
version of the current model. The experiment studies the effect of different
network topologies between farmers (their static network) in combination
with a population average NFR connections (dynamic network) and differ-
ent market sets on the respective market shares. Also the rate at which new
information enters the world (ISR) was varied.
• Experiment 2: Does increasing the quality of farmers’ knowledge lead to
their choosing for higher quality markets? This experiment is described in
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detail in (Osinga et al., 2013), using a preliminary version of the current
model. The experiment studies whether it is rewarding to dispose of low-
valued info-items, so that the average quality of remaining info-items in-
creases. Therefore, all info-items that have a low value (according to a value
threshold thr) are disposed of. Also, the effect of extra protecting info-items
that are ‘in use’ for supplying to the current market is studied (by applying a
chance kch that an in-use item is saved from disposal).
• Experiment 3: How effective is it for a government or sector as a whole to
impose a policy decision on the farmer population? This experiment is de-
scribed in detail in (Osinga et al., 2014), using the current model. The ex-
periment studies what happens when the lowest quality market is no longer
an option, referring to what happened in the Netherlands when retailers de-
cided in May 2014 that they wished to respect animal welfare concerns and
that they would only accept meat of good farming star quality from now on
(Pig Progress, 2014). Two different market closure policies are tested: sud-
den death (SD) versus graceful degradation (GD).
For this article, all experiments were re-run with the current comprehens-
ive model, which comprises all elements that were available in previous model
versions. When the model element can be ignored for an experiment, para-
meters controlling it are given neutral values. When the model element is of
particular interest for an experiment, parameters controlling it are systematic-
ally varied. Osinga et al. (2013) describe some methodological aspects of safe-
guarding model outcomes when using successive model versions. We determ-
ined the number of runs for each experiment with help from a convergence
test introduced by Troitzsch, which entails visual inspection of graphs plotting
the differences between successive average observables against increasing run
numbers Troitzsch (2014). On top of the production runs, we also did runs
for local sensitivity analysis, most extensively in Experiment 2. Table 8.5 shows
how parameters of interest were varied per experiment. Things from Table 8.5
not mentioned yet in the ODD are explained below:
• Network topologies of their static networks were tested in populations of
100 farmers. Topology ring10d consists of 10 disjoint ring-wise connected
clans; clan10-2d consists of 10 disjoint clans, where each clanmember is con-
nected to 2 random other clan members; in tree1-10 one agent is connected
to 10 others who are separately connected to 9 others; isolated means that
there are no connections at all.
• Market sets: requirements are always expressed in terms of abstract types
A, B, C and D with range [0,100].
– ext-diff8: 4 low and 4 high quality markets. The low ones require 10 on A,
B, C, D respectively and none on the three other types, base price 10; the
high ones require 80 instead of 10 and have base price 80. (Experiment 1)
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– ext-same8: the same markets as ext-diff8, but all base prices are 50. (Ex-
periment 1)
– unif-inc8: 8 uniformly increasing markets. Market 1 requires 10 each on
all four types A,B,C,D with base price 10. Market 2 requires 20 with base
price 20, and so on up to 80. (Experiment 1)
– rand-inc8: 8 random values for A, B, C, D where the average of each mar-
ket’s requirements is increasing from 10, 20, up to 80; the average is also
the base price. (Experiment 1 and 2)
– unif-inc4-low: the same as unif-inc8, but consisting of only 4 markets, re-
quiring 20, 30, 40, 50. Base price equals requirement. (Experiment 3)
– unif-inc4-hi: the same as unif-inc4-low, but now requiring 20, 40, 60, 80.
(Experiment 3)
For the markets from Experiment 1 and 2, the price constant always equals
200 + the base price. For Experiment 3 markets, the base price equals the
requirement and the price constant is always 200. Price elasticity for all ex-
periments is 0.1.
• Policy: In Experiment 3, a shock (shock-at) is introduced at t=400 (on a
run length of 800). With policy Sudden Death (SD), the degrading factor
is set to 0, meaning that at the shock farmers are forced to leave the lowest
market immediately. With Graceful Degradation (GD) policy, the degrading
factor is set to 100, meaning that at the shock the lowest market is no longer
available as an option, but farmers who already supplied there can keep this
market until they leave it voluntarily, after which they cannot return.
The total number of parameter sets in Experiment 2 is calculated as follows.
All parameters were varied one-at-a-time. Parameters thr and kch were also
varied together. The sensitivity analysis involved 21 one-at-a-time variations
(11 variations of kch with thr fixed to 0; 11 variations of thr with kch fixed to
0; 1 double removed), and 9 thr-kchs combinations that were varied together,
which adds up to 30 different thr-kch combinations. For 9 other parameters, we
chose values slightly higher and slightly lower than the base value. These were:
ISR,NFR,number of farmers, run length,maximumvalue for info-items, number
of different info-items, information window, pig price, number of pigs capacity.
In conclusion: every thr-kch combination was run with the base value and 18
other values, making a total of 19*30=570 combinations.
8.7 Results and multi-level analysis
Each experiment yielded results similar to the ones already described in previ-
ous studies. For this article, we are especially interested in multi-level analyses,
where an observed pattern can be inspected with help of individual-level data,
something the previous studies of these experiments did not yet allow.
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Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
(Static) network ring10d; clan10-2d; ring10d isolated (only
topology tree1-10; isolated NFR effect)
Market sets ext-diff8; ext-same8; rand-inc8 unif-inc4-low;
unif-inc8; rand-inc8 unif-inc4-hi
ISR (information 10; 50; 90 50 25; 50; 75; 100
supply rate)
NFR (nr of friends 0; 0.5; 1; 3 1 0; 1; 3
population average)
thr
0
0, 10,..,100
0(value-threshold) (kch=0/thr=0)
kch 10,20,..,90
(keep chance (combined)
policy n/a; shock after n/a; shock SD; GD
end of run time after end of shock at t=400
run time
Total nr of para- 4*4*3*4 = 192 (11+10+9) * 19 2*4*3*2 = 48
meter sets = 570
Runs per set 32 32 128
Table 8.5: Variations in parameter values per experiment, total number of para-
meter sets and total runs per set.
8.7.1 Visualization of results
Figure 8.3 shows two sample results, each visualising farmers’ joint market
choices over time for one particular run, with markets aggregated into high,
medium, low and commodity market segments. Although this information is
very detailed, it is already summarized over all farmers.
Separate visualisations of a single run lack conciseness to evaluate the effect
of specific parameters (e.g. ISR andNFR) on the emerging market choices. For
this purpose, we used graphs as depicted in Figure 8.4, visualizing the joint
market choices of all farmers, again aggregated into threemarket segments and
the commodity market, averaged over all runs of this parameter combination,
and averaged over time. By placing parameter combinations as bars below each
other in a coherent order, any change in effect of parameter combinations can
be visually observed. In comparison with Figure 8.3 this graph has a higher
level of abstraction in the sense that the course over time is no longer visible.
The sensitivity analysis results fromExperiment 2were visualized by graphs
showing on the vertical axis the relative sensitivity of each parameter when thr-
kch had values as specified on the horizontal axis. The other parameters were
according to Table 8.5. For eachmarket share such a picture was created. Figure
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Figure 8.3: Two sample results. Farmers active over time at (aggregated) mar-
kets during one run. Left: Experiment 1 (cumulative; an information-rich situ-
ation, no visible commodity): market set unif-inc8, network topology ring10d,
ISR of 90, NFR of 3. Right: Experiment 3 (poorer: no friends, high demanding
markets): market set unif-inc4-hi, ISR of 75,NFR of 0, policyGD at time t=400.
Figure 8.4: A sample result from Experiment 2. Joint market choices, aggreg-
ated into market segments high, medium, low and commodity, averaged over
all runs and averaged over time. This is the base case scenario (see Table 8.5)
of the combinations with value 0 for kch (so: no special protection for in-use
items) and all 11 variations for thr (anything of lower value is disposed of).
Figure 8.5: Sensitivity analysis for Experiment 2. The relative sensitivity of para-
meters (vertical axis) for each thr-kch combination that is shown on the hori-
zontal axis, for commodity (left) and high markets segment (right).
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8.5 shows the commodity and high-markets segments. Both are one-at-a-time
variation samples.
8.7.2 Results after multi-level analysis
The added value of the re-runs with the comprehensive model was (a) to in-
crease confidence in the results obtained before because of higher run num-
bers, and individual inspection of ‘outliers’; (b) to inspect system-level patterns,
identified but not understood before, at individual level. We illustrate per ex-
periment what insights one or more of these multi-level analyses adds to our
results already obtained. When applicable, we highlight the role of info-items,
i.e. knowledge.
a) Experiment 1: analysis of multiple runs
Our focus of Experiment 1 is on the analysis of multiple runs of the same scen-
ario. The main findings of Experiment 1 are similar to what was found in the
earlier studies. In summary: information turnover (ISR) has a consistently
huge effect: the higher the ISR, the more markets are within reach. Only when
there is little information in the system (i.e. ISR is low), there is an effect of
varying NFR: the more friends, the more markets become within reach. There
is no clear effect from network topology, except for isolated, which consistently
performs worst. Lack of network topology effect is partly due to influence from
NFR (with higherNFR, the dynamic network overshadows the static network).
Varying market sets has a minimal effect. Niche markets remain attractive des-
pite high requirements, even with low base price, because the price-constituent
that depends on total supply makes themarket attractive with few competitors.
Added value of performing more runs: We gained confidence in these out-
comes now that they also appear with sufficient runs (sufficient according to
Troitzsch’ convergence test). We did inter-run analysis to find out how stable
our outcomes are. Secondly, we inspected ‘outliers’, because the benefit from
ABM is that outliers are especially interesting to understand a phenomenon
(Squazzoni et al., 2013). The inter-run analysis entailed visual inspection of
result graphs. Troitzsch (2014) argues that in simulation studies the effect size
is more important than the significance of the effect (because by increasing the
run numbers, one can make any effect significant), and that eye-judgment is a
good indicator for an effect. Sorting the same result graph scenario by different
sorting order gives various visual inspection opportunities. Figure 6 shows an
extract from a sample result graph (to the left). By eye-judgment, the inter-run
variation is small. Also, there are no real ‘outliers’, but only ‘extreme cases’ in a
pattern that is quite stable. This appears to be true for most of our scenarios.
The arrow in the figure indicates one of those extreme cases: this run seems to
produce a slightly higher market share for both black (commodity) and green
(medium segment), relative to the other runs. On the right hand side, this ex-
treme case is shown as individual run over time. We repeated this particular
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Figure 8.6: Left: Extract from sample inter-run variation inspection graph
(scenario rand-inc8, clan10-2d, ISR 10, nfr 30) from Experiment 1, sorted from
the right hand side by high, medium, low and commodity segment. The arrow
points at an ‘extreme case’. That one is shown as single run over time in the
right graph. Individual farmer data inspection brought no further explanation
for the extreme case deviations.
Figure 8.7: (Experiment 3). The Gini-coefficient over time for two different
policies (shock at t = 400) of the same scenario: NFR 3, ISR 50, low-markets, SD
policy (left) and GD policy (right). The ‘bubble’ (right) is present in a number
of scenarios, most clearly in those with low-markets sets.
run, but now recording individual farmer data, so that we could inspect them.
We found various individual differences in farmers’ info-items, pointing in op-
posite directions, which did not lead to an explanation for the extreme case
deviations other than that they seem to be coincidental.
b) Experiment 2: individual-level inspection of pattern (‘boomerang’)
Weuse Experiment 2 to seewhat individualmultiple-level analysis can dowhen
a pattern appears for which we have a theory. The main findings of Experiment
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2 are, in summary: Farmers reach higher quality markets with higher thr and
kch, up untilmoderate values. The influence of thr is inmost situations stronger
than that of kch. Sensitivity results provide additional insight: For the com-
modity market segment, when thr is not dominant, other parameters such as
the number of farmers and the ISR are. A ‘boomerang’ effect emerges, named
after the shape of the graph: when thr is high, and only high-valued info-items
remain, the level of quality markets decreases again. This effect is visible in
Figure 8.4.
We have a theory about this emerging boomerang effect. Initially, with a
thr-value up to about 30, it seems profitable to maintain high-quality informa-
tion only. Although it seems contradictory that ‘throwing away info-items’ can
lead to higher-quality results than keeping them, the theory is that quality pays
off during exchange with other farmers. When other farmers also have only
higher-quality information, the exchange will - on average - be more profitable
than when they run a risk to receive a low-valued info-item. On the other end,
when thr gets a value higher than about 70, farmers can no longer maintain
their quality-markets segments because they cannot afford to lose anything;
they become too vulnerable then. The sensitivity analysis results indicate that
the thr parameter is dominantly responsible for farmers’ market choices, which
is not in conflict with this theory.
Added value of inspecting individual-level data for boomerang-pattern for
which we have a theory: To test whether our theory holds, we repeated re-runs
of scenarios representative to test the boomerang, meanwhile recording indi-
vidual farmer-data. First, we checked whether it is true that exchange with
other farmers initially leads to higher-quality info-items when thr increases.
For several scenarios we plotted for an arbitrary farmer in an arbitrary run the
number of info-items and the total value for each type of info-item over time.
This showed indeed that although the number of info-items for that farmer
decreases, the value per type of info-item is maintained. Next, we checked
whether it is true that farmers lose toomuch info-items when thr gets too high.
By a similar inspection, this theory also holds.
c) Experiment 3: individual-level inspection of pattern (‘Gini-bubble’)
Experiment 3 also shows an emerging, unexplained pattern. Again we apply
multi-level analysis to find out more about this pattern. In general, the main
findings of Experiment 3 are, in summary: When only the end result counts,
there is no difference between policies SD and GD. However, looking at the
time of transition, with GD policy farmers can stay away from the commodity
market for a longer time. This is especially true in information-poor situations.
Both policies respond differently in the transition period right after the shock,
but either way the markets balance out into a new equilibrium, which depends
on the other parameters. Plots of the Gini-coefficient show that, only with GD
policy and most prominently in scenarios with relatively low-demanding mar-
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kets, there is temporarily a higher wealth inequality right after the shock (see
Figure 8.7). Without inspecting individual-level data, we have no means to ex-
plain the cause of this bubble and who the temporarily rich farmers are.
Added value of inspecting individual-level data for Gini-bubble pattern for
which we have no theory: By repeating some of the runs, meanwhile recording
individual farmer data at the time of the bubble, we could track down the relat-
ively rich farmers. It appears that these are all farmers on market 1: the closing
market. With GD policy, market entry is closed for other farmers, but farmers
already on that market can stay if they want. This results in a decreasing num-
ber of competitors. The price mechanism ensures a relatively high price for the
remaining farmers, which makes them relatively rich. However, all farmers at
some point have to leave this market when they no longer qualify for it (be-
cause of info-items becoming obsolete). This eventually happens to all of them
within 100 time steps after the shock.
8.8 Expert validation
Our simulation results give us outcomes and patterns emerging from our
model’s behaviour. Additional multi-level analysis gives us explanations for
these outcomes or patterns. We have shown that these explanations are valid
in model terms: given the assumptions and mechanisms of our model, we can
explain this behaviour. What we wish to know next is whether these outcomes,
patterns and explanations have any relevance with the real world. Are these
outcomes plausible in reality, and would domain experts deem our explana-
tions acceptable?
To this end, we conducted expert validation. We interviewed 9 expert rep-
resentatives from the following areas: animal science (pigs), pig production
economics, pig sector innovation, pig farmer sociology, pig meat processing
business, business economics, agent-based modelling, and systems modelling
(the latter two both with experience in pig sector domains). Most experts
covered at least two of these disciplines. All experts were interviewed face-to-
face during one hour. We introduced them to the model by means of pictures
(10 minutes), showed them result graphs like those in this article, asked them
to reflect on these, and then asked them to reflect on the explanations that our
ownmodel and analyses had taught us. All interviews were recorded and qual-
itatively analysed. The most important outcomes are summarized in Table 8.6.
Per element the links with reality that experts came up with are given, in-
cluding an indication of how often this particular linkwas brought up or agreed
with among the team of experts. It happens that experts mention or agree with
more than one such link.
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8.9 Discussion
This research entailed an entiremodelling cycle (see Figure 8.2). Themodel’s as-
sumptions were grounded in literature, and the selection and abstraction steps
to build the ABM were carefully chosen. During development, we verified our
model and its results in such a way that we had great confidence in our model’s
behaviour. Still, what we discussed during expert validation sessions provoked
lively discussions with our consulted experts, indicating that ABM modelling
of the pig sector is not straightforward, but both challenging and promising.
Things to discuss boiled down to four major categories: regarding our assump-
tions, model parameters, resulting patterns and methodology.
8.9.1 Assumptions
Information items. The multidimensional (ID, type, value) info-items
worked well for our consulted experts. They could understand the concept. As
for type, they could reason with us about what kinds of types were applicable,
and that there can be several info-items per type. As for value, we heard more
than once that it should be possible to not only downgrade but also upgrade an
info-item’s value other than by repeated exchange. In relation to this, we have
been thinking about including another dimension to info-items that specifies
the sender of the info-item. Different senders may imply different values to the
receiver, perhaps related to the link strength that may be calculated or inferred.
Institution. Our model of knowledge appears to be authoritative, with an
‘institution’ to bring knowledge to farmers (and depreciate its value!). However,
the institution is an abstraction. Its role is to create knowledge and tomake sure
it enters the population at a specified rate. It can just as well be interpreted as a
‘source of innovation’: a farmer who gets a visit from the institution could be a
farmer who finds something innovative and spreads it through the community.
Commodity market. The model assumes that farmers who have nowhere
else to go resort to the commodity market, for which they do not get paid. This
was meant to be an ‘escape’, to allow the simulation to continue. This is not
a realistic assumption. In reality, when farmers cannot supply their product
anywhere, they turn to the export (commodity) market, but they will certainly
get paid a (low) price. In our model it is possible to stay on the commodity
market for a longer time. In reality, this will never happen: if they had no other
choice, they would quit farming instead.
Market segments. Experts considered the market share outcomes for our
simulated farmers ‘too positive’. Some graphs show a lot of yellow (like Figure
8.3). In reality, the large majority of pigs in the Netherlands is destined for the
commodity market. Only 2% is organic, and the remaining part is for the inter-
mediate segment, consisting of various market concepts such as good farming
star. However, this does not imply that our model should be changed. It only
143
implies that the market sets may be initialized according to more realistic re-
quirements and associated price parameters.
Market choice based on information. An important model assumption is
that farmers’ behaviour is solely determined by their collection of info-items.
Experts were critical about this: a farmer does not have that much decision
freedom, an example being the organic segment for which there is currently a
‘waiting list’.
Element Links with reality (according to the experts) n
Experiment 1: Yes, information in itself (the more, the better) is bene- 9
The general ficial for farmers’ performance.
outcomes: Yes, so is exchange. TheNetherlands has an extremelywell 3
- information is organized knowledge infrastructure for pig farmers.
more import- Most farmers are member of a study club (of say 40): they 4
ant than net- share information with each other, invite speakers, etc.
work structure In smaller groups (of say 6), they are willing to share even 2
- the more in- business information with each other. They want to learn
formation is from each other (typical for the Dutch). And it pays off.
present, the Even isolated farmers get on-farm visits from suppliers, 1
higher quali- veterinarian, accountant, so info reaches them anyway.
ty markets Farmers are heterogeneous; there’s much variation in far- 2
are reached mers’ personalities, capabilities to innovate, make a profit
Experiment 2: No. Farmers do not ‘lose information’ (thr). It builds up.
The general Maybe. Protection for in-use info is imaginable (kch) 3
outcome: Maybe. It seems plausible that knowledge becomes 3
it pays off obsolete because it needs to be continuously renewed.
to keep only Maybe. If we assume that the human brain has limited 2
high-quality or capacity, then it is plausible that we lose information.
in-use Partly. Only for technical, not managerial knowledge. For 2
information, a new rule, e.g. obligatory air scrubber to reduce emis-
instead of sions, updated knowledge is required; the old is outdated.
maintaining all Partly. Only if market requirements change equally dy- 2
information namically. Not the case in the model, but true in reality.
Only if ‘information’ includes investments and business 2
inputs as well. If you don’t have them, you fail.
Yes, making decisions and changing behaviour requires 2
some slack (seemingly unnecessary knowledge).
Without it, farmers are no longer flexible to innovate.
Yes, pig farming that includes managing breeding sows is 2
highly knowledge-intensive. Farmers must continuously
update their knowledge to compete.
Experiment 2: No. The boomerang has no counterpart in reality. 6
Notable No. To end up with only high-quality information you 6
pattern: the can’t afford to lose or you’ll go bankrupt isn’t plausible.
‘boomerang’ Yes: it is a rat-race to keep up, knowledge-wise (breeding 1
sows). Historic example: a European country’s pig pro-
duction performance collapsed after economic downfall.
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Experiment 2: Yes. It is plausible that info exchange is more effective if 3
Explanation: everybody’s knowledge is of higher quality level.
high quality ex- Indifferent, no strong opinion. 6
change pays off
Experiment 2: Yes, that could be the case. 3
Explanation: No. That is weird.
too efficient = 6
too vulnerable
Experiment 3: Yes for GD: this is how it usually happens, with a long 6
The general (5, 10 year) transition period. 5
outcome: Yes for SD: can happenwhen acute crisis (e.g. swine fever). 3
no long-term No for SD: can’t think of an example where this happened. 4
difference It would have been more realistic to close the high 3
between SD market instead of the low one. This currently happens
vs. GD policy, to the organic segment.
but transition Transition period usually has an end term, too. That is 3
matters more realistic than to let it ‘phase out’.
Experiment 3: Yes. During a transition, there is temporarily a 5
Notable differentiation among farmers. Some manage to make
pattern: the a profit out of the situation.
‘Gini-bubble’
Experiment 3: Yes. I can think of at least one example to illustrate this: 6
Explanation: farmers have a product for which the market closes, but
some demand is still there. With fewer competitors, they
transition can make a profit.
farmers are Yes. Alternative explanation: some farmers may decide 6
temporarily to quit farming after the transition period.
rich They have lower costs and are temporarily rich.
No. If demand is still there, it means that customers will 3
get it from the world market. A few Dutch farmers
won’t change the world price.
A transition may require a new skill. Those who transit 1
need to learn this. Those who don’t may have a benefit
because they can still manage-by-routine.
Government may compensate if transition is too sudden. 1
Sometimes those farmers receiving it may profit.
Table 8.6: Summarized results of 9 experts’ validation: links with reality they
mention for all experiments’ outcomes, notable patterns and explanations. The
third column indicates the number of experts who mention this link.
Market switching. Switching markets is not without costs, nor without
memory. Our agents are memory-less, except for the fact that they remember
their current market, and can check markets’ last price. Also, their info-items
collection reflects a history: it changes only gradually over time. But it is indeed
possible that farmers repeatedly switch markets. In reality, this is not the case.
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There is path dependency involved, because of lock-in: a farmer has invested
in many respects to be able to supply to another market segment. Those invest-
ments prohibit him from switching back right away. These things can be incor-
porated in our model by including ‘transaction costs’ for market switching, or
by forcing the farmer to stay on his current market for a minimum amount of
time.
Time scale. There are some inconsistencies with how we treat time. One
time step in our model represents one pig growth process to maturity: about 6
months. By the same model cycle, our farmers reconsider their market every 6
months as well. In reality this is a strategic choice, which occurs once every 5
or 10 years at the most. However, considering a new market may happen more
often than actually changing market. It depends on the case how to agree upon
a consistent time scale. In our case, a solution could be to maintain the time
step of 6 months, but to restrict market switching (e.g. allow no switching,
or only to a market that is, requirements-wise, close to the current market).
Only once every 10 time steps (5 years) farmers may actually make a major
switch. On a side note: our simulations last for 800 or 2000 time steps, which
is unrealistically long for real life. However, model-wise, we are interested in
the stability of the outcome over time, so for the simulations it is better to take
a long time horizon.
Market closing. There are some issues about market closing: if it is closed, is
demand still there? In our model, only market entry is restricted but being on
a market-to-be-closed is no different from being on a real market. Our price
mechanism does not change the price parameters for a closing market. So in
ourmodel: yes, demand is still there, and the price responds in the sameway. In
reality, it is plausible that the price parameters of a market-to-be-closed would
change as well.
Price mechanism. The price mechanism was generally considered adequate
by the experts. However, some argued that the part of the price that is supply-
related should be allowed to become negative, to indicate that farmers can ac-
tually lose with respect to their costs. This seems realistic, but requires a dif-
ferent price mechanism. Changing a mechanism is a more fundamental model
change than changing a parameter or a value.
8.9.2 Model parameters
ISR. Our simulation results togetherwith the expert validation indicate that
ISR is a useful parameter. It serves its purpose, and simulation results achieved
through this parameter seem plausible.
NFR. The number-of-friends parameter is also a good one, with similar ar-
gumentation.
Network typology, or static network, can go: NFR can create connections,
and the structure of these connections is not important according to our own
results.
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Market sets seem to be functional, assuming the current price mechanism.
Their values could be adapted to better reflect realistic market segments, but
model-wise they are fine.
The thr and kch parameters are hard to recognize for experts. The whole
concept of ‘losing information’ is questionable in reality, despite the fact that
there are some valid arguments in favour of it. We might consider using this
mechanism only for information of certain type, as some experts suggested:
technical, but not managerial knowledge. We could also make the parameters
individual-based: each agent gets his own threshold value.
SD and GD. Policy parameter SD is a very artificial one according to some
experts. Still, it can serve as a base case to compare other policies with. Con-
trarily, GD is recognized by most experts as a plausible policy. Suggestions to
actively end transition periods can be taken into account. It might be interest-
ing to see what happens if the high market closes instead of the low one.
8.9.3 Resulting patterns
Two notable patterns from our simulation results were the ‘boomerang’ effect
and the ‘Gini-bubble’. The Gini-bubble is recognizable in the real world by ex-
perts, but the boomerang effect was considered strange. Most experts could
not link this to a counterpart from reality. We may conclude that this pattern
is too artificial. However, our boomerang pattern has an interesting parallel in
the world of (sports) team cooperation: research in this area indicates a ‘too-
much-talent-effect’ (Swaab et al., 2014). This means that a team consisting of
exclusively top-players performs less well than if a few sup-top players were
added to the team. Their explanation is that with only top-players there is too
little intra-team coordination. Regarding our own model, there were a few ex-
perts who did say that having some slack is important tomaintain the flexibility
to innovate, where slack is interpreted as seemingly unimportant knowledge.
It may well be that our pattern’s behaviour is too artificial at its extreme, but
it seems plausible that ‘having some slack’ is a necessary factor even in those
extreme situations.
8.9.4 Methodology
After applying expert validation to evaluate ourmodel results and explanations,
can we now assert that our model is valid? It was built based on assumptions
that were carefully chosen. Next, we ran our simulations and looked for inter-
esting patterns. We then tried to explain these patterns in terms of our own
model: its assumptions and mechanisms. Our experts could draw parallels
between certain outcomes and reality. Some of their parallels concerned an
explanation from reality that could never be true for our model, because our
model did not contain the elements for that explanation. This is the case for the
suggestion that the Gini-bubble could be caused by farmers who quit farming:
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in our model, farmers do not have the behavioural option to quit farming, so
this cannever be ‘the’ explanation. Fortunately, therewere also parallels that did
concord with our model. The explanation that diminished competition is be-
neficial for the stay-behinds, assuming that demand is still there, fits with how
we could explain this phenomenon in our own model’s terms. For the Gini-
example, this means that our model outcomes, the observed Gini-pattern, the
individuals responsible for it, and the explanation of how this happened are all
plausible, ‘imaginable’ in reality.
Validation of agent-based models is a recognized challenge (Moss, 2008;
van Vliet, 2013). Ourmodel is not as abstract as a purely theoretical model. It is
- for example - not amodel of the prisoners’ dilemma, forwhich all theoretically
possible options and outcomes can be listed, tried and checked, after which we
can call themodel validated. Themodel is not a facsimilemodel either, because
there is no one-to-one match with reality. We did not model real farmers of
whom we have data that we can use for validation (the extent at which that is
even possible is another subject of discussion). Our model is middle-range: it
shares characteristics with a real life situation, it has been sufficiently abstracted
bymaking its behaviour as transparent as possible without losing the properties
of interest, but it has not become purely theoretical. This means that neither
theory nor real-world data can be used for definitive validation. We are of the
opinion that expert validation is the highest level of validity we can obtain for
a model like ours. If the experts are well chosen, their validation can make the
model plausible. This is sufficient for a middle-range model.
8.10 Conclusion
The ultimate objective of this study was to gain insight in the multi-level re-
lationship between knowledge-rich decision behaviour of individuals and the
emerging market shares on sector level, relevant for the manageability of a sec-
tor consisting of autonomous suppliers. We explored this bymeans of an ABM,
used to carry out three experiments, each investigating specific research ques-
tions. Multi-level analysis, which comes natural to an ABM, addressed the fact
that the sector has multiple levels and that explanations from individual level
can help to explain emerging patterns on sector level in model terms. We used
expert validation to evaluate our results and explanations with respect to their
relevance for the real world. Important drivers in the currentmodel are its price
mechanism, and the role of information as a proxy for behaviour.
With respect to research question 1, ‘Does information exchange affectmar-
ket choices?’, we may conclude that there is a positive effect. Simulation results
consistently show this outcome, and the experts agree that this is plausible in
reality. They also agree with the conclusion that network structure is subordin-
ate to the availability of knowledge. In a country like the Netherlands, where
the knowledge-infrastructure for farmers is very efficient, network structure is
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of secondary importance. Multi-level analysis for this experiment entailed in-
spectingmultiple runs of the same scenario. The inter-run variabilitywas small,
indicating a stablemodel result. There were no real outliers, only extreme cases.
Analysis of those did not provide any additional insights.
For research question 2, ‘Does increasing knowledge quality lead to higher
quality market choices’, the outcome is not so clear. Simulation results show a
distinct effect when knowledge quality increases by ‘throwing out’ low-valued
information. Initially, that works well, but there is a limit to this efficiency.
Multi-level analysis by inspecting the actual individuals’ info-items confirmed
our theory that exchanging information within a network of farmers who all
have only high-quality information helps farmers to increase their knowledge
quality, which allows them to choose higher markets. The experts confirmed
that this is plausible. On the other end of the spectrum this effect backfires
(‘boomerang’). Our theory was that high efficiency makes vulnerable and
causes lack of flexibility to innovate. This theory is not recognized by themajor-
ity of our experts, presumably because this end of the spectrum is too artificial
to allow for comparison with real life. There is, however, reason to believe that
some slack knowledge is required to have the flexibility to innovate, where slack
is interpreted as seemingly unimportant knowledge.
The third research question, regarding the effect of a policy intervention,
applying GD policy yielded a final outcome very similar to the outcome after
applying SDpolicy. This indicates that policy doesn’tmatter if only the end result
counts. However, the transition itself does matter, and this is also representat-
ive of reality. With respect to the Gini-bubble, the temporary inequality during
transition time, multi-level analysis revealed that the farmers on themarket-to-
be-closed are the cashers. Experts did not come up with one solid explanation
from reality for this phenomenon, but they provided various plausible explan-
ations. A plausible explanation that is in line with our model assumptions is:
fewer competitors on a closing market for which there is still demand leads to
a temporarily higher income.
A secondary aim of this article was to communicate the methodology of
ABM to researchers of similar domain areas: an information-rich sector con-
sisting of many individual decision makers where multi-level analysis of both
the sector and the individuals helps to gain insight in phenomena of interest.
In the ABM modelling community it is not common practice to explicitly de-
scribe all modelling steps (apart from providing the ODD). This article gives a
transparent overview of the modelling process as we applied it. An important
driver for design was parsimony of modelling to keep the model’s behaviour
transparent. Strength of our approach is its explicit separation of levels, and
the application of multi-level analysis and expert validation. We recommend
this for other ABM applications as well.
As a final question: What did we learn from this ABM exercise? Regen-
erating patterns which we try to get to the bottom of by inspecting individual
agents’ behaviour at that point is definitely fruitful, as two illustrations in this
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case have shown. The alternative of saving all individual simulation data is un-
attractive. It might be physically possible to analyse all data through grid com-
puting and datamining tools, but pattern-based inspection of individual agents
is cheaper in all respects andmaywell produce similar results. By finetuning the
model’s mechanisms and its level of abstraction, we expect to be able to make
output that is even more plausible to the experts’ opinions. Already the model
has shown its purpose as a valuable means of communication. The model can
be used to explore what-if scenarios for multi-level knowledge-rich domains
within the limits of our model assumptions.
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Preface to Chapter 9
General discussion
Op een dag liepen de eekhoorn en de olifant door het bos.De zon scheen en ze hadden het over boomschors, motregen
en bemoeizucht.
Onder de eik bleef de olifant staan.
‘Denk je dat ik door de eik heen kan lopen?’ vroeg hij.
‘Nee,’ zei de eekhoorn. ‘Hij is te dik.’
‘Dik is geen reden,’ zei de olifant. ‘Mist is soms heel dik. En
molmsoep.’
‘Maar hij is ook te groot,’ zei de eekhoorn.
‘Te groot...’ zei de olifant schamper. ‘De woestijn is groot. En
de lucht. De lucht is nog veel groter... en daar lopen jij en ik dwars
doorheen, eekhoorn!’
‘Hij is te zwaar,’ zei de eekhoorn.
‘Dat is ook geen reden,’ zei de olifant.
‘Waarom niet?’ vroeg de eekhoorn.
Dat kon de olifant zo gauw niet bedenken, maar het was geen
reden, dat wist hij zeker.
One day the squirrel and the elephant were walkingin the forest.The sun was shining and they were talking about
bark, drizzle, and meddlesomeness.
The elephant stood still under the oak tree.
‘Do you think I can walk through the oak tree?’ he asked.
‘No,’ said the squirrel. ‘It’s too thick.’
‘Thick is no reason,’ the elephant said. ‘A fog can be thick. And
mould soup.’
‘But it is also too big,’ the squirrel said.
‘Too big...’ the elephant said, scornfully. ‘The desert is big. And
the sky. The sky is even bigger... and we’re walking right through
it, squirrel!’
‘It is too heavy,’ the squirrel said.
‘That’s no reason either,’ said the elephant.
‘Why not?’ the squirrel asked.
The elephant found that hard to answer, but it was no reason,
he was fairly certain of that.
Chapter 9
General discussion
In this final chapter we answer our research questions and reflectonwhat we learned. In Chapter 2, we structured our thesis chapters accord-ing to Hevner’s relevance, design and rigour cycles. Figure 9.1 shows the
deliverables from our work. To the left is the relevance cycle, where we include
the insights we learned from the expert validation that we performed in the
synthesis chapter (Chapter 8). Apart from evaluating our results, the experts
also provided us withmany useful reflections on our assumptions andmechan-
isms, many of which return in the discussion sub-section of this chapter. In the
design cycle in the middle we present the three models of our work: the pilot
studymodel fromChapter 3, the pork cyclemodel fromChapter 4, and the final
model covering four chapters (Chapters 5-8). The final model was introduced
in Chapter 5, extended with a mechanism to increase knowledge quality in two
ways (Chapter 6) and extended with another mechanism to model two inter-
vention policies (Chapter 7). In the synthesis chapter (Chapter 8), we used the
same model without further extensions again to repeat our experiments from
the previous three chapters, and to increase the level of analysis. To the rigour
side of the figure we present the scientific insights we found (depicted as a dia-
gram) and also the methodological and practical insights we gained (depicted
as tools).
In the remaining sections we answer our research questions (including sci-
entific insights), discuss our findings (with much help from insights from ex-
perts), present our methodological toolbox, and end with a conclusion.
9.1 Research question 1
What is the relationship between sector-level knowledge management measures
(top-down), actions of individuals, and the system behaviour resulting from these
actions (bottom-up) in the context of a sector of autonomous suppliers, specifically
applied to the case of pig farmers?
Before answering this main question, we answer its two sub-questions.
To keep the text readable, we avoid using the names of specific parameters.
For more detailed explanations we refer to the respective chapters. Each sub-
question is first answered separately, after which we answer the main question.
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Figure 9.1: The deliverables from this thesis according to Hevner’s relevance,
design and rigour cycles (see also Chapter 2): experts’ views regarding the rel-
evance of our work, three models, and scientific and methodological insights.
9.1.1 Sub-research question 1a
What is the effect of agent-level variations with respect to knowledgemanagement
on total system behaviour?
Agent-level variations refer to experimenting with those agent attributes
thatmake the population heterogeneous, and see what the effects are on system
level (bottom-up). We applied ‘agent-level variations with respect to know-
ledge management’ in the cases from Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. We varied the
amount and quality of information, which directly affects knowledge manage-
ment. We also varied network structures, which are a prerequisite for know-
ledge exchange (in those cases where that is an option), so these variations also
affect knowledge management. In the case of Chapter 6 we varied system-level
parameters to filter out high-quality information. These variations can still be
considered to be at agent-level, because each farmer’s collection of personal in-
formation (a heterogeneous property) is filtered according to these parameters,
which results in an altered but still heterogeneous collection of info-items. We
revisit all cases where agent-level variations were an issue.
Pilot study (Chapter 3)
• We varied how many farmers receive a visit from the information provid-
ing agent (20% versus 100%): a measure of how much information farmers
have. The effect on quality level is present in all scenarios, but most salient
in situations where the higher quality markets are attractive because of high
demand there.
• Farmers are heterogeneous with respect to their ‘openness’ attribute (static),
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which co-determines their satisfaction threshold (i.e. the probability that
they will change market) and the probability that they will aim for a higher
quality market. This heterogeneity affects how farmers eventually distribute
themselves over qualitymarkets. Themechanisms bywhich this happens are
concatenated and depend on each other bymany parameters, eachwith their
ownheterogeneous influence, whichmakes it difficult to saywith confidence
what their contribution to the outcome is.
Case: pork cycle (Chapter 4)
• Each farmer possesses information (a numeric value, static throughout the
simulation), from which the accuracy is derived with which he determines
his expected price. Farmers’ expected prices therefore range from naïve
to perfect. Naïve means that they take the previous price; perfect means
that they take the price mechanism’s equilibrium price. This heterogeneous
agent-level property determines whether the pork cycle emerges.
Case: markets model & multi-dimensional information (Chapter 5)
• Farmers are heterogeneous with respect to the number of info-items they
have (dynamic during the simulation, because of exchange), the value those
items have for them (also dynamic), their current market (dynamic), and
their network (both static and dynamic). Of these, we varied the number of
info-items present in the system, static network topology, and dynamic net-
work. Most influential for the result is amount of information in the system,
followed by dynamic network, both causing an increase in quality market
shares. There was hardly any effect from network topology.
Case: increasing quality of information (Chapter 6)
• We varied quality-increasing parameters, meaning that farmers maintain
only info-items of high quality (in our experiments evaluated by two dif-
ferent ways to assess quality), initially resulting in slightly increasing quality
market shares. This seems strange at first: farmers have less knowledge (they
lose low quality info-items), so how can they perform better than before?
This can be explained because of their exchange events with others. Since all
farmers have higher-valued info-items, info-item exchanges are more prof-
itable than before: the probability that farmers receive a high-valued info-
item from their peer has increased. This initially increasing effect does not
last: for higher values of quality-increasing parameters, the effect on quality
market shares decreases. The resulting graph from this effect (first increas-
ing, then decreasing market shares) is boomerang-shaped, which is why we
name it in our further analyses the boomerang effect.
• Sensitivity analysis shows that the amount of information in the system
is among the most influential parameters, for low values of the quality-
increasing parameter, especially on higher market segments.
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Synthesis: repeating experiments (Chapter 8)
• The repeated experiments for the cases relevant for this sub-research ques-
tion (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) give similar outcomes, and increase con-
fidence in these outcomes. Multi-level analysis shows that the boomerang
effect happens indeed because farmers are losing too valuable information
when the quality of their info-items becomes too high.
Answer for sub-research question 1a (bottom-up, agent-level)
From all our experiments where we varied agent-level properties, we conclude
that they have in almost all models an effect on system behaviour that is ac-
cording to expectation. For some properties we could or did not measure the
effect (heterogeneity in the pilot study, remaining heterogeneous attributes in
the other cases). For network topology, there is hardly any effect. When in-
creasing info-quality the effect has a tipping point (boomerang effect). In gen-
eral we can say that, in all our models, system behaviour responds accordingly
when agent-level properties are varied.
As for plausibility, experts confirm that more information and more net-
work connections contribute to higher performance, and that these effects are
more important for higher market segments. Experts do not recognize the
boomerang effect: this is a model outcome that does not seem plausible in
reality. Experts do acknowledge that increasing information quality may be
efficient: leading to higher performance, resulting in higher quality market
shares. However, only to some extent, and only for certain types of knowledge:
technical knowledge, not managerial knowledge. The necessity of having some
slack, i.e. seemingly worthless knowledge, is generally acknowledged.
9.1.2 Sub-research question 1b
What is the effect of system-level interventions on agent behaviour and total sys-
tem behaviour?
Interventions at sector level are changes from a top-down perspective that
concern the sector as a whole. Such interventions were applied three times:
changing demand volumes (pilot study case Chapter 3), changing market re-
quirements (case of Chapter 5), and closing a market (case of Chapter 7). We
revisit all these occasions.
Pilot study (Chapter 3)
• The intervention in the pilot study is: changing the required demand per
quality class. Demand is varied as a system parameter, indicating howmuch
each buyer agent in themodel (one for every quality class) can purchase from
farmers. We do see a change in farmers’ satisfaction and consequently farm-
ers moving to other quality classes, when demand changes. This is especially
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true in information-rich situations when higher quality classes come within
reach.
Case: markets model & multi-dimensional information (Chapter 5)
• The intervention here is to vary the market sets. Market sets differ with
respect to requirements they set and associated price parameters. Chan-
ging the market set essentially changes demand. These changes are not dy-
namic, but treated as a parameter: once initialized, a market set remains
static throughout the simulation. We varied 4 market sets: two sets of ‘ex-
trememarkets’ setting only low and high requirements, and twomarket sets
with increasing requirements. We also varied the associated base price farm-
ers would receive at these markets (either increasing with requirements, or
the same base price regardless of requirements). We saw only modest vari-
ations in outcome. One interesting phenomenon was that ‘niche markets’
appeared to be attractive even if their base price was lower than their re-
quirements justified: the supply-dependent part of the price compensated
for the low base price. (A niche market would only last until other farmers
discovered it).
Case: policy interventions (Chapter 7)
• The intervention in this case is to close one of the available markets (the one
with lowest requirements). This happens either by sudden death or graceful
degradation policy. We see that policy does not matter for the final outcome:
in both cases the low market eventually disappears and the remaining mar-
kets find a new balance, dependent on the other parameters of the model.
The time of transition does matter: farmers are able to stay away from the
dump market (which is an ultimate resort in the model) a bit longer, espe-
cially in information-poor situations.
• We see an emergent pattern that we call theGini-bubble, indicating a differ-
ence in wealth equality in the population at the time of the transition, only
for graceful degradation policy.
Synthesis: repeating experiments (Chapter 8)
• The repeated experiments for the cases where we varied system-level prop-
erties (Chapter 5. and Chapter 7) give similar outcomes, and increase con-
fidence in these outcomes. Multi-level analysis for the Gini-bubble pattern
shows that the farmers who linger on the closing market are the ones who
are - temporarily - very rich, thus responsible for the emerging Gini-bubble.
Answer for sub-research question 1b (top-down, system-level)
A system-level intervention such as demand change or closing a market has an
effect on the population: farmers adapt, choose different markets, and a new
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balance of market shares emerges. The new balance depends on the other para-
meter settings. In an information-poor situation, farmers have limited options
to make the move to higher quality markets; in information-rich situations,
more farmers are able to move to higher quality markets. The policy experi-
ment shows that the type of transition has no lasting effect on the final outcome,
whichmakes a farmer-friendly alternative (graceful degradation) the preferred
policy. During the transition period, we see temporarily deviating wealth dis-
tribution (the Gini-bubble) for the graceful degradation policy situations.
The fact that a newmarket balance appears after an intervention is deemed
plausible by our experts, because this is indeed what happens in reality. Experts
confirm that interventions are usually made according to graceful degradation
policy: including a (usually long) transition period. Sudden death policy only
occurs in times of acute crisis, e.g. a swine fever outbreak, and is never a pre-
ferred policy. Most experts can provide explanations for the Gini-bubble in
the sense that they have seen farmers profiting during a transition period. Not
all explanations they provide are possible in terms of our model. A plausible
explanation that agrees with our model is that farmers experience less compet-
ition on amarket for which there is still demand, which results in a higher price
for their product.
9.1.3 Answer for research question 1 (bottom-up vs. top-down)
In conclusion, we can say that there is indeed an interacting relationship
between sector level knowledge management measures and actions of indi-
viduals. Both when individual properties and when system-level properties
were varied, this resulted in responsive behaviour that can be explained in
model terms, and that is to some extent also plausible in reality.
Most interesting are the cases where an unexpected pattern emerges. This
happened twice: the boomerang and the Gini-bubble effect. Multi-level ana-
lysis showed in both cases what the relationship is between the pattern (which
is by definition at system level) and the individual level. For the boomerang
effect, this explanation is valid in model terms, but not plausible in reality. For
the Gini-bubble, the explanation is valid in model terms as well as considered
plausible in reality.
9.2 Research question 2
How suitable is agent-based modelling as a method for representing a real-world
case of sectorial knowledge management?
Before we answer this research question, we bring to mind the process
framework we used in Chapter 8, synthesis, depicted here as Figure 9.2. We
consider this framework a scientific deliverable from our work. At the end of
Chapter 2 we concluded that Hevner’s research framework is helpful to distin-
guish between relevance, design and rigour cycles, but that Hevner does not
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Figure 9.2: Process framework of multi-level agent-based modelling as, a sci-
entific deliverable from our work. The numbers indicate a possible research
chronology. For details, see Chapter 8.
highlight the process of how to alternate between his three cycles. Our Figure
9.2 show a possible chronological ordering of research activities. Also, the two
levels (sector and system versus actor and agent level) are clearly present in our
figure, as well as the interaction between the two.
Sub-research question 2a addresses the selection and abstractionwe applied
to model our agent behaviour (number 7 in Figure 9.2). For this behaviour we
made design choices (number 6) based on assumptions grounded in literature
(number 5) of how to represent relevant concepts and mechanisms. The sub-
research question concerns these representational issues with respect to know-
ledge management, and the representation of the two levels in the system.
Sub-research question 2b is about validity: how relevant are our models
and results for the real world. This concerns the arrows in Figure 2 labelled
with numbers 11 and 13. In the figure, the vertical arrow on the left (number 3)
indicates the assumed relationship between an observed pattern from the real
world and observed actor behaviour in the real world. The vertical arrow on
the right (number 12) indicates the same relationship but now in the model,
the difference being that model and agent behaviour can be inspected. Our
experts assessed (number 11) the plausibility of our main simulation outcomes,
the emerging patterns themselves (number 10), and the explanations (number
13) we found for these patterns in model terms (number 12).
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9.2.1 Sub-research question 2a
Representation: How well does the design of the agent-based model permit rep-
resenting knowledge management and representing the multiple levels of the real-
world case?
Before we can answer sub-question 2a, we must define the representation
power of what we consider ‘representing knowledge management’ in our re-
search. In our view this representation power comprises the following ele-
ments: what ‘knowledge’ represents and how this is expressed, how new know-
ledge is created and how it diffuses through the population either from outside
or within a peers-network, what the main knowledge-based decision and the
incentive for that decision is, what the relationship is between knowledge and
behaviour towards that decision, how time is represented, and whether the two
(actor and sector) levels are present. In Table 9.1 we summarize these elements
for all our models - i.e. the models presented in Figure 9.1: the pilot study
model, the pork cycle model, and the final model. In the following sections we
provide additional details and explanations regarding this table where needed.
Pilot study Pork cycle Final model
model model
Knowledge Information units Info-items Info-items
name
Knowledge Quality level of Informedness Type: range of know-
represents pigs; of farmer ledge categories
Price indicator Value: how skilled,
for pigs educated, informed
farmer is; relevance
Knowledge Single number Single number Multi-dimensional:
expressed [1,100] [0,100] (id, type, value [0,
as 100], in-use [y/n]
Generation At initialization: At initiali- Institution creates at
of LBO is assigned zation: random initialization 100 ran-
knowledge 100 unique infor- info-items per dom info-items; each
mation units farmer time step 1 new one
Knowledge No limit (stan- No limit Obsolete by age,
lifetime dard runs last or by value, pro-
30 time steps) tected by in-use
Knowledge LBO hands out co- No Institution hands
diffusion pies of its 100 (knowledge out random copies
(from information units is a static of its info-items
outside) to random farmers property) to random farmers
Knowledge On demand ex- No (no Always exchange;
diffusion change; within network) within static and
(peers) dynamic network dynamic network
Main Change target qual- Restock or not Change quality
decision ity & quality level market
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Incentive Internal; personal Internal; External;
for main circumstances, personal ex- previous market
decision satisfaction pected price price
Time step 1 month; 1/6 of far- 1 month; 1/6 6 months; all
represents mers may sell pigs of farmers farmers sell pigs
(on demand) sell pigs
Relation If satisfaction < Informedness Poll 1 new market
between threshold→ Change → Accuracy→ → If better expected
knowledge target quality→ Expected price price & criteria
and (Make more friends) → Restock match info-items
(summarized) → Change quality or not → Change quality
behaviour level market
Multi-level Present; dense Present; mostly Present; model
representation model inhibits implicit allows multi-
inspection level inspection
Table 9.1: Comparison of the three models with respect to knowledge manage-
ment and multiple levels. The arrow (→) indicates the order within the beha-
vioural mechanisms.
Table 9.1 - Additional details for pilot study model
• Farmers can only exchange information units with other farmers from their
network. They generate a network if they choose to spend time on making
new friends (time not spent on other behavioural options). Exchange hap-
pens only if a farmer explicitly chooses to do this (and it costs time, again).
• A farmer’s satisfaction level (affected by how well he sold his pigs in the pre-
vious round) rises or drops. When it drops below his threshold level, which
partly depends on his personal ‘openness’, he may decide to change quality
class. Downgrading is always possible but implies less income. Upgrading
can only happen if quality level suffices. If quality is insufficient, the farmer
may choose to increase quality (one of the four behaviours in his action rep-
ertoire). This takes time which he cannot spend on other behaviours (e.g. to
make new friends). Increase quality means that he picks one of his friends
and exchanges an information unit with this friend. If he receives a new
information unit, his quality level increases by 1. His quality level will also
increase if the LBO happens to visit him, but he cannot control when this
happens.
Table 9.1 - Additional details for pork cycle model
• A farmer’s info-items represent how informed he is. This is a proxy for ac-
curacy, on scale [0,1], by which he is able to determine his expected price, so
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accuracy and expected price are also static for every farmer throughout the
simulation.
• A farmer’s info-units, hence his accuracy, hence his expected price will be
the basis for his decision to restock or not. If the expected price is good,
the probability that he will restock is higher than when the expected price
is low. The better informed he is, the more accurate his decision, the less
chance the sector runs to end up in an over- or undersupply situation, of
which the farmer experiences the consequences.
Table 9.1 - Additional details for final model
• Knowledge is expressed as ‘information items’, or info-items for short, a
farmer attribute. Each farmer has a list of info-items. An info-item is multi-
dimensional: it consists of 4 parts (id, type, value, in-use - the last one is
only actively used in Chapter 6). A farmer can have several info-items of the
same type, each with their own id and value.
• A farmer’s info-items represent his knowledge and skills in a very broad
sense, the range of which is determined by the available types. The value can
represent various things: how skilled or how educated or how informed the
farmer is for this particular piece of knowledge, or how relevant this piece
of knowledge is for him.
• Each time step, all farmers exchange knowledge, unless they have no friends:
they exchange one info-item with each friend in their network. They re-
ceived some network connections during initialization and dynamically
change connections during the simulation. They may receive a new info-
item, or one they already have. Either way, the info-item’s value for the re-
ceiver changes.
• Each time step, all farmers will sell their pigs, but first they must determine
at which market. Each farmer polls one newmarket per time step (bounded
rationality), whose last price is a driver for the farmer to change market,
but only if he can meet this markets’ requirements. Those requirements are
expressed in terms of required values on selected types of info-items. If there
is a match, the farmer will change. If not, he will stay. Only if he cannot
stay (because he no longer qualifies) he seeks further. To determine whether
there is a match with a market, the farmer will take the average value of his
5 highest info-items per type (also reflecting bounded rationality).
Table 9.1 - Additional details for multi-level representation
• For all three models there is a clear distinction between agent level and sys-
tem level. In all cases, only agents and their behaviour are modelled, and
system level behaviour emerges.
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• The pilot study’s multi-level representation is limited in the sense that there
are only 10 agents, and that the system-level outcomes are hard to interpret
because they depend on so many parameters and mechanisms.
• The pork cycle model is very parsimonious regarding the two levels: the
agents’ representation is minimal, and the outcome is a fluctuating pattern
for which we used Fourier transformation to determine whether it is peri-
odic. There is no explicit relationship anymore between pattern and indi-
viduals.
• The final model has the richest multi-level representation: the outcome is
farmers permarket set, so themoremarketswe define, themore fine-grained
the results can be (and we can choose to aggregate them again, as well). The
model allows us to record individual data up to the granularity we need. This
means that for any pattern in the outcome we can do re-runs of the model
and record individual data to the level we need, as detailed as that of one
farmer in one time step.
Answer for sub-research question 2a
We see that representation power is different for each model. The pork cycle
model differs the most from the other two. It has the simplest representation
power: knowledge refers to only one single, static number. There is no ex-
change, no new knowledge. Knowledge represents ‘how informed the farmer
is’. It could implicitly meanmuchmore (ability, skill), but since the number is a
proxy for accuracy and expected price, it makes sense to limit its representation
to those farmer qualities that result in being able to predict the price he expects
to get for his pigs, on which he bases his decision.
The knowledge representation power is highest in the final model. Sev-
eral types of knowledge can be distinguished. For every type of knowledge,
personal values are associated. Instead of combining all this into one number,
knowledge can be differentiated and personalized in this model. This hasmuch
more representation power than both other models.
There are similarities between the way knowledge is represented in the pilot
study and in the final model. In both cases, the LBO (or the institution) is the
source of new knowledge, and new knowledge can be obtained from exchange
with friends. The relationship between knowledge and behaviour is different:
in the final model, farmers do not seek for higher quality but simply check
whether they match a market’s criteria (driven by its price). In the pilot study
model, the personal circumstances of the farmer (satisfaction, depending on
his ‘openness’) drive a farmer to act.
Both in the pilot study and the pork cycle model farmers have an intrinsic
motivation to act. In the pilot study model, satisfaction triggers farmers to
change quality class. In the pork cycle model, their expected price (dependent
on a personal attribute) is an important ingredient for their decision to restock.
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This intrinsicmotivation is implicit in the finalmodel, where farmers are driven
by an external factor (price).
All models succeed to some extent to represent knowledge management
and multiple levels of a real world case. The pilot study model’s focus is on
representing heterogeneity in individual behaviour, but does not allow for easy
multi-level inspection. The pork cycle model is most implicit with respect to
representation power but succeeds in creating a sector-level pattern based on
agent-level behaviour. The finalmodel is richest in representing knowledge and
best allows inspection of the relationship between sector and agent level.
9.2.2 Sub-research question 2b
Validity: Do the evaluated simulation results lead to increased understanding of
the interdependence of emerging system behaviour and individual agent beha-
viour in the real-world case?
Validity and plausibility have been explicit issues in our synthesis chapter
(Chapter 8), where we used expert validation to determine what our research
outcomes mean to the real world. Sub-research question 1a already answers
this question per pattern, per case, indicating whether the pattern is considered
plausible by consulted experts.
An interesting issue is: what is actually our starting point? In Figure 2,
the ‘pattern of interest’ in the real world has number 1 assigned to it. This is
also where we started our quest, years ago: the pattern of emerging quality
market shares. Can we gain insight in this pattern through our agent-based
modelling exercises? Can we manipulate that pattern by changing something
for individuals? Can we manipulate it by intervening at sector level? Are our
model outcomes representative for phenomena in the real world? Our cases
show that this is indeed plausible, at least for some of the things we tried. As
the answer we gave under sub question 1a demonstrates: we could make the
full cycle for this pattern a number of times - regenerate it with the agent-based
model, relate it to what happens at individual level, and link it back to the real
world.
However, the most exciting moments for us were the patterns that emerged
unexpectedly in our agent-based model. A boomerang! A Gini-bubble! We
had no real world phenomenon in our minds that triggered us to look for
these patterns. Yet the patterns appeared, and we started reasoning the other
way around - could we perhaps link a real world phenomenon to our model’s
emerged pattern? To some extent, and with some reservation, we could do this,
at least for the Gini-bubble. This exercise was useful because it caused lively
debates with experts - if not useful, it was at least inspiring. It was also useful,
because it made us question our model’s behaviour, and inspired us to think
about model changes. The discussion section contains some of these ideas.
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9.2.3 Answer for research question 2
With respect to knowledge management, our answer to sub-research question
2a shows that our models’ representation power differs per model. Dependent
on the aim of the model, representation power can be kept deliberately modest
(as in the pork cycle model), or can be high (as in the final model with respect
to representing different types of knowledge). There is no end yet to the possib-
ilities: our model could still be extended to represent e.g. more heterogeneity
in farmers’ decision behaviour. We believe that representation power of agent-
based models makes them sufficiently suitable to represent a real-world case,
as long as the model has a well-defined purpose.
As for how representative these models are for the real world in terms of
validity: we also discussed in the synthesis chapter that ‘plausible’ is not the
same as ‘validated’. We are happy if an expert confirms that our artificial pattern
and the explanation we provide for it in model terms has a counterpart in the
real world, but - even if we have an explanation that does not contradict with
ourmodel - we have no guarantee that this is indeed the explanation thatmakes
our model valid, and hence that the model is representative for the real world.
9.3 The agent-based modeller’s toolbox
As a spin-off from our work, we would like to present the collection of mod-
elling insights and methods that helped us analyse our model data. The meth-
ods were not invented by us but proved to be useful in the context of our re-
search. This emerging agent-based modeller’s toolbox may also be helpful to
other agent-based modellers in our field.
We use the terms ‘rich’, ‘dense’, ‘sparse’ as follows: A rich model is a model
that contains a large number of concepts and mechanisms to represent the real
world. By a dense model, we mean that its accessibility is inhibited: it does not
allow structural analysis in such a way that we can still interpret results. Sparse
(or: parsimonious)means that the number of concepts andmechanisms is kept
as little as possible in order to keep the model transparent, i.e. such that our
levels of analyses can explain its behaviour.
• ‘A too rich model behaves like a black box’ (pilot study). Although it is tempt-
ing to represent a realistic case in all its richness, be aware that the dense-
ness of the mechanisms may obscure the relationship between inputs and
outcomes.
• ‘Less is more’ (pork cycle, final model). Parsimony inmodelling pays off when
it comes to analysing model behaviour (we reinvented the known adage
KISS: ‘keep it simple, stupid’).
• Fourier transformation is useful to determine periodicity (pork cycle). Meth-
ods that are common in other disciplines may show their worth in novel
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applications. Fourier transformation, usually applied to analyse frequencies
in (sound) waves, is also applicable to the pork cycle.
• Heterogeneity can be achieved by a random element (pork cycle, final model).
When there is variation in a population, but the details of this variation are
not of our concern, assigning a random value is the sparsest way of model-
ling this variation.
• Summarizing simulation results as bar charts (Chapter 5 and 6). Visualizing
many simulation runs in order to see the course of the changes in outcome
can be achieved by representing each run as a bar chart and sorting them in
the order or interest. We created a Python program for this.
• Post-processing results (Chapter 5). To quantify differences between various
simulation experiments, pairwise comparison can be applied and counted
and recorded (we used Python). For details we refer to Chapter 5.5.
• Automatize batch simulation processing. For our last experiments, we cre-
ated a Java program to process the data during the runs into the format we
desired, based on specifications read from file. This was useful both from a
processing point of view and for archiving experiments.
• Record full data or summarize data during runs. The same Java program also
allowed us to choose for full data recording if we had reason to do this, e.g.
to inspect pattern causes.
• Verification of model versions the way we did it (Chapter 6). When extending
an existing model, such as we did in the case of Chapter 6, it is helpful to
explicitly verify that the newly added mechanism does not change model
outcomes when applied to the ‘old’ cases. For details we refer to Chapter 6.5.
• Local sensitivity analysis (Chapter 6). The local sensitivity analysis approach
as we applied it is not difficult to do and helpful for investigating the relative
influence of parameters.
• Troitzsch’ test (Chapter 7 and 8). To determine whether the number of simu-
lations is sufficient, we can recommend Troitzsch’ approach. For details see
Chapter 7.7 or (Troitzsch 2014).
• Multi-level analysis (Chapter 8). Multi-level analysis addresses the core of
agent-basedmodelling: to inspect patterns in terms of individual behaviour,
as this thesis demonstrates, especially in Chapter 8.
• Expert validation (Chapter 8). Expert validation is a good method to assess
the plausibility of an agent-based model’s results, as we claim in this thesis.
Apart from plausibility assessment of results, most experts give valuable ad-
vice and comments that help ground the work as well.
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9.4 Discussion
The discussion section is structured around our knowledge management
paradigm, model assumptions and mechanism, and simulation and analysis
related issues. If not otherwise specified, the discussed issues concern the final
model of the last three cases.
9.4.1 Knowledge management paradigm
Knowledge representation - Types
Ourfinalmodel’s knowledge paradigm - representing knowledge as a collection
of info-items of different types and with different values per owner -may raise
a discussion of what exactly these knowledge types can be. We gave examples
such as: health, hygiene, management of pigs, housing issues, feeding issues.
These are all - indeed - things for which a farmer can collect distinct pieces of
knowledge. He can then increase these pieces’ value when he repeatedly hears
them, develops them, or gets experienced in them. The fact that the types re-
main abstract makes the model powerful - it could be anything. But, as one
expert asked: can it also be infrastructure? Investments? Money? Steel? The-
oretically, the answer is: yes, the model can probably handle that. But in the
context of our case, knowledge management is not about these things.
Knowledge owner - Institution
The representation of the institution (LBO) seems ‘authoritative’: the wise,
learned official owns all knowledge and gives it to farmers as he pleases. But
we would like to emphasise that the event of the institution visiting a farmer
could equally mean that new knowledge enters the population at that instant.
We could interpret it as: the farmer has a new idea which can start spreading.
The institution is important, however, to control how often new ideas enter the
population. In this interpretation, that parameter can express the innovative-
ness of a population.
Knowledge downgrading and knowledge exchange
In our final model, knowledge downgrades as soon as it enters the popula-
tion. When a farmer repeatedly hears the same thing, its value can only be-
come higher if the info-item was offered with a higher value. If it was offered
with a lower value, its value does not increase at all. This is not entirely satis-
factory. Perhaps knowledge should be allowed to upgrade for the pure sake of
repeatedly hearing something, nomatter its value. It is also imaginable that up-
grade occurs under other circumstances, for example if the sender has a higher
status than the receiver. Currently, we did not model this.
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Losing knowledge
Our experts were most puzzled about the fact that we let farmers lose info-
items, especially in the case of Chapter 6 (where we introduce mechanisms to
increase the quality of remaining knowledge). Still there are plausible explan-
ations of why losing knowledge is a real possibility. Most important is that in
knowledge-intensive domains, like managing breeding sows, knowledge needs
to be kept up-to-date and continuously renewed. Updating knowledge im-
plies that other knowledge ‘gets old’. In less knowledge-intensive domains, it
seems that losing knowledge is plausible in case of technical knowledge, but
not managerial knowledge. “I don’t suddenly forget how to take care of my
pigs”. Translating this back to the model: we might consider to change the los-
ing mechanisms in such a way that it only applies to information of a certain
type.
9.4.2 Model assumptions and mechanisms
Market criteria
After having lost info-items, it sometimes happens that farmers no longer qual-
ify for their current market. This seems to make more sense if the reason why
they no longer qualify is not because they have lost crucial information (an ex-
ample of reality being that they lost e.g. a certification), but because market
criteria have changed. Experts acknowledge that this is realistic, especially for
new market concepts. “There is always something extra that we also have to
do”, farmers complain, according to our experts. In model terms, it is not an
easy adjustment to change market criteria dynamically, but it is an idea worth
investigating.
Price as a driver is too strong - path dependency & lock-in
Experts agreed about the price mechanism in our final model, but they criti-
cized the assumption that “the price determines all”. Especially that our farmers
can theoretically switch back and forth as much as they like if only the price is
better elsewhere meets resistance. And they have a point. In reality, farmers do
not switch market like that, but there is path dependency involved. Switching
market requires preparation, investment, and happens only once or twice in
a farmer’s lifetime. If he has just invested to move to another market, he will
not backtrack anymore, because of lock-in. It is worth investigating how of-
ten the farmer agents in our model actually make a switch, because, also in the
model, their collection of info-items constrains their options, and this collec-
tion changes only gradually over time.
Dumpmarket
The term ‘dumpmarket’ that we used in the cases of most of our earlier-written
chapters encountered resistance with the experts. (The dump market in our
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models sets no requirements, but farmers do not get paid anything either).
However, meat is not treated like vegetables: there is always the world market,
or commodity market, that does pay something. It is true that meat gets down-
graded, for example if there is oversupply for a certain (higher) quality, then a
processing factory downgrades this to other available quality, or ultimately to
commodity. In some of our model outcomes, farmers keep supplying to the
dump market for a longer time. This would never happen in reality, experts
assure us, because a farmer would rather quit farming if he received no money
for his product than to let that happen again. For this reason we changed the
dump market’s name in our synthesis chapter to ‘commodity market’, but the
model still pays them no revenue there.
Market shares could be more realistic
A majority of Dutch pork meat is produced for the commodity market; the
other market segments are actually very small. Our model can accommodate
this by giving realistic values to the market set that is defined at the start of the
simulation. It would also make sense to limit the volume of certain markets.
Commodity market and ‘level playing field’
Many experts referred to the fact that Dutch or European farmers need to com-
ply with Dutch or European regulations that do not hold for farmers in other
parts of the world, even if they produce for the commodity market (as the vast
majority of Dutch pig farmers do). This means that there is no ‘level playing
field’: famers need to meet criteria for which they receive the same price as
farmers from other countries who were not restricted by these requirements.
However, in terms of knowledge management, it may still pay off: if a farmer
has more knowledge (needed to meet more criteria), he is most probably also
a more efficient producer than the foreign farmer who did not need to have all
this knowledge, so his production costs are lower. Dutch pig farmers are in-
deed known to be among the most efficient producers in Europe, second after
the Danes (Hoste, 2013).
What happens to demand when a market closes
Another interesting question in relation with the graceful degradation policy
intervention case of Chapter 7 is: what happens to demand if amarket closes? Is
there still a demand - but then, is thatmarket really closed? Inmodel terms, this
is clear. With graceful degradation policy, when a market closes, only market
entry closes, newcomers are not admitted. But those remaining on the market
can stay - and receive a price, so implicitly this means that there is still demand.
In reality, this is not so clear. Because there is always the worldmarket: if amar-
ket closes and lowest quality is no longer available by the rules, ‘somebody with
demand for lowest quality’ will turn to the world market to import it instead of
be willing to pay a higher price to the few remaining suppliers.
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This has similar implications for our Gini-bubble pattern, which emerges
because farmerswho remain on the lowermarket become temporarily very rich
- since demand is still there but there are less competitors. Experts deemed it
plausible that this happens, but not to the extent that these rich farmers’ income
visibly affects the Gini-coefficient. If the price would be that high in reality, all
higher segment farmers would offer theirmeat to thatmarket as well, nomatter
how high its quality (and the price would soon drop). In our model, that is not
possible because we closed market entry.
From this respect: we might have tried to close the highest market instead
of the lowest. This would have been a realistic scenario as well, because there is
currently an entry barrier for the organic segment. Closing the highest market
does not have the world market escape. Also, in reality, if a market closes, it
is realistic to assume that demand changes accordingly, and that something
should change about the price parameters as well.
Pork cycle model’s assumptions
We did not discuss the pork cycle model with our experts. They did confirm
that the pork cycle still exists, but that governmental interventions (like buy-
ing excessive supply and freezing it for a couple of years) have not happened
in recent years, at least not in Europe. With respect to the assumptions of how
the farmers behave in our pork cycle model (restock or not based on price ex-
pectation): in the Netherlands, it is no option to ‘not restock’ if you have a pig
farm. In China this may still be possible - most famers have crops and pigs: if
the pig price is high you purchase piglets and feed them the crops, and if not,
you don’t get the piglets and sell the crops.
9.4.3 Simulations and analyses
Model - sensitivity analysis and interaction effects
We applied local sensitivity analysis - using a commonly accepted method -
in our case from Chapter 6. We simultaneously varied the two parameters re-
sponsible for increasing the quality of farmers’ info-items (thr and kch). The
others were one-at-a-time variations. One-at-a-time variation assumes that
parameters are independent. Except for thr and kch, we did not include other
interaction effects in our sensitivity analysis, effects that are the result from
combined, not necessarily independent parameters.
It is, however, very plausible that there are indeed interaction effects present
in our model. A few of our experts, those with a strongmodelling background,
also suggested this. To investigate this we could consider to perform global
sensitivity analysis that also cover interaction effects. There are global sensitiv-
ity methods available that we could use, for example those including stratified
methods such as Monte Carlo (Jansen et al., 1994), applied in (Burgers et al.,
2010), or Latin hypercube simulation (Helton and Davis, 2003).
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Multi-analysis: inter-run variability and outlier-inspection
In the synthesis chapter, we performed inter-run variation analysis and outlier
analysis for the case of Chapter 5, but it turned out that there were no real out-
liers in that experiment. Also inter-run variation did not yield exciting results.
So although the idea was appealing, there are no worthwhile results to report
from this exercise, and we lacked the time to repeat this for another case that
turned out to have actual outliers to inspect.
Multi-level analysis: why do farmers leave?
We did another kind of multi-level analysis that we did not report in the case
chapters, addressing the question: Why would farmers leave a high market at
some point? In our model, farmers can leave a market (1) because they see
a better opportunity - price - elsewhere, and (2) because they no longer meet
the requirements for their current market due to loss of info-items becoming
obsolete. We were curious how many times these two situations occur. We
analysed (manually) in one run how many times the first 10 farmers left the
high segment for a lower market, and for what reason. It turned out that this
happened 17 times voluntarily (reason 1), and 145 times forced (reason 2). Gen-
eralizing this would mean that farmers leave a high market because they no
longer qualify in roughly 90% of the cases. In our model ‘no longer qualifying’
is apparently a strong driving mechanism to leave a high market.
9.5 Future work
The discussion section already contains several pointers for future work. In
summary, our ideas include to extend info-items with an extra attribute which
refers to the sender of the info-item. The value-change of that item for the
receiver depends on how important its sender is - which can be derived from
e.g. his number of connections or his performance.
Other ideas are to differentiate between information types and mechan-
isms by which they become obsolete. As experts indicated, we could apply this
to certain types of information only: technical knowledge, which has a lim-
ited lifecycle, becomes obsolete, but managerial knowledge of basic activities
remains. Another interesting idea is to let market criteria change dynamic-
ally instead of defining them once at the beginning of a simulation. Finally, to
model an intervention of closing a high market instead of a low one could be a
nice alternative to compare with what we already did.
In broader terms, we are thinking of extending the model in a social dir-
ection, to make it more interesting with respect to heterogeneity of agents: we
could divide agents over groups and let agents’ behaviour depend more on be-
haviour ofmembers of their group. Behaving according to norms could be part
of this group behaviour. Culturally embedded aspects could be translated into
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model parameters that allow for comparison between pig farmers’ behaviour
in various cultural contexts.
9.6 Plausibility and validation
We concluded for research question 2 that our model outcomes are plausible
in some occasions, but we do not consider them validated. Is validity perhaps
too strong a claim for middle-range agent-basedmodels like ours, and is plaus-
ibility not sufficient? We argued earlier in this thesis that agent-based models
are not suitable for making predictions, but suitable for exploring possibilities.
Our reference discipline is informationmanagement, in a context of knowledge
diffusion through a population. In this discipline, validation is not part of the
research process at all. It is more common practice to explore a new method,
and make plausible that this method can be of use. Seen in this tradition, we
believe that our research fits in very well: by modelling the object of informa-
tion management, the sector, we have already provided added value to what is
common practice. Given the current state of development of our work, we can-
not yet aim for validity. This is no problem, as long as we can see a route ahead
of us that could lead there eventually. We see many possibilities to continue, as
addressed in the Future Work sub-section, and we do believe that agent-based
modelling is a method worth adding to the toolbox of the information man-
agement modeller.
An alternative approach for expert validation as ameans to validate is to use
role-play or gaming simulations, to strengthen the empirical basis of a model.
Gilbert (2008) advocates that empirical validation is as important as sensitivity
analysis. Meijer applied a chain-game to validate his workwith real traders (not
actors) in the mango supply chain (Meijer et al., 2009). This experience gave
him valuable insight additional to the model and its behaviour.
Hommes (Hommes et al., 2008; Hommes, 2011) used a lab experiment to
act out the pork cycle: participants had to forecast expected prices during 50
time periods. After each forecast, a computermodel calculated the equilibrium
price out of their forecasts, and gave this as feedback to the students (telling
them that their forecast was ‘too high’ or ‘too low’). The experiment showed
that the equilibrium price can be influenced, for example it can be pushed up if
the participants are given too much positive feedback. This results in a ‘wrong’
equilibrium price, which is likely to happen in economic reality as well - if feed-
back is provided by stakeholders (such as pension funds) who benefit from a
higher equilibrium price. The experiment showed something else: the theory
says that expectations should be independent, but this may not be the case in
reality. Although participants in the experiment did not know what the oth-
ers’ forecasts were, their own line of forecasts was not independent - they did
not switch forecasting strategies all the time but pursued certain forecasting
strategies once they had used thembefore, and thus exhibited path dependency.
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This implicit coordination between forecasts, together with the price-pushing
effect of positive feedback, caused periodic oscillations such as in the pork cycle
to occur.
Our own work could also include role-playing to find additional empirical
insights to help us with model development. We could act out our final model
with a group of participants who each have a collection of info-items that they
can exchange under certain conditions, let them behave according to a set of
rules, and see what unanticipated mechanisms might develop there.
9.7 Conclusion
In retrospect, this PhD thesis can best be characterized as a heuristic process.
When we started out, the general goal was clear: to investigate what the possib-
ilities are of agent-basedmodelling as amethod in our knowledgemanagement
domain, and what we could learn from studying the multi-level aspect. What
wewould discoverwas not fixed from the beginning. We advanced case by case,
not sure where this would lead, but making progress all the same. The current
thesis adds coherence to those cases and articulates what we learned over the
years, but it is not an end point. We can think of many ways how to continue
the present line of cases - we feel we have only just begun.
To study themultiple levels in knowledgemanagement is an ambitious aim.
Our cases contribute to that aim as individual patches contribute to a quilted
blanket. We investigated a collection of patterns, agents and mechanisms, giv-
ing colour to some of the patches. However, there aremany uncoloured patches
left. Nevertheless, we are positive about what our contribution yields. Epstein
(2006) challenges agent-based modellers with his adage grow it to show it: we
must consider the very fact that our models can reproduce behaviour simply
‘according to expectation’ an achievement in itself. That they also produce un-
expected patterns which we can unravel in terms of individual behaviour gives
added value. We expressed that value when we answered our research ques-
tions: in the context of knowledge management, agent-based models are suit-
able to investigate the relationship between system level and agent level and
vice versa. They also allow for the representation of real-world cases. We re-
commend agent-based modelling as a method. We believe that continuing this
line of research is promising for any discipline where complex adaptive sys-
tems are objects of study, of which knowledge management and information
management are examples.
To illustrate that we are indeed talking about complex adaptive systems, we
take a repeating example from our cases: that of obligatory group housing for
breeding sows. This regulation became effective as of January 2013 and involves
investments to the pigs’ housing, but also requires changes in farmers’ manage-
ment style. Already duringmymini-traineeship in 2007, I heardDutch farmers
being preoccupied with this new regulation. However, the first signs regard-
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ing this issue stem from much longer ago: my co-promotor Gert Jan Hofstede
was already in 1984 studying “the deleterious effect of tethering breeding sows”
(Cronin et al 1984). Apparently, a society needs 30 years before it is ready to
adopt ideas that first entered the debate so long ago. The idea needs to develop,
diffuse, and it requires a tipping point before it is adopted by society. Usually
the regulation follows societal acceptance.
How generally applicable is our work? Our first model was of Chinese pig
farmers, we then abstracted to Dutch pig farmers, and we claim that the fi-
nal model is useful for other knowledge-rich supplier-market domains as well.
We learned that Dutch pig farmers are specific in the sense that they are en-
trepreneurial, that there is a rich knowledge-infrastructure, and that they are
individualists, but willing to learn from each other if that canmake them better.
Dutch society is also specific: in no other country is pressure on farmers due
to demand from society to producemore animal- and environment-friendly as
high a factor as in the Netherlands (Hoste, 2013). For future work, also cultur-
ally embedded aspects could be translated intomodel parameters that allow for
comparison between pig farmers in various contexts (Hofstede et al., 2010a).
Returning to my choir analogy from the Introduction, I would like to refer
to certain music where, at first sight, little seems to happen. I am thinking
of the 90-minutes lasting meditative choral music Kanon Pokajanen by Arvo
Pärt, and the non-choral Canto Ostinato by Simeon ten Holt. An unsuspecting
listener might label this music at first as ‘long lasting profound tones, sound-
ing all alike’ (Kanon Pokajanen) or ‘just a lot of continuous thrumming on the
piano’ (Canto Ostinato). In contrast, somebody who is willing to sit down a
while and immerge himself in this music, after some time discovers that even
the slightest variations in harmony are able to cause an incredible effect. In the
Canto Ostinato, these are the moments when harmony ‘ends on its feet’ in full
splendour, which has a glorious impact upon the listener. In the Kanon Poka-
janen, a long-awaited modulation, after a patient build-up, is experienced as a
marvellous event when it finally occurs. As an expert in this field I can con-
firm various reportings of this effect, and I can add that the same experience is
sensed by the singers themselves. In relation to this thesis: we compared our
work to colouring patches of a quilt that still needs many more pieces before it
becomes a sizeable blanket. However, the power of agent-based models is that
seemingly unimportant changes over time can be the beginning of something
more substantial than we could have imagined beforehand. Perhaps later, in
hindsight, we appear to have been at the start of a new era: an era when agent-
based modelling of complex adaptive systems belongs to the core activities of
studying information management. We are eager to reach that tipping point.
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English summary
Complex adaptive systems research is concerned with studying sys-tems (meaning: the whole thing, consisting of several parts) that areadaptive (they can adapt behaviour in response to a situation) and com-
plex (‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’). Complex adaptive systems
are characterized by multiple levels of behaviour: the behaviour of individual
components and the behaviour of the entire system. In this thesis we study
this relationship by means of agent-based models. By modelling individuals
(agents) and their behaviour only, and simulating their behaviour over time,
we generate emerging patterns: we did not explicitly put them in. We give our
individual agents their rules of behaviour; we let the system create conditions
in which the agents can operate; they act according to those rules and condi-
tions; and together they create system-level patterns that we can study. We try
to understand these patterns by reasoning back to individual level (multi-level
analysis).
The objective of this thesis is to study what the complex adaptive systems
domain of knowledge management at individual level implies for knowledge
management at sector level, and vice versa. We explore this relationship by
means of a series of agent-based modelling cases of situations where suppliers
are matched with available markets. The objective is relevant in the sense that
including a multi-level perspective in knowledge management (1) adds insight
in the field of knowledgemanagement, and (2) evaluates agent-basedmodelling
as a candidate method for the toolbox available to knowledge management re-
searchers. To address that second issue, we highlightmethodological aspects of
our research throughout the thesis to help us evaluate how suitable agent-based
modelling as a method is to represent multi-level knowledge management.
Our notion of knowledge management combines elements from the aca-
demic fields of information management and knowledge management. We
combine the technological ‘data’-oriented meaning of information manage-
ment and the behavioural notion of knowledge management, such as in know-
ledge sharing and learning. In this thesis, both the terms ‘information man-
agement’ and ‘knowledge management’ refer to the same. Knowledge manage-
ment has not been studied before by means of agent-based modelling, as far as
we know.
Knowledge is defined as everything a supplier needs to know to match the
entrance criteria set by a market segment, as perceived by that supplier, and in-
strumental in his decision making process. We leave implicit that this required
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knowledge is of heterogeneous nature. It represents factual knowledge, e.g. re-
garding requirements with respect to the product itself and the manufacturing
process of the product. It represents skills and know-how that require experi-
ence to build up. It represents personal capabilities. It represents constraints to
a supplier’s options, for example access to financial resources needed to invest.
It represents the available ‘action repertoire’ that a supplier has at his disposal,
enabled or constrained by factors beyond our concern. It also represents that
the supplier knows how to operationalize this knowledge to behaviour. From
our modelling perspective, our definition of knowledge assumes that all these
issues are a joint concept. Throughout the thesis, the terms ‘information’ and
‘knowledge’ are used interchangeably, meaning the same thing.
All cases in our successive simulation studies are taken from the pig sector:
we model pig farmers who take the decision of what quality market to supply
their pigs to. To be able to decide which market to choose requires that the
farmer has all relevant knowledge at his disposal, and that he has the flexibility
and means to actually take that decision. During the simulation he is gath-
ering that knowledge, receiving some, sharing some with other agents, which
continuously changes his options spectrum. The farmers apply bounded ration-
ality when they make a decision: instead of optimizing all alternatives to find
the best one, they use a satisficing approach to find a market that fits their need
and for which they qualify.
The secondary aimof this thesis is to pay attention tomethodological issues.
These include finding the balance between what to include in the model; how
to represent it in such a way that it is still clear which results were caused by
which behaviour; how to develop and extend such a model while ensuring that
former model results are still comparable with new ones; how to handle results
frommultiple runs and the sensitivity ofmodel parameters to those results; and
validity issues, i.e. whether results have any relevance for the real world.
The thesis is set up in three parts. Part I concerns the general introduction,
defining model concepts and posing the research questions (Chapter 1), and a
chapter to introduce the methodology (Chapter 2). The pilot study (Chapter
3) also belongs here. Part II subsequently describes four cases (Chapters 4-7),
each investigating a specific issue of our problem domain. Part III is the syn-
thesis part. It starts with a synthesizing chapter (Chapter 8) that connects the
last three cases with each other; better grounds them in literature; repeats the
experiments more thoroughly; adds multi-level analysis; and performs expert
validation. The last chapter is the general discussion (Chapter 9), answering
the research questions, reflecting on the research in the discussion, and ending
with a conclusion.
The research questions, each of them having two sub-questions, are:
1. What is the relationship between sector-level knowledgemanagementmeas-
ures (top-down), actions of individuals, and the system behaviour resulting
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from these actions (bottom-up) in the context of a sector of autonomous
suppliers, specifically applied to the case of pig farmers?
a) What is the effect of agent-level variations with respect to knowledge
management on total system behaviour?
b) What is the effect of system-level interventions on agent behaviour and
total system behaviour?
2. How suitable is agent-based modelling as a method for representing a real-
world case of sectoral knowledge management?
a) Representation: How well does the design of the agent-based model
permit representing knowledge management and representing the
multiple levels of the real-world case?
b) Validity: Do the evaluated simulation results lead to increased under-
standing of the interdependence of emerging system behaviour and
individual agent behaviour in the real-world case?
We further highlight each research question and present our results, start-
ing with the sub-questions.
Sub-question 1a. Agent-level variations refer to experimenting with those
agent attributes that make the population heterogeneous, and see what the
effects are on system level (bottom-up). We applied this in the pilot study
(Chapter 3) and three cases (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). We varied the amount and
quality of information in the system, which directly affects knowledgemanage-
ment. We also varied network structures, which are a prerequisite for know-
ledge exchange (in those cases where that is an option). In general, we can say
that, in all our models, system behaviour responds accordingly when agent-
level properties are varied. We could let patterns emerge out of modelling in-
dividual behaviour only (pork cycle pattern, Chapter 4). More information
leads to higher quality market shares, as long as there is a minimum number
of network connections (Chapters 3, 5). Network typology appears to be of
secondary importance (Chapter 5). Varying the quality of information leads
to a tipping point in our model behaviour that we call the boomerang effect
(named after the shape of its graph): increasing the quality a little is effective
at first, but increasing it too much is deteriorating (Chapter 6). As for plaus-
ibility, experts confirm that more information and more network connections
contribute to higher performance, and that these effects aremore important for
highermarket segments. Experts do not recognize the boomerang effect: this is
a model outcome that does not seem plausible in reality. They do acknowledge
that increasing information qualitymay be efficient: leading to higher perform-
ance, resulting in higher quality market shares. However, only to some extent,
and only for certain types of knowledge: technical knowledge, not managerial
knowledge. The necessity of having some slack, i.e. seemingly worthless know-
ledge, is generally acknowledged.
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Sub-question 1b. Interventions at sector level are changes from a top-down
perspective that concern the sector as a whole. We applied these in three ways:
changing demand volumes (pilot study Chapter 3); changing market require-
ments, essentially also a demand change (cases Chapters 5); and closing the
lowest market by two different policies - one without and one with a transition
period (case Chapter 7). We studied how our agents respond to these interven-
tions. The results show that farmers adapt, choose different markets, and a new
balance of market shares emerges. The new balance depends on the other para-
meter values. In an information-poor situation, farmers have limited options to
make the move to higher quality markets; in information-rich situations, more
farmers are able to do that. The policy experiment shows that the type of trans-
ition has no lasting effect on the outcome, which makes a farmer-friendlier
alternative (with transition period) the preferred policy. When a policy with
transition period is applied, we see an unexpected pattern emerge: a tempor-
arily deviating wealth distribution (we refer to this pattern as the Gini-bubble).
The fact that a new market balance appears after an intervention is deemed
plausible by our experts, because this is indeed what happens in reality. Most
experts can provide explanations for the Gini-bubble in the sense that they
have seen farmers profiting during a transition period. Not all explanations
they provide agree with our model. A plausible and concordant explanation
is that farmers experience less competition on a market for which there is still
demand, which results temporarily in a higher price.
Answer to research question 1. In conclusion, we can say that there is
indeed a relationship between (top-down) sector level knowledge manage-
ment measures and (bottom-up) actions of individuals. Both varying indi-
vidual properties and varying system-level properties result in responsive be-
haviour that can be explained in model terms, and that is to some extent plaus-
ible in reality. Most interesting are the two cases where an unexpected pat-
tern emerges: the boomerang and the Gini-bubble effect. Multi-level analysis
(inspecting the pattern on individual agent level) gave an explanation in both
cases. For the boomerang effect, this explanation is valid in model terms, but
not plausible in reality. For the Gini-bubble, the explanation is valid in model
terms as well as plausible in reality.
Sub-question 2a. Answering this question requires reviewing how know-
ledgemanagement and themultiple levelswere represented in themodels of the
successive cases. Representation of knowledge management comprises various
elements that differ per model. All models succeed to some extent to repres-
ent knowledge management and multiple levels of a real world case. The focus
of the pilot study model (Chapter 3) is on representing heterogeneity in indi-
vidual behaviour, but does not easily allow multi-level inspection. The pork
cycle model (Chapter 4) is implicit with respect to representation power but
succeeds in letting a sector-level pattern emerge based on agent-level beha-
viour. The final model (Chapters 5-8) is richest in representing knowledge and
best allows inspection of the relationship between sector and agent level.
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Sub-question 2b. Validity and plausibility have been explicit issues in our syn-
thesis chapter (Chapter 8), where we used expert validation to determine what
our research outcomes mean to the real world. This question concentrates on
the following issue. We can observe patterns in the real world, and assume a
relationship between a particular pattern and associated actor behaviour (real
world relationship). We can also observe patterns in ourmodels, and inspect the
relationship between a pattern and associated agent behaviour (model relation-
ship), and present explanations for it. How plausible is the model relationship,
and the explanation we provide, for the real world relationship, according to
experts? And if it is plausible, how valid can we then call our model results?
We draw the line at plausibility, and we do not conclude that our models are
therefore validated.
Answer to research question 2. Representation power appears to differ per
model. Dependent on the aim of the model, representation power can be kept
deliberately modest (as in the pork cycle model), or can be rich (as in the final
model with respect to representing different types of knowledge). We believe
that representation power of agent-based models is sufficiently suitable to rep-
resent a real-world case, as long as themodel has a well-defined purpose. As for
validity, we have no guarantee that a plausible explanation for a pattern is indeed
the explanation tomake ourmodel valid, and hence that themodel is represent-
ative for the real world. Is validity perhaps too strong a claim for middle-range
agent-based models like ours, and is plausibility not sufficient? Agent-based
models are known to be not suitable for making predictions, but suitable for
exploring possibilities. Our reference discipline is information management:
in this discipline, validation is not part of the research process at all. It is com-
mon practice to explore a new method, and make plausible that this method
can be of use. Seen in this tradition, we believe that our research fits in very
well: by modelling the object of information management, the sector, we have
already provided added value to what is common practice in our discipline.
Conclusion. We conclude that studying the multiple levels in knowledge
management is an ambitious aim. Our cases contribute to that aim as individual
patches contribute to a quilted blanket. We investigated a collection of patterns,
agents and mechanisms. We gave colour to some of the patches, but there
are many patches left uncoloured. Nevertheless, we are positive about what
our contribution yielded. We recommend agent-based modelling as a method.
We believe that continuing this line of research is promising for any discip-
line where complex adaptive systems are object of study, of which knowledge
management and information management are examples. For future work, we
intend to polish our knowledge and skills, and continue to expand. Possible dir-
ections of research include extending the model in more social directions: let
agents’ behaviour depend more on behaviour of members of their group (e.g.
how norms could be part of this group behaviour). Also culturally embedded
aspects could be translated into model parameters that allow for comparison
between pig farmers’ behaviour in various cultural contexts.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Onderzoek op het gebied van complex-adaptieve systemen (com-plex adaptive systems) houdt zich bezig met de studie van systemen(‘het geheel’ dat uit verschillende onderdelen bestaat) die adaptief zijn
(ze kunnen hun gedrag aanpassen aan de situatie) en complex (‘het geheel is
meer dan de som der delen’). Complex adaptive systems kenmerken zich door
gedrag op meerdere niveaus (multiple levels): het gedrag van de individuele
componenten en het gedrag van het systeem als geheel. In dit proefschrift be-
studeren we deze relatie met behulp van agent-gebaseerd (agent-based) model-
leren. Door alleen individuen (agenten) en hun gedrag temodelleren, en dit ge-
drag te simuleren als functie van de tijd, genereren we emergente patronen: we
hebben ze er niet expliciet ingestopt. We geven onze individuele agenten hun
gedragsregels, we laten het systeem bepaalde omstandigheden creëren waar-
binnen de agenten hun gang kunnen gaan, de agenten gedragen zich volgens
deze regels en binnen deze omstandigheden, en gezamenlijk creëren ze patro-
nen op systeemniveau die wij kunnen bestuderen. Die patronen proberenwe te
begrijpen door terug te redeneren naar het niveau van het individu (multi-level
analyse).
Het doel van dit proefschrift is te onderzoeken wat het individuele niveau
van kennismanagement - een complex adaptive systems domein - betekent
voor kennismanagement op sectorniveau, en vice versa. We werken deze re-
latie uit met behulp van een serie agent-gebaseerde modellen van gevalsstudies
die betrekking hebben op situaties waarin toeleveranciers gekoppeld worden
aan beschikbare markten. Het doel is relevant in de zin dat we door het aanne-
men van een multi-level perspectief in kennismanagement (1) inzicht kunnen
toevoegen aan het vakgebied van kennismanagement, en (2) kunnen evalueren
of agent-gebaseerd modelleren een geschikte methode is om toe te voegen aan
de gereedschapskist van kennismanagement-onderzoekers. Vanwege dat laat-
ste leggen we door het hele proefschrift heen de nadruk op methodologische
aspecten van ons onderzoek, zodat we beter kunnen beoordelen hoe bruikbaar
agent-gebaseerd modelleren is als methode voor het representeren van multi-
level kennismanagement.
Onze invulling van het begrip kennismanagement combineert elemen-
ten van de academische disciplines informatiemanagement en kennismanage-
ment. We combineren de technologische, ‘data’-georiënteerde betekenis van
informatiemanagement met het gedragsaspect van kennismanagement, zoals
bij leren en het delen van kennis. In dit proefschrift verwijzen de termen ‘in-
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formatiemanagement’ en ‘kennismanagement’ naar hetzelfde. Kennismana-
gement is niet eerder bestudeerd met behulp van agent-gebaseerde modellen,
voor zover wij weten.
Kennis wordt gedefinieerd als alles dat een toeleverancier moet weten om
aan de entree-eisen te voldoen die een marktsegment stelt, in zijn eigen per-
ceptie, en voor zover instrumenteel voor zijn beslisproces. We laten verder
impliciet dat deze vereiste kennis heterogeen van aard is. De kennis omvat
feitenkennis, zoals bijvoorbeeld criteria die over het product zelf of over het
productieproces gaan. De kennis omvat daarnaast vaardigheden en know-how
die groeien door ervaring. De kennis omvat ook capaciteiten die van persoon
tot persoon verschillen. De kennis omvat bovendien de beperkingen die een
toeleverancier ervaart, bijvoorbeeld omdat hij beperkte toegang heeft tot finan-
ciële middelen die nodig zijn om te investeren. De kennis omvat het ‘actiere-
pertoire’ dat een toeleverancier ter beschikking heeft, gefaciliteerd of beperkt
door factoren die voor ons onderzoek verder niet van belang zijn. De kennis
omvat tevens de aanname dat de toeleverancier weet hoe hij deze kennis moet
operationaliseren tot gedrag. Onze definitie van kennis, opgesteld vanuit een
modelleerperspectief, veronderstelt dat al deze zaken hierin meegenomen zijn.
In dit proefschrift worden de termen ‘informatie’ en ‘kennis’ door elkaar ge-
bruikt, maar ze verwijzen allebei naar ditzelfde begrip.
Alle gevalsstudies voor onze serie simulaties komen uit de varkenssector:
wemodelleren varkensboerendie de beslissingmoetennemen aanwelke kwali-
teitsmarkt zij hun varkens willen leveren. Om te kunnen besluiten welke markt
hij kiest moet de boer over alle relevante kennis beschikken, en de flexibiliteit
en de middelen hebben om die beslissing ook daadwerkelijk te nemen. Gedu-
rende de simulatie verzamelt hij deze kennis, ontvangt soms wat, wisselt wat
met andere agenten uit, waardoor hij steeds andere mogelijkheden krijgt. De
boeren passen begrensde rationaliteit (bounded rationality) toe bij hun beslis-
proces: in plaats van te optimaliseren en van alle alternatieven de beste te be-
palen, stoppen zemet zoeken zodra ze eenmarkt hebben gevonden die voldoet
en waar ze voor in aanmerking komen (satisficing).
Een aanvullend doel van dit proefschrift is aandacht te besteden aanmetho-
dologische aspecten. Hiertoe behoort bijvoorbeeld het zoeken naar de balans
tussen wat wel en wat niet mee te nemen in het model; hoe zaken op zo’n ma-
nier te representeren dat nog duidelijk is welke resultaten veroorzaakt worden
door welk gedrag; hoe een model ontwikkeld en uitgebreid kan worden en te-
gelijkertijd te waarborgen dat eerdere modelresultaten nog te vergelijken zijn
met nieuwemodelresultaten; hoe om te gaanmet resultaten vanmeerdere runs
en de gevoeligheid van modelparameters voor deze resultaten; en validiteits-
issues, dat wil zeggen: de vraag welke relevantie de resultaten hebben voor de
werkelijkheid.
Dit proefschrift is opgezet in drie delen. Deel I omvat de algemene intro-
ductie, waarin modelconcepten gedefinieerd worden en de onderzoeksvragen
gesteld worden (Hoofdstuk 1), en een hoofdstuk om de methodologie te intro-
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duceren (Hoofdstuk 2). Het proefmodel (de pilot study) hoort hier ook thuis
(Hoofdstuk 3). Deel II beschrijft achtereenvolgens vier gevalsstudies (Hoofd-
stukken 4-7), die elk ingaan op een specifiek aspect van ons probleemdomein.
Deel III is de synthese. Het begint met een synthese-hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 8)
dat de laatste drie gevalsstudies met elkaar verbindt, ze beter grondt in de lite-
ratuur, de experimenten op een degelijke manier herhaalt, multi-level analyse
toevoegt en een expertvalidatie uitvoert. Het laatste hoofdstuk is de algemene
discussie (Hoofdstuk 9) dat de onderzoeksvragen beantwoordt, reflecteert op
het onderzoek in het discussie-gedeelte en eindigt met een conclusie.
De onderzoeksvragen, elk met twee deelvragen, zijn:
1. Wat is de relatie tussen kennismanagement-maatregelen op sectorniveau
(top-down), handelingen van individuen en het systeemgedrag dat hiervan
het resultaat is (bottom-up) in de context van een sector bestaande uit auto-
nome toeleveranciers, specifiek toegepast op varkensboeren?
a) Wat is het effect op het algehele systeemgedrag als er gevarieerd wordt
op agentniveau met betrekking tot kennismanagement?
b) Wat is het effect op agentgedrag en algeheel systeemgedrag van inter-
venties op systeemniveau ?
2. Hoe geschikt is agent-gebaseerd modelleren als methode om een situatie uit
de werkelijkheid te representeren met betrekking tot kennismanagement in
een sector?
a) Representatie: Hoe gemakkelijk laat het ontwerp van een agent-
gebaseerd model het toe om het kennismanagement en de meerdere
niveaus van de situatie uit de werkelijkheid te representeren?
b) Validiteit: Leveren de geëvalueerde simulatieresultaten een beter be-
grip op van de onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen emergent systeem-
gedrag en individueel agentgedrag in de context van de situatie uit de
werkelijkheid?
We lichten nu iedere onderzoeksvraag toe en presenteren onze resultaten,
te beginnen met de deelvragen.
Deelvraag 1a. Met variaties op agentniveau experimenteren we met eigen-
schappen van agenten die de populatie heterogeen maken, en kijken we wat de
effecten daarvan zijn op systeemniveau (bottom-up). We hebben dit gedaan in
de pilot study (Hoofdstuk 3) en drie gevalsstudies (Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6). We
varieerden de hoeveelheid en de kwaliteit van informatie in het systeem, wat di-
rect invloed heeft op kennismanagement. We varieerden ook de netwerkstruc-
turen tussen agenten, een voorwaarde voor kennisuitwisseling (in die situaties
waarin dat gebeurt). Over het algemeen kunnen we zeggen dat het systeem-
gedrag in al onze modellen volgens verwachting reageerde op de variaties op
agentniveau. We kunnen patronen laten ontstaan door alleen het individuele
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gedrag te modelleren (het varkenscyclus-patroon, Hoofdstuk 4). Meer infor-
matie leidt tot een groter marktaandeel van de hogere kwaliteitsmarkten, als er
tenminste een minimaal aantal netwerkverbindingen is (Hoofdstukken 3, 5).
Netwerktopologie lijkt van ondergeschikt belang te zijn (Hoofdstuk 5). Varië-
ren met de kwaliteit van informatie leidt tot een omslagpunt (tipping point) in
ons modelgedrag dat we het boomerang-effect noemen (naar de vorm van de
grafiek): een kwaliteitstoename is aanvankelijk effectief, maar als de kwaliteit
te hoog wordt verslechtert de situatie weer (Hoofdstuk 6). Wat de aanneme-
lijkheid (plausibiliteit) hiervan betreft, experts bevestigen dat meer informa-
tie en meer netwerkverbindingen leiden tot betere prestaties, en dat dit met
name belangrijk is voor de hogere marktsegmenten. Experts herkennen het
boomerang effect niet: dit is een modeluitkomst die niet plausibel lijkt te zijn
in de werkelijkheid. Ze erkennen wel dat het efficiënt kan zijn de kwaliteit van
informatie te verhogen: dit leidt tot betere prestaties en daarmee tot een gro-
ter marktaandeel van de hogere kwaliteitsmarkten. Echter, slechts in beperkte
mate, en alleen voor een bepaald type kennis: technische kennis, geen mana-
gementkennis. De noodzaak voor enige speling (slack), ofwel ogenschijnlijk
laaggewaardeerde kennis, wordt algemeen erkend.
Deelvraag 1b. Interventies op sectorniveau zijn veranderingen die de hele
sector betreffen, gestuurd vanuit een top-down perspectief. Wij deden dit op
driemanieren: door het volume van de vraag te veranderen (pilot studyHoofd-
stuk 3); door de eisen te veranderen die markten stellen, wat in feite ook een
verandering in de vraag is (gevalsstudiesHoofdstuk 5); en door de laagstemarkt
te sluiten volgens twee verschillende beleidsalternatieven - éénmet en één zon-
der overgangsperiode (gevalsstudie Hoofdstuk 7). We bestudeerden hoe onze
agenten reageerden op deze interventies. De resultaten laten zien dat boeren
zich aanpassen, andere markten kiezen, en dat er een nieuwe balans in markt-
aandelen ontstaat. Deze nieuwe balans hangt af van de andere parameterwaar-
den in het model. In een informatie-arme situatie hebben boeren maar be-
perkte mogelijkheden om de overgang naar een hogere kwaliteitsmarkt te ma-
ken; in informatie-rijke situaties zijn meer boeren daartoe in staat. Het be-
leidsexperiment laat zien dat de aard van de transitie geen blijvend effect heeft
op de uitkomst, zodat het boervriendelijke beleidsalternatief (met overgangs-
periode) de voorkeur verdient. Als er een beleid met overgangsperiode wordt
gehanteerd zien we een onverwacht patroon optreden: een tijdelijk afwijking
in inkomensverdeling (we noemen dit patroon deGini-bubbel). Dat er een ver-
schuiving inmarkten optreedt na een interventie vinden onze experts plausibel,
want dit gebeurt in werkelijkheid ook. De meeste experts kunnen een verkla-
ring geven voor de Gini-bubbel in de zin dat ze sommige boeren wel hebben
zien profiteren gedurende een overgangsperiode. Niet alle verklaringen die ze
geven zijn in overeenstemming met ons model. Een plausibele verklaring die
ook overeenkomt met het model is dat boeren minder concurrentie hebben
op een markt waar nog steeds vraag naar is, wat hen een tijdelijk prijsvoordeel
oplevert.
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Antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 1. Concluderend kunnen we zeggen dat
er inderdaad een relatie is tussen kennismanagement-maatregelen op sector-
niveau (top-down) en handelingen van individuen (bottom-up). Zowel het
variëren met eigenschappen op individueel niveau als het variëren met eigen-
schappen op systeemniveau levert reactief gedrag op dat we kunnen verklaren
in termen van ons model, en dat ook in zekere mate plausibel is voor de wer-
kelijkheid. Het interessantst zijn de twee gevalsstudies waar een onverwacht
patroon ontstaat: het boomerang-effect en de Gini-bubbel. Multi-level analyse
(inspectie van dit patroon op individueel agentniveau) leverde een verklaring
op voor beide gevallen. Voor het boomerang-effect is deze verklaring wel gel-
dig in termen van het model, maar niet plausibel voor de werkelijkheid. Voor
de Gini-bubbel is de verklaring zowel geldig in termen van het model als ook
plausibel in werkelijkheid.
Deelvraag 2a. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden moeten we eerst nagaan
hoe kennismanagement en de beide niveaus gerepresenteerd worden in onze
modellen van de opeenvolgende gevalsstudies. Kennismanagement omvat veel
zaken die permodel op een verschillendemanier gerepresenteerd worden. Alle
modellen slagen er in zekere mate in om het kennismanagement en de beide
niveaus van de gevalsstudie uit de werkelijkheid te representeren. De focus
van het pilot study model (Hoofdstuk 3) ligt op de representatie van heteroge-
niteit in individueel gedrag, maar multi-level inspectie is hier niet eenvoudig.
Het varkenscyclusmodel (Hoofdstuk 4) is vrij impliciet wat representatiekracht
betreft, maar het kan wel een patroon op sectorniveau laten ontstaan dat geba-
seerd is op gedrag op agentniveau. Het laatste model (dat van Hoofdstukken
5, 6, 7 en 8) is het rijkst qua kennisrepresentatie en is ook het krachtigst als het
erom gaat de relatie tussen sector- en agentniveau te kunnen inspecteren.
Deelvraag 2b. Validiteit en plausibiliteit zijn nadrukkelijk onderwerp van
onderzoek geweest in ons synthese-hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 8), waarbij we ex-
pertvalidatie gebruikten om te bepalen wat onze onderzoeksuitkomsten bete-
kenen voor de werkelijkheid. Deze vraag draait om het volgende. We obser-
veren patronen in de werkelijkheid en we nemen aan dat er een relatie bestaat
tussen een bepaald patroon en bepaald actorgedrag (de relatie in werkelijk-
heid). We kunnen ook in onze modellen patronen observeren, en de relatie
tussen het patroon en bijbehorend actorgedrag inspecteren (de modelrelatie).
Hoe plausibel is de modelrelatie, en de verklaring die we daarvoor geven, voor
de relatie in werkelijkheid, naar het oordeel van experts? En als deze plausibel
is, hoe valide kunnen we onze modelresultaten dan noemen? Wij trekken de
lijn bij plausibiliteit, en we concluderen niet dat onze modellen daarom ook
gevalideerd zijn.
Antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 2. Representatiekracht blijkt te verschil-
len per model. Afhankelijk van het doel van het model kan deze representa-
tiekracht bewust beperkt gehouden worden (zoals in het varkenscyclusmodel),
of rijk (zoals in het laatste model waarin verschillende typen kennis gerepre-
senteerd kunnen worden). Wij geloven dat de representatiekracht van agent-
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gebaseerde modellen voldoende toereikend is om een gevalsstudie uit de wer-
kelijkheid te kunnen representeren, zolang het model een welomschreven doel
heeft. Wat validiteit betreft, we hebben geen garantie dat een plausibele ver-
klaring voor een patroon ook inderdaad de verklaring is die ons model va-
lide maakt, waardoor ons model representatief wordt voor de werkelijkheid. Is
validiteit misschien een te sterke claim voor middle-range (‘middengebied-’)
modellen zoals de onze, en is plausibiliteit niet voldoende? Agent-gebaseerde
modellen staan erom bekend dat ze niet geschikt zijn om er voorspellingen
mee te doen, maar wel geschikt om verschillende mogelijkheden te verkennen.
Onze referentie-discipline is informatiemanagement: in dit vakgebied is vali-
diteit überhaupt geen onderdeel van het onderzoeksproces. Het is gebruikelijk
een nieuwemethode te verkennen, en aannemelijk te maken dat deze methode
bruikbaar kan zijn. In dit licht bezien geloven wij dat ons onderzoek heel toe-
passelijk is: door het object van informatiemanagement te modelleren, name-
lijk de sector, voegen we al waarde toe aan wat gebruikelijk is in ons vakgebied.
Conclusie. We concluderen dat het bestuderen van meerdere niveaus van
kennismanagement een ambitieus doel is. Onze gevalsstudies dragen bij aan
dit doel zoals individuele lapjes bijdragen aan een quilt-deken. We hebben een
verzameling patronen, agenten enmechanismen bestudeerd. Daarmee hebben
we sommige vakjes van de quilt kleur gegeven, maar er zijn nog veel open vak-
jes over. Niettemin zijn we positief over wat we hebben kunnen bijdragen. We
raden agent-gebaseerd modelleren als methode aan. We geloven in het voort-
zetten van deze onderzoekslijn, die wat ons betreft veelbelovend is voor iedere
discipline waarin complex adaptive systems object van studie zijn, zoals ken-
nismanagement en informatiemanagement. Voor de toekomst zijn we van plan
onze kennis en vaardigheden verder te verfijnen, en gaan we door met ons te
ontplooien. Voormogelijk verder onderzoek denken we aan het uitbreiden van
ons model in de richting van sociaal gedrag: laat het gedrag van agenten meer
afhangen van het gedrag van de leden van de groep waartoe ze behoren (nor-
men zouden bijvoorbeeld onderdeel kunnen zijn van dit groepsgedrag). Ook
cultuurgebonden aspecten zouden vertaald kunnen worden in modelparame-
ters die hetmogelijkmaken het gedrag van varkensboeren in verschillende cul-
turele contexten met elkaar te vergelijken.
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Fryske gearfetting
Yn dit proefskrift giet it oer kompleks-adaptive systemen. In systeem(gehiel fan komponinten, gearstald en oardere neffens in beskaat begjin-sel) is adaptyf as de komponinten harren gedrach oanpasse kinne oan
feroarjende omstannichheden. We neamme it kompleks as it gedrach fan it ge-
hiel net itselde is as dat fan de som fan de dielen. Skaaimerkjend foar kompleks-
adaptive systemen is dit gedrach op ferskate nivo’s (multiple levels, dat fan de
yndividuele komponinten en dat fan it gehiel). Yn dit proefskrift bestudearje
wy de gedrachsrelaasje tusken dizze nivo’s mei help fan agint-basearre model-
learjen. Troch allinnich yndividuen (aginten) en harren gedrach te modellear-
jen, en dit gedrach te simulearjen as funksje fan’e tiid, generearje wy patroanen
dy’t ermergere, dat wol sizze: út harren sels ûntstean (wy hawwe se der net
eksplisyt yn treaun). Wy jouwe ús yndividuele aginten harren gedrachsrigels
en litte it systeem beskate omstannichheden kreëarje. Sa ûntstiet der in be-
heinde romte, dêr’t de aginten harren yn gedrage neffens de foarskreaune rigels
en omstannichheden, en mei-inoar soargje hja foar patroanen op systeemnivo
dy’t wy bestudearje kinne. Wy besykjen dy patroanen te begripen troch werom
te redenearjen nei it nivo fan it yndividu.
It doel fan dit proefskrift is by it kompleks-adaptive systeem ’kennisma-
nagement’ te ûndersykjen wat it yndividuele nivo dêrfan betsjut foar dat op
sektornivo, en oarsom. Wywurkje dizze relaasje út mei help fan in searje agint-
basearre modellen fan gefalsstúdzjes dy’t situaasjes oanbelangje wêryn taleve-
ransiers keppele wurde oan beskikbere merken. It doel is relevant yn de sin dat
wy troch it oannimmen fan in multi-level perspektyf yn kennismanagement
(1) ynsjoch tafoegje kinne oan it fakgebiet fan kennismanagement, en (2) eva-
luearje kinne oft agint-basearre modellearjen in gaadlike metoade is om ta te
foegjen oan de arkkiste fan kennismanagement-ûndersykers. Fanwege dat lê-
ste lizze wy troch it hiele proefskrift hinne de klam opmetodologyske aspekten
fan ús ûndersyk, sadat wy better beoardielje kinne hoe brûksum agint-basearre
modellearjen as metoade is foar it represintearjen fan multi-level kennismana-
gement.
Ús betsjutting fan it begryp kennismanagement kombinearet eleminten
fan de akademyske dissiplines ynformaasjemanagement en kennismanage-
ment. Wy kombinearje de technologyske, ‘data’-oriïntearre betsjutting fan yn-
formaasjemanagement mei it gedragsaspekt fan kennismanagement, lykas by
leare en it dielen fan kennis. Yn dit proefskrift ferwize de termen ‘ynformaas-
jemanagement’ en ‘kennismanagement’ nei itselde. Kennismanagement hat net
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earder bestudearre west mei help fan agint-basearre modellen, foar safier’t wy
witte.
Kennis wurdt definiearre as alles dat in taleveransier witte moat om oan de
yntree-easken te foldwaan dy’t in merksegmint stelt, yn syn eigen persepsje, en
foar safier ynstrumentiel foar syn beslútproses. Wy litte fierder ymplisyt dat
dizze fereaske kennis heterogeen fan aard is. De kennis omfettet feitekennis,
lykas bygelyks kritearia dy’t it produkt sels of it produksjeproses oanbelangje.
De kennis omfettet dêrnjonken feardichheden en knowhow dy’t groeie troch
ûnderfining. De kennis omfettet ek kapasiteiten dy’t fan persoan ta persoan
ferskille. De kennis omfettet boppedat de beheiningen dy’t in taleveransier ûn-
derfynt, bygelyks om’t hy beheinde tagong hat ta finansjele middels dy’t nedich
binne om te ynvestearjen. De kennis omfettet it ‘aksjerepertoire’ dat in taleve-
ransier ta syn foldwaan hat, mooglikmakke of beheind troch faktoaren dy’t foar
ús ûndersyk fierder net fan belang binne. De kennis omfettet ek de ferûnder-
stelling dat de taleveransier wit hoe’t hy dizze kennis ta gedrach operasjonali-
searje moat. Ús definysje fan kennis, opsteld fanút in modelleardersperspektyf,
ferûnderstelt dat al dizze saken hjiryn meinommen binne. Yn dit proefskrift
wurde de termen ‘ynformaasje’ en ‘kennis’ troch inoar brûkt, mar hja ferwize
allebeide nei ditselde begryp.
Alle gefalsstúdzjes foar ús searje simulaasjes komme út de bargesektor: wy
modellearje bargeboeren dy’t it beslút nimme moatte oan hokker kwaliteits-
merk sy har bargen leverje wolle. Om beslúte te kinnen hokker merk hy kieze
sil moat de boer oer alle relevante kennis beskikke, en de fleksibiliteit en de
middels hawwe om it beslút ek feitlik te nimmen. Ûnder de simulaasje sam-
melt er dizze kennis, kriget er soms wat, wikselt er wat mei oare aginten út,
wêrtroch ’t er hieltyd oare mooglikheden kriget. De boeren passe begrinzge
rationalisaasje ta yn harren beslisproses: yn plak fan te optimalisearjen en fan
alle alternativen it bêste út te finen, stopje hja mei sykjen sagau’t hja in merk
fûn hawwe dy’t foldocht en dêr’t hja foar yn oanmerking komme (satisficing).
In oanfoljend doel fan dit proefskrift is oandacht te besteegjen oan meto-
dologyske aspekten. Hjirta heart bygelyks it sykjen nei de balâns tusken wat
men al en wat net meinimt yn it model. En hoe represintearet men saken op
sa’nmanier dat noch dúdlik is hokker resultaten feroarsake wurde troch hokker
gedrach? Hoe kin inmodel ûntwikkele en útwreide wurde en hoe jout men dêr
tagelyk de garânsje by dat eardere modelresultaten noch te fergelykjen binne
mei nije? Hoe giet men om mei resultaten fan ferskate runs en de gefoeligens
fan modelparameters foar dizze resultaten? Hoe behannelt men de fraach hok-
ker relevânsje modelresultaten hawwe foar de wurklikheid (falidens)?
Dit proefskrift is opset yn trije parten. Part I begjint mei in algemiene yn-
troduksje, dêr’t modelkonsepten yn definiearre wurde en de ûndersyksfragen
yn steld wurde (Haadstik 1), en in yntroduksje fan de metodology (Haadstik
2). De proefstúdzje heart hjir ek thús (Haadstik 3). Part II beskriuwt efterinoar
fjouwer gefalsstúdzjes (Haadstikken 4-7), dy’t elk yngean op in spesifyk aspekt
fan ús probleemgebiet. Part III is de synteze. It begjint mei in synteze-haadstik
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(Haadstik 8) dat de lêste trije gefalsstúdzjesmei-inoar ferbynt, se better grûnde-
aret yn ‘e literatuer, de eksperiminten op in deugdlike manier werhellet, multi-
level analyse tafoeget en in ekspertfalidaasje útfiert. It lêste haadstik, de alge-
miene diskusje (Haadstik 9), jout antwurden op de ûndersyksfragen, refleksjes
op it ûndersyk yn it diskusje-part en einiget mei in konklúzje.
De ûndersyksfragen, elk mei twa dielfragen, binne:
1. Wat is de relaasje tusken kennismanagement-maatregels op sektornivo (top-
down), hannelingen fan yndividuen en it systeemgedrach dat hjirfan it re-
sultaat is (bottom-up) yn de kontekst fan in sektor besteande út autonome
taleveransiers, spesifyk tapast op bargeboeren?
a) Wat is it effekt op it systeemgedrach (as gehiel), wat kennismanage-
ment oanbelanget, as der fariearre wurdt op agintnivo?
b) Wat is it effekt fan yntervinsjes op systeemnivo op agintgedrach en sys-
teemgedrach as gehiel?
2. Hoe gaadlik is agint-basearre modellearjen as metoade om in situaasje út de
wurklikheid te represintearjen, wat kennismanagement yn in sektor oanbe-
langet?
a) Represintaasje: Hoe linich giet it ûntwerp fan in agint-basearre model
om mei it represintearjen fan kennismanagement en de ferskate nivo’s
fan de situaasje út de wurklikheid?
b) Falidens: Leverje de evaluearre simulaasjeresultaten in better begryp
op fan ‘e ûnderlinge ôfhinklikens tusken systeemgedrach dat ûntstiet
en yndividueel agintgedrach, yn de kontekst fan ‘e situaasje út de wur-
klikheid?
Wy ljochtsje no elke ûndersyksfraach ta en presintearje ús resultaten, te
begjinnen mei de dielfragen.
Dielfraach 1a. Mei fariaasjes op agintnivo eksperimintearje wy mei eigens-
kippen fan aginten dy’t de populaaasje heterogeenmeitsje, en sjogge wy wat de
effekten dêrfan binne op systeemnivo (bottom-up). Wy hawwe dit dien yn de
proefstúdzje (Haadstik 3) en trije gefalsstúdzjes (Haadstikken 4, 5 en 6). Wy fa-
riearren de mannichte en de kwaliteit fan ynformaasje yn it systeem, wat direkt
ynfloed hat op kennismanagement. Wy fariearren ek de netwurkstruktueren
tusken aginten, in betingst foar kennisútwikseling (yn dy situaasjes dêr’t dat
bart). Oer it algemien kinne wy sizze dat it systeemgedrach yn al ús modellen
neffens ferwachting reagearre op de fariaasjes op agintnivo. Wy kinne patro-
anen ûntstean litte troch allinnich it yndividuele gedrach te modellearjen (it
bargesyklus-patroan, Haadstik 4). Mear ynformaasje liedt ta in grutter merk-
oandiel fan de hegere kwaliteitsmerken, as der teminsten in minimum oantal
netwurkferbiningen is (Haadstikken 3, 5). Netwurktopology liket fan minder
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wichtich belang te wêzen (Haadstik 5). Fariearje mei de kwaliteit fan ynfor-
maasje liedt ta in omslachpunt (tipping point) yn ús modelgedrach dat wy it
boomerang-effekt neame (nei de foarm fan de grafyk): in kwaliteitstanimming
is yn it begjin effektyf, mar as de kwaliteit te heech wurdt, wurdt de situaasje
wer minder (Haadstik 6). Wat de oannimlikens (plausibiliteit) hjirfan oanbe-
langet, eksperts befêstigje dat mear ynformaasje en mear netwurkferbiningen
liede ta bettere prestaasjes, en dat dit benammen wichtich is foar de hegere
merksegminten. Eksperts kinne it boomerang effekt net teplak bringe: dit is in
modelútkomst dy’t net oannimlik liket te wêzen yn de wurklikheid. Hja wolle
der wol oan dat it effisjint wêze kin de kwaliteit fan ynformaasje te ferheegjen:
dit jout bettere prestaasjes en dêrmei in gruttermerkoandiel fan de hegere kwa-
liteitsmerken. It giet lykwols mar yn beskate mjitte op, en inkeld foar in beskaat
type kennis: technyske kennis, gjin managementkennis. De needsaak foar wat
sinterske kennis (slack), oftewol kennis dy’t sa op it earste each neat wurdich
is, wurdt algemien erkend.
Dielfraach 1b. Yntervinsjes op sektornivo binne feroaringen dy’t de hiele
sektor oanbelangje, stjoerd fanút in top-down perspektyf. Wy diene dit op trije
manieren: troch it folume fan de fraach te feroarjen (proefstúdzje Haadstik 3);
troch de easken dy’t merken stelle te feroarjen, wat feitlik ek in feroaring yn’e
fraach is (gefalsstúdzjes Haadstik 5); en troch de leechste merk te sluten nef-
fens twa ferskillende beliedsalternativen - ien mei en ien sûnder oergongspe-
rioade (gefalsstúdzje Haadstik 7). Wy bestudearren hoe’t ús aginten reagearren
op dizze yntervinsjes. De resultaten litte sjen dat boeren har oanpasse, oare
merken kieze, en dat der in nije balâns yn merkoandielen ûntstiet. Dizze nije
balâns hinget ôf fan de oare parameterwearden. Yn in ynformaasje-earme situ-
aasje hawwe boeren mar beheinde mooglikheden om de oergong nei in hegere
kwaliteitsmerk te meitsjen. Yn ynformaasje-rike situaasjes binne mear boeren
dêrta by machte. It beliedseksperimint lit sjen dat de aard fan de transysje gjin
bliuwend effekt hat op de útkomst, sadat it boerfreonlike beliedsalternatief (mei
oergongsperioade) de foarkar fertsjinnet. As der in belied mei oergongsperio-
ade brûkt wurdt sjogge wy dat’er in ûnferwachte patroan ferskynt: in tydlike
ôfwiking yn ynkommensferdieling (wy neame dit patroan de Gini-bubbel). Ús
eksperts wolle der wol oan dat der him in ferskowing yn merken foardocht
nei in yntervinsje, want dit bart yn wurklikheid ek. De measte eksperts kinne
wol in ferklearring jaan foar de Gini-bubbel yn de sin dat hja wol sjoen ha-
wwe dat guon boeren profitearje tidens in oergongsperioade. Lykwols binne
net alle ferklearringen dy’t hja joue binne yn oerienstimming mei ús model.
In oannimlike ferklearring dy’t ek strykt mei it model is dat boeren minder
konkurrinsje hawwe op in merk wêr’t noch hieltyd fraach nei is, wat harren in
tydlik priisfoardiel opleveret.
Antwurd op ûndersyksfraach 1. Konkludearjend kinne wy sizze dat der
yndie in relaasje is tusken kennismanagement-maatregels op sektornivo (top-
down) en hannelingen fan yndividuen (bottom-up). Sawol it fariearjen mei
eigenskippen op yndividueel nivo as it fariearjenmei eigenskippen op systeem-
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nivo leveret reaktyf gedrach op dat wy ferklearje kinne yn termen fan ús mo-
del, en dat ek yn beskate mjitte oannimlik is foar de wurklikheid. It nijsgjir-
richst binne de twa gefalsstúdzjes wêr’t in ûnferwachte patroan efter wei komt:
it boomerang-effekt en de Gini-bubbel. Multi-level analyse (ynspeksje fan dit
patroan op yndividueel agintnivo) levere in ferklearring op foar beide gefal-
len. Foar it boomerang-effekt is dizze ferklearring wol jildich yn termen fan
it model, mar net oannimlik foar de wurklikheid. Foar de Gini-bubbel is de
ferklearring likegoed jildich yn termen fan it model as oannimlik yn’e wurklik-
heid.
Dielfraach 2a. Om dizze fraach te beantwurdzjen moatte wy earst nei-
gean hoe’t kennismanagement en de beide nivo’s represintearre wurde yn ús
modellen fan de opinoar folgjende gefalsstúdzjes. Kennismanagement omfet-
tet in protte saken dy’t yn ús modellen op ferskate wize werjûn wurde. Alle
modellen slagje der yn beskate mjitte yn om it kennismanagement en de beide
nivo’s fan de gefalsstúdzje út de wurklikheid te represintearjen. De fokus fan
it proefstúdzje-model (Haadstik 3) leit op de werjefte fan heterogeniteit yn yn-
dividueel gedrach, mar multi-level ynspeksje is hjir net ienfâldich. It bargesy-
klusmodel (Haadstik 4) is frijwat ymplisyt wat represintaasjekrêft oanbelanget,
mar it kin wol in patroan op sektornivo ûntstean litte dat basearre is op ge-
drach op agintnivo. It lêste model (dat fan’e Haadstikken 5, 6, 7 en 8) is it rykst
kwa kennisrepresintaasje en is ek it krêftichst as it derom giet de relaasje tusken
sektor- en agintnivo ynspektearje te kinnen.
Dielfraach 2b. Falidens en oannimlikens ha mei klam ûnderwerp fan ûn-
dersyk west yn ús synteze-haadstik (Haadstik 8), dêr’t wy ekspertfalidaasje by
brûkten om út te finen wat ús ûndersyksútkomsten betsjutte foar de wurklik-
heid. Dizze fraach komt del op it folgjende. Wy beskôgje patroanen yn de
wurklikheid en wy nimme oan dat der in relaasje bestiet tusken in beskaat pa-
troan en beskaat aktorgedrach (de relaasje yn wurklikheid). Wy kinne ek yn ús
modellen patroanen beskôgje, en de relaasje tusken it patroan en it bijhearrend
aktorgedrach ynspektearje (de modelrelaasje). Hoe oannimlik is de modelre-
laasje, en de ferklearring dy’t wy dêrfoar jouwe, foar de relaasje ynwurklikheid,
neffens eksperts? En as dizze relaasje oannimlik is, hoe falide kinne wy ús mo-
delresultaten dan achtsje? Wy lûke de line by oannimlikens en konkludearje
net dat ús modellen dêrom ek falide binne.
Antwurd op ûndersyksfraach 2. Represintaasjekrêft blykt yn de model-
len te ferskillen. Ôfhinklik fan it doel fan it model kin dizze represintaasjekrêft
bewust lyts hâlden wurde (lykas yn it bargesyklusmodel), of ryk wêze (lykas
yn it lêste model wêr’t ferskate typen kennis representearre wurde kinne). Wy
leauwe dat de represintaasjekrêft fan agint-basearre modellen foldwaande ta-
rikkend is om in gefalsstúdzje út de wurklikheid represintearje te kinnen, sa-
lang’t it model in krekt omskreaun doel hat. Wat falidens oanbelanget hawwe
wy gjin garânsje dat in oannimlike ferklearring foar in patroan ek yndie de
ferklearring is dy’t ús model falide makket, wêrtroch ús model represintatief
wurdt foar de wurklikheid. Is falidens faaks in te mânske claim foar middle-
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range (‘middengebiet’) modellen lykas uzes, en is oannimlikens net genôch?
Agint-basearre modellen steane derom bekend dat se net gaadlik binne om der
foarsizzingen mei te dwaan, mar wol gaadlik om ferskate mooglikheden te fer-
kennen. Ús referinsje-dissipline is ynformaasjemanagement: yn dit fakgebiet
is falidens alhiel gjin ûnderdiel fan it ûndersyksproses. Dêrfoaroer is it wens-
tich in nije metoade te ferkennen, en oannimlik te meitsjen dat dizze metoade
gaadlik wêze kin. Yn dit ljocht besjoen leauwe wy dat ús ûndersyk tige tapaslik
is: troch it objekt fan ynformaasjemanagement te modellearjen, nammentlik
de sektor, foegje wy al wearde ta oan wat wenstich is yn ús fakgebiet.
Konklúzje. Wy koncludearje dat it bestudearjen fan ferskate nivo’s fan ken-
nismanagement in ambisjeus doel is. Ús gefalsstúdzjes drage by oan dit doel
lykas yndividuele lapkes bydrage oan in quilt-tekken. Wy hawwe in samling
patroanen, aginten en meganismen bestudearre, dêr’t wy in stikmannich fak-
jes fan de quilt kleur mei jûn hawwe, mar der binne noch withoefolle iepen
fakjes oer. Lykwols binne wy posityf oer wat wy bydrage kinnen hawwe. Wy
riede agint-basearre modellearjen as metoade oan. Wy leauwe yn it fuortsetten
fan dizze ûndersyksline, dy’t neffens ús gâns ûnthjittend is foar elke dissipline
dêr’t kompleks-adaptive systemen objekt fan stúdzje binne, lykas kennismana-
gement en ynformaasjemanagement. Foar de takomst binne wy fan doel ús
kennis en feardigens fierder oan te skerpjen, en sille wy trochgean ús te ûnt-
wikkeljen. Foar mooglik fierder ûndersyk tinke wy oan it útwreidzjen fan ús
model de kant op fan sosjaal gedrach: lit it gedrach fan aginten mear ôfhingje
fan it gedrach fan’e leden fan’e groepwêrta’t hja hearre (noarmen soene bygelyks
ûnderdiel wêze kinne fan dit groepsgedrach). Ek kultuerbûne aspekten soene
oerset wurde kinne yn modelparameters dy’t it mooglik meitsje it gedrach fan
bargeboeren yn ferskate kulturele konteksten mei elkoar te fergelykjen.
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Preface to
Acknowledgements
Op een ochtend schreef de eekhoorn een brief aan demier.
Beste mier,
Ik wil je iets zeggen, maar ik denk dat ik
het beter kan schrijven. Daarom schrijf ik je.
Maar misschien kan ik het je toch beter
zeggen.
Eekhoorn.
De wind blies de brief naar de mier. Het was een mooie dag
en niet lang daarna stapte de mier de kamer van de
eekhoorn in.
‘Hallo eekhoorn,’ zei hij.
‘Hallo mier,’ zei de eekhoorn en wreef zich in zijn handen.
[...]
In de verte zong een lijster. De zon scheen door het open
raam.
Ten slotte schraapte de mier zijn keel en vroeg: ‘Wat wil je
mij eigenlijk zeggen?’
De eekhoorn dacht diep na, keek naar de vloer en naar het
plafond, zuchtte diep en zei: ‘Ik denk dat ik je dat beter kan
schrijven.’
‘Dat is goed,’ zei de mier.
One morning the squirrel wrote the ant a letter.
Dear ant,
I have something to say to you, but I think it’s
probably better if I write it down. So that’s why I
am writing this letter.
Then again, maybe it would be better to tell
you in person after all.
Squirrel.
The wind blew the letter to the ant. It was a beautiful day and
before long the ant was at the squirrel’s door.
‘Hello squirrel,’ he said.
‘Hello ant,’ said the squirrel, rubbing his hands.
[...]
Far away a thrush was singing. Sunlight streamed in through
the open window.
Finally, the ant cleared his throat and asked: ‘What was it you
wanted to say to me?’
The squirrel pondered for a while, studied the floor and the
ceiling, heaved a sigh and said: ‘I think it would be better to put it
in a letter.’
‘That’s alright,’ said the ant.
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Epilogue
De mier en de eekhoorn kregen les van de zwaan. Het wasaan de oever van de rivier, de zon scheen en zij zaten onder
de wilg, in de schaduw van een laaghangende tak.
Het was de tweede les, maar van de eerste les hadden zij niets
onthouden.
‘Vandaag,’ zei de zwaan, ‘zal ik het hebben over voorbij.’
Dat vonden de mier en de eekhoorn een goed idee, want daar
wisten zij weinig van.
De zwaan trok een ernstig gezicht en zei: ‘Alles gaat voorbij.’
Het was heel even stil onder de wilg. Het water in de rivier
glinsterde en er was nauwelijks wind.
‘Wisten jullie dat?’ vroeg de zwaan.
‘Nee,’ zeiden de mier en de eeekhoorn. ‘Dat wisten wij niet.’
T he ant and the squirrel took classes with the swan.It was down by the river, the sun was shining and they were
sitting under a willow, shaded by a low branch.
This was their second lesson, but they’d already forgotten
everything from the first.
‘Today,’ said the swan, ‘I will talk about passing.’
The ant and the squirrel liked that idea, since they didn’t know
much about it.
The swan put on a serious face and said: ‘Everything passes.’
There was a short silence under the willow. The water in the
river glimmered and there was hardly any wind.
‘Did you know that?’ the swan asked.
‘No,’ the ant and the squirrel said. ‘We didn’t know.’
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